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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on selected aspects of network congestion arising in
liberalized electricity markets and their management methods with a special
weight placed on the integration of increased renewable generation in Europe
and Germany. In a ﬁrst step, the theoretical concepts of congestion manage-
ment are introduced complemented by a review of current management regimes
in selected countries. In the second step, the European approach of managing
congestion on international as well as national transmission links is analyzed
and the beneﬁts of an integrated congestion management regime are quantiﬁed.
It is concluded that beneﬁts can be achieved by a closer cooperation of national
transmission system operators (TSOs). Thirdly, the German congestion man-
agement regime is investigated and the impact of higher renewable generation up
to 2020 on congestion management cost is determined. It is shown that a homo-
geneous and jointly development of generation and transmission infrastructure
is a prerequisite for the application of congestion alleviation methods and once
they diverge congestion management cost tend to increase substantially. Lastly,
the impact of intermittent and uncertain wind generation on electricity markets
is analyzed. A stochastic electricity market model is described, which replicates
the daily subsequent clearing of reserve, dayahead, and intraday market typical
for European countries, and numerical results are presented.
Das Leben ist wert, gelebt zu werden,
sagt die Kunst, die schönste Verführerin;
das Leben ist wert, erkannt zu werden,
sagt die Wissenschaft.
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)
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1. Introduction
Fooling around with alternating current is just a waste of time.
Nobody will use it, ever.
Thomas A. Edison
In the late 19th century researchers like Nikola Tesla, George Westinghouse,
and Thomas A. Edison contributed to the understanding of the principles of
generating, transmitting, and transforming electrical power. So far the phe-
nomena of electricity was rather a curiosity, but turned to be an essential ele-
ment of modern life through the pioneering work on electrical power. In 1882
Thomas A. Edison built up the ﬁrst electrical distribution system in order to
light his Pearl Street laboratory in Manhattan. The distribution system was
based on direct current (DC). At the same time Nikola Tesla started to work
on alternating current (AC) distribution network which allows the transmission
of electrical power over long distances without serious power losses through a
transformation of voltages. In 1886 George Westinghouse and William Stanley
applied the AC transmission concept and installed the ﬁrst AC power system in
Great Barrington (Massachusetts) using multiple voltages to transmit electrical
power. In the following years the AC concept became the preferred transmis-
sion technology due to higher transmission eﬃciency. The progress in generation
technologies towards larger power generators additionally fostered the develop-
ment of AC distribution networks transmitting electrical power to consumers.
In the following decades, power networks evolved into a widespread and meshed
infrastructure to link large centralized generation units with load centers and
to ensure a reliable power supply. Integrated utilities dealt with all parts of the
value chain namely generation, transmission, and distribution and enabled an
integrated optimization of operation, maintenance, and expansion of the entire
power system.
In the 1990s, the unbundling of vertically integrated utilities came up in var-
ious countries all over the world and the power supply industry moved from
monopolistic towards liberalized market structures. Vertically integrated util-
ities were unbundled into distinct generation, transmission, and distribution
services. In the following, liberalized electricity markets evolved which enabled
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the market entrance of new players beside the formerly integrated utilities. How-
ever, the transmission and distribution networks remained a natural monopoly.
An industry is a national monopoly when the total industry output is produced
by a single ﬁrm at lower total production costs than by two or more ﬁrms
(Bobzin, 2006, p. 254). Therefore, the regulation of the transmission and dis-
tribution networks by public authorities and a guaranteed non-discriminatory
access to network capacities has become a crucial element in liberalized electric-
ity markets. In general, the unbundling of integrated utilities has broken up the
formerly integrated optimization of the power system into distinct optimization
problems for generation and transmission operation.
In the last years, the discussions on climate change and the associated promo-
tion of renewable energy sources have added further challenges to current power
systems. The integration of decentralized and ﬂuctuating renewable generation
has required structural changes of parts of the value chain and the liberalized
market design of power systems. Due to decentralization of renewable genera-
tion, distribution and transmission networks1 are of special importance to allow
an eﬃcient integration of newly built generation capacities.2
However, technical and economic characteristics of electricity transmission
limit the access to network capacities. Firstly, power ﬂows in transmission net-
works follow Kirchhoﬀ's laws3. Kirchhoﬀ's laws cause power ﬂows mainly on
the direct link but also on parallel links, so called loop ﬂows. In general, the
distribution of power ﬂows within the transmission network depends on the net-
work topology and the electro-technical characteristics of transmission lines.4
1 In the following, the focus is laid on analyzing the aspects arising in transmission networks
thus abstracting from distribution networks.
2 At the time of writing this thesis, especially physical congestion problems in the existing
network became increasingly important in Germany due to the transformation of the
energy system and the associated increase in renewable generation capacities (e.g. Flauger
and Stratmann, 2012). In 2011, the nuclear disaster in Fukushima (Japan) initiated the
transformation for the German energy system especially the successive shut-down of
nuclear power plants. In combination with ambitious targets for renewable generation,
this presented a structural change of the existing energy system. In particular wind
generation impacts the transmission network and causes network congestion (e.g. Uken,
2011b).
3 Kirchhoﬀ's laws are two rules that describe the conservation of charges (Kirchhoﬀ current
or point law) and energy (Kirchhoﬀ voltage or mesh law) in electrical networks. Further
information can be found in standard electrotechnical textbooks e.g. (Claussnitzer, 1965,
p. 40ﬀ).
4 For instance, the German wind generation and the impact on the transmission network
is not restricted solely to Germany due to physical loop ﬂows. In particular, the Pol-
ish and Czech network operators claimed that renewable wind generation in Germany
overloads their transmission networks more frequently. Due to physical characteristics
of power ﬂows in transmission networks, the security of the network is jeopardized due
to overloading of transmission lines through unscheduled loop ﬂows especially on windy
days (Uken, 2011a; Ponikelska, 2012).
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Secondly, transmission capacity is scarce. Transmission lines are limited by
thermal or stability limits and if these limits are binding a transmission line
becomes congested. Furthermore, building up a congestion-free network is not
economical and thus ineﬃcient due to the economic characteristics of transmis-
sion investments (Stoft, 2006). The economic characteristics of transmission
networks and their investments are long lifetimes of transmission assets and
capital-intensive, lumpy, and irreversible investments in transmission capacities
(e.g. Brunekreeft, 2004; Kirschen and Strbac, 2004; Lévêque, 2006). The phys-
ical and economic characteristics of transmission networks in combination with
the liberalized market structure require an eﬃcient operation of the network in
the short-run and adequate expansion in the long-run perspective. Eﬃcient op-
eration includes a market-based allocation of scarce transmission capacity taking
physical characteristics of power ﬂows into account in order to avoid network
congestion. To allocate transmission capacity, congestion management methods
have been developed and are diversely applied in liberalized electricity markets.
It is the objective of this thesis to analyze selected aspects of network con-
gestion arising in liberalized electricity markets and their management methods
with respect to the identiﬁed existing and future challenges, especially the in-
tegration of increased renewable generation. The provided economic analyses
focus on transmission networks due to their relevance in providing inter-regional
trade and transmission opportunities. The main contribution of this thesis is
that theoretical concepts of managing congestion problems in transmission net-
works are applied to realistic representations of existing electricity markets.
Furthermore, model approaches are developed to reﬂect the mentioned tech-
nical and economic characteristics of electricity markets and thus to provide
quantitative insights.
The remainder of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2 the principles of
congestion management and available methods to manage arising congestion in
transmission networks are introduced. The theoretical introduction to conges-
tion management methods is complemented by a review of selected countries
and their congestion management strategies. The chapter provides the theoret-
ical background for the analysis performed in the subsequent chapters of the
thesis.
Chapter 3 deals with the European congestion management regime and asks
whether a change in the current European congestion management and thus
pricing regime towards a more integrated transmission and energy market achieves
beneﬁts with respect to costs and surpluses of market participants. An Euro-
pean electricity market model is applied to determine the optimal operation of
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generation and transmission infrastructure under diﬀerent congestion manage-
ment regimes. It is concluded that the integration of transmission and energy
markets achieves lower generation costs which accrue from a closer cooperation
among European countries in the congestion management.
Chapter 4 seizes the research question of the previous chapter for the Ger-
man electricity system. As the signiﬁcant share of renewable generation and
the phase-out of nuclear power plants after the disaster of Fukushima poses
a challenge for the existing transmission infrastructure, the amount of future
congestion management costs are quantiﬁed which would occur under the cur-
rent congestion management regime based on congestion alleviation methods.
Within the developed model economic as well as technical methods to manage
network congestion are explicitly taken into account. It is shown that the appli-
cation of technical methods can reduce the need for redispatching power plants
but are limited by the requirements on security and stability of the transmission
network. It is concluded that a homogeneous and jointly development of gen-
eration and transmission infrastructure is a prerequisite for the application of
congestion alleviation methods and once they diverge congestion management
cost tend to increase. Through the application of an integrated congestion man-
agement regime, market participants are informed about the network situation
and thus receive economic signals which may support a homogeneous develop-
ment.
Given the challenge of renewable integration in current power systems, a
unique electricity market model is presented in Chapter 5, which explicitly takes
the characteristics of variable and stochastic wind generation into account. The
German electricity market serves as a basis for the mathematical formulation
of the dayahead and intraday market as well as the sequential clearing proce-
dure of both markets. The dayahead market model sets out to minimize total
generation cost and determines the commitment and the generation dispatch of
individual power plants. Given these commitments of generators, the intraday
market provides the opportunity to ﬁrstly reoptimize the dayahead commit-
ments, and secondly to balance uncertainty about wind generation. As the
forecast of wind supply improves over time due to shorter forecast lengths the
adjustments of generation commitments are required in the intraday. It is shown
that the adjustment of generation and thus the development of a ﬂexible gen-
eration portfolio depends on the way uncertainty is introduced in the models.
If uncertain wind generation is explicitly considered during the market proce-
dure, less ﬂexible generation units are used by decreasing their utilization and
increasing the number of operating units to balance resulting forecast errors.
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Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary of the analyses carried out.
Topics for future research are identiﬁed.
2. Review of Congestion
Management Methods in
Liberalized Electricity Markets
2.1. Introduction
Congestion has become an issue in the liberalization process of national elec-
tricity markets. In the past, national electricity markets were characterized
by vertically integrated monopolistic companies managing both generation and
transmission systems. Through the liberalization the integrated management of
production and transmission was broken up into two distinct processes. Firstly,
generators optimize and determine their power plant scheduling and dispatch5
with respect to market prices of the diﬀerent sub-markets (future and spot
markets)6 available in a liberalized electricity market. Secondly, transmission
operators have to manage the transmission system with respect to technical
and economic criteria given the previously determined dispatch of power plants.
Thus, the dispatch of power plants is preset to the transmission system operator
and he can make use of congestion management methods to achieve a techni-
cally and economically feasible operating status of the transmission system.
However, as congestion is an immanent part of a liberalized power system due
to the technical and economic nature of transmission networks, the eﬃcient use
of the existing infrastructure and thus management of transmission congestion
has become increasingly important.
Congestion is the restriction of transfers between diﬀerent system nodes or
regions in an electricity system. Congestion (or a bottleneck) arises when sched-
uled or planned transactions exceed available transmission capacity and thus the
5 Power plant scheduling (or unit commitment) and dispatch describes the determination
of the operating status of power plants (oine or online) and their generation quantities
for a given time period.
6 The term spot market describes the dayahead market, which is characterized by a physical
trading of the commodity with a delivery at the next day. Additionally, short-term
physical trading close to delivery is possible within the intraday market. In contrast,
future and forward markets enable a ﬁnancial (future) or physical (forward) trading with
a delivery at a future date (e.g. year-ahead, month-ahead). See e.g. Stoft (2002) or
Kirschen and Strbac (2004) for further information.
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physical transmission grid is not capable of transmitting scheduled power. Con-
gestion occurs as a consequence of too little available generation capacity in
conjunction with limited import capacities, or as a consequence of a generation
surplus in conjunction with limited export capacities.
Congestion can be distinguished by their cause in either physical or economic
congestion (Knops et al., 2001). Physical congestion describes the situation the
electricity system is not able to technically serve electrical load. Thus, available
generation and transmission capacities cannot serve regional loads leading to
black-outs in the short-term. In the long-run, investments in generation and
transmission facilities are required to overcome physical congestion. Economic
congestion arises when market transactions (e.g. dispatch of power plants) lead
to overloadings in the transmission system. Thus, the transmission system is
technically capable7 to meet electricity demand, but available transmission ca-
pacity is insuﬃcient to implement pre-determined market transactions. Thus,
the market solution is infeasible for the transmission network, but a feasible sta-
tus can be achieved through adjustments of the market transactions. Conges-
tion management methods are used to relieve economic congestion. Congestion
management aims to optimally allocate the scarce transmission capacity either
before, during and/or after clearing of the electricity market (Wangensteen,
2007; Kirschen and Strbac, 2004).
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides
an overview on congestion management methods including preventive capac-
ity allocation methods and curative congestion alleviation methods. Capacity
allocation methods comprise the explicit and implicit auction of transmission
capacity in order to price scarce transmission capacity. Congestion alleviation
methods include the description of market-based (e.g. redispatch) and techni-
cal congestion management methods. Congestion management methods have
diﬀerent economic implications with respect to short- and long-run eﬃciency.
Therefore, an economic evaluation of congestion management methods is pre-
sented Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 the electricity markets of Germany, Norway,
Sweden, Great Britain, and Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) are de-
scribed. A particular focus is on national congestion management approaches.
Section 2.5 provides the conclusions.
7 Available transmission capacity is ﬁrstly determined by their technical capacity (e.g.
maximum thermal current). However, security and stability aspects (e.g. N-1 criterion)
further reduce technical capacity of transmission lines (Kawann and Sakulin, 2000; Ilic
et al., 2011).
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2.2. Congestion Management Methods
Congestion management methods aim to "handle network access in the pres-
ence of congestion" (Frontier Economics and Consentec, 2004, p. 4). They can
be generally classiﬁed into preventive or curative methods8 (Table 2.1). Pre-
ventive congestion management methods aim at managing congestion prior or
during the market procedure and can be further classiﬁed into administrative
and capacity allocation methods. Through capacity allocation methods, mar-
ket participants9 are directly informed about the existence of congestion and
thus receive economic signals (e.g. price information) which are considered in
their market decision (e.g. generation dispatch of power plants). On the other
hand, expected congestion in the real-time operation of the power system as
a result of the market procedure are managed by curative congestion manage-
ment methods. Redispatch of power generation as well as technical methods are
used to ease congestion in the transmission network. A bibliographical survey
of congestion management, applied methods, and other related issues is given
in Kumar et al. (2005).
Preventive Methods Curative Methods
Administrative Capacity Allocation Congestion Alleviation
Access Limitation Explicit Auctioning Redispatch
Priority List Implicit Auctioning Counter-trade
Pro rata rationing Technical methods
Table 2.1.: Congestion management methods. Source: Own illustration
Following Frontier Economics and Consentec (2004), the management of con-
gestion in electricity systems can be classiﬁed into four characteristic phases
during the regular market clearing procedure (Figure 2.1). First, available
transmission capacity is determined by the transmission system operator and is
afterwards allocated in the second phase to market participants through capac-
ity allocation methods. After the clearing of the transmission capacity market
and spot market, the transmission system operator is able to perform a conges-
tion forecast in the third phase. Based on market results, physical ﬂows in the
transmission network can be forecasted and, if required, congestion alleviation
is performed to ease remaining congestion. The use of congestion alleviation
8 Other classiﬁcations of congestion management methods exist (see e.g. Androcec and
Wangensteen, 2006; Dieckmann, 2009).
9 Generators, consumers, and network operators are considered as characteristic market
participants in this analysis. The terms demand or load are used for consumers inter-
changeable.
Chapter 2. Review of Congestion Management Methods 9
may not be required and depends on the applied capacity allocation methods
and the transmission constraints considered in this phase.
Capacity Congestion
If required:
of available
transmission
capacity
allocation forecast
congestion
alleviation
Determination
Transmission
capacity requests
Spot market
results
Figure 2.1.: Phases of congestion management. Source: Own illustration based on
Frontier Economics and Consentec (2004)
2.2.1. Administrative Methods
Administrative methods describe preventive congestion management regimes
which are applied prior to regular market clearing procedure. They are char-
acterized by the fact that the transmission system operator decides about the
allocation of scarce transmission capacity administratively without considering
the economic eﬃciency. Thus, the methods are neither market-based nor do
they give economic signals to market participants (ETSO, 2006).
Retention or Access Limitation
Available transmission capacity is not available for market participants and re-
served for speciﬁed participants (Wangensteen, 2007).
Priority List
Transmission capacity is allocated to market participants in a speciﬁed priority
order until available capacity is reached. Priority criteria are e.g. chronological
order (ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served) or past use of capacity (ETSO, 2006).
Pro rata rationing
Transmission capacity is allocated to all market participants without any pri-
ority. If requested capacity exceeds available transmission capacity, available
transmission capacity is allocated relative to capacity requests of market partic-
ipants (ETSO, 2006). As transmission capacity is allocated to all requests, the
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method is non-discriminatory, but is neither market-based nor does it provide
economic signals to market participants.
2.2.2. Capacity Allocation Methods
Another category of congestion management methods is the allocation of trans-
mission capacity prior or within the clearing of the spot market. Market partic-
ipants therefore anticipate the congestion problem in their market transactions
and ﬁnally generation and demand patterns are eﬃciently adjusted. Capacity
allocation methods can be generally distinguished into explicit and implicit auc-
tions. Explicit auctioning requires a separate market for transmission capacity
(beside the spot market) where this capacity is explicitly allocated to market
participants according to certain market rules. In an implicit auction, transmis-
sion capacity is allocated implicitly during the spot market clearing procedure
to market participants and a separate market for transmission capacity is not
required.
2.2.2.1. Explicit Auctioning
In explicit auctions, market participants oﬀer a price along with the requested
capacity for the use of the transmission. Afterwards, the bids are ordered by
price and allocated to market participants until available transmission capacity
is reached. Market participants with the highest willingness to pay are con-
sidered ﬁrst in the allocation procedure. Thus, the auction is economically
eﬃcient as the transmission capacity is allocated to market participants accord-
ing to their willingness to pay (Wawer, 2007). Pricing of transmission capacity
can be done in a uniform or discriminatory way based on the bids of the market
participants. Uniform or marginal bid pricing means that the price of transmis-
sion capacity is determined by the last accepted or marginal bid if requested
capacity exceeds available transmission capacity. Otherwise, the price is zero.
Thus, all accepted bids pay the same price for transmission capacity. On the
other hand, in a discriminatory pricing (pay-as-bid) market participants pay the
price notiﬁed in their bid if accepted. A discussion of diﬀerent pricing methods
is given in de Vries and Hakvoort (2002). They conclude that uniform pricing
provides better bidding incentives and pay-as-bid pricing is rather interesting
from a theoretical point of view as it results in higher auction revenues due to
the individual pricing of market participants' bids.
In explicit auctions the transmission capacity is allocated in a separate market
and thus timely separated from the spot market. In a competitive environment
and under the assumption of complete information the price of transmission ca-
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pacity determined in explicit auctions equals the price diﬀerential of the regional
wholesale markets (Wawer, 2007). However, the separation of the energy and
transmission capacity market increases the complexity of the entire market as
market participants have to value transmission services prior to clearing of the
spot energy market (Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2005). The increased complexity
can lead to a misjudgment of market outcome and thus market ineﬃciency as
available transmission capacity is not optimally used.
The advantage of an explicit auction is its 'simple' implementation as it can
function between quite diﬀerent market regimes (Knops et al., 2001). Therefore
it was a popular and widely used option for international congestion manage-
ment thus the allocation of interconnector capacities between European coun-
tries in the last years (e.g. ETSO, 2006). To overcome the aforementioned
higher complexity of the market, the explicit auctioning is mostly replaced by
an implicit auctioning of international capacity.
In the context of national congestion management and thus the management
of congestion within a market region, the use of explicit auctions as a tool for
managing congestion is possible only for bilateral trades and incompatible with
anonymous trading at power exchanges (Wawer, 2007). The knowledge about
the location of the counterpart is essential to explicitly contract the required
transmission rights for network usage.
2.2.2.2. Implicit Auctioning
The implicit auction describes a congestion management method in which the
network restrictions are reﬂected in the spot market price. Market participants
submit "bids for energy in the geographical zone they wish to generate or con-
sume, and the market clearing procedure [of the spot market] determines the [...]
eﬃcient amount and direction of physical power exchanges between the market
zones" (Frontier Economics et al., 2006, p. 7). Hence, transmission capacity is
implicitly auctioned within the spot energy market procedure and a separate
transmission capacity market is not required as in an explicit auction. The
implicit auctioning procedure can be in the form of market splitting or market
coupling.
The main diﬀerence between market splitting and coupling is the number of
electricity market places considered in the procedure. In case of market splitting,
a single electricity market is divided into market zones or bidding areas according
to the network congestion. A cooperation of multiple independent electricity
markets and the implicit auctioning of transmission capacity between those
markets is known as (decentralised) market coupling. Ehrenmann and Smeers
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(2005) analyze both approaches and resume that market splitting and coupling
are equivalent if the deﬁnition of (possible) market zones and the representation
of network constraints are identical.
The advantage of an implicit auction is the integration of the transmission
market in the energy market. Thus, market participants do not have to value
transmission prior to the clearing of the energy market as in an explicit auc-
tioning.
Market Splitting Procedure
Market splitting aims to split a single market into diﬀerent market zones ac-
cording to congestion within the network. If congestion occurs, market prices
of diﬀerent market zones will diﬀer. The utilization of limited transmission ca-
pacity is implicitly done by the responsible market operator using the bids of
market participants in the energy market. The procedure of market splitting is
explained in the following using a stylized example (Figure 2.2).
Region A is characterized by high demand and generation capacities with
high marginal costs, whereas in Region B demand and generation with low
marginal costs are located. Bid curves of generation and demand for each Region
are denoted by GA, GB, QA, and QB. Transmission between both regions is
possible up to the maximum capacity TC. Due to cost structure of generation
and regional demand, Region B always exports some amounts to Region A where
generation shows higher marginal generation costs.
The market splitting procedure starts with the clearing of the two market
areas (Region A and B) as if there is inﬁnite transmission capacity TC con-
necting both zones. Hence, a single market price p∗A = p
∗
B can be determined
based on a combined generation curve and total demand (see Figure 2.2, right
graph). The regional generation is g∗A and g
∗
B and the diﬀerence between re-
gional demand and generation represents transfer between both regions. In
general, if the determined transfer between both regions exceeds the available
transmission capacity TC, the single market will be split into diﬀerent market
zones as congestion occurs. Otherwise, if the transfer is lower than the avail-
able transmission capacity (unconstrained case), a splitting of the market is not
necessary and market prices are equal. In this unconstrained case, Region B ex-
ports the diﬀerence between g∗B and QB to Region A. This export is considered
as additional generation in Region A shifting the generation curve to the right
(G∗A)
10.
10 The generation cost curve of Region A (GA) and the exporting part of the generation
cost curve of Region B are combined to a new generation cost curve for Region A (G∗A).
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In case of congestion, the exchange between both market zones is restricted to
the maximum transmission capacity TC. Thus, previously determined genera-
tion in Region B g∗B is decreased to available transmission TC leading to ﬁnal
generation gˆB. Consequently, the export TC from Region B is considered in Re-
gion A as additional generation resulting in the new generation curve GˆA. The
transmission capacity between both regions is now fully utilized. The ﬁnal mar-
ket prices (pˆA > pˆB) are diﬀerent from the market prices in the unconstrained
case (p∗A = p
∗
B) as transmission capacity is limited (see Figure 2.2).
Price
Quantity Quantity Quantity
Region A Region B
p∗A
GA +GB
GA
QA
PricePrice
pˆA
p∗B
QA +QB
pˆB
GˆA
QB gˆB
TC
TC
Region A+B
G∗A
g∗B
GB
g∗A
Figure 2.2.: Market splitting procedure. Source: Own illustration based on Krause
(2007)
Market splitting requires an organized electricity exchange to determine the
unconstrained market results and the zonal decomposition in case of congestion.
The approach of market splitting is currently applied in the Italian11 and Nordic
power market (Nord Pool12, see Section 2.4.2) to manage internal network con-
gestion. Furthermore, Spain and Portugal allocate their cross-border capacities
through a market splitting procedure.13
Market Coupling Procedure
The market coupling follows a comparable procedure as market splitting. How-
ever, the main diﬀerence is that "market coupling does not have an integrated
market to start with, but only a set of independent market that it wants to
link" (Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2005, p. 145).
The market coupling procedure starts an independent clearing of the separate
regional markets. Thus, no transmission capacity is considered. The clearing
results in the regional market prices pA and pB (see Figure 2.3). In a second step,
the net import/export curves are computed and import/export quantities up to
11 Compare: http://www.mercatoelettrico.org/En/Mercati/MercatoElettrico/MC_
Modello.aspx
12 Compare: http://www.nordpoolspot.com/
13 Compare: http://www.omip.pt/OMIP/MIBEL/tabid/72/language/en-GB/Default.aspx
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the available transmission capacity TC are determined (see Figure 2.3, middle
graph). Due to transmission possibility between both regions, costly generation
in Region A can be replaced by cheaper generation in Region B, thus leading
to a reduction in market prices to pˆA and pˆB. If the transmission capacity
TC is lower than the quantity at the intersection of net import/export curves
(Figure 2.3, mid graph) regional price diﬀerences occur (pˆA > pˆB). Otherwise,
regional prices converge to an identical price for both regions (p∗A = p
∗
B) as the
transmission capacity is not limiting.
Price
Quantity Quantity Quantity
Region A Region B
pA
p∗A
pB
GB
QB
GA
QA
PricePrice
pˆA
p∗B
g∗Bg
∗
A gˆA gˆB
pˆB
TC
Figure 2.3.: Market coupling procedure. Source: Own illustration based on Schwarz
and Lang (2006)
The market coupling requires organized power exchanges on both sides of
the congested connection. Market coupling is currently applied in the central
western European (CWE) market region (covering Belgium, the Netherlands,
France, and Germany) to eﬃciently allocate cross-border capacities between
these countries during the EPEX dayahead spot market procedure.14 Addition-
ally, the Nordic power market is coupled with the central western European
market (European Market Coupling (EMCC)15).
Deﬁnition of Market Zones
The application of implicit auctions and the market splitting or coupling pro-
cedure requires the deﬁnition of (possible) market zones or bidding areas.16
Following the described procedures, only transmission capacities between spec-
iﬁed market zones can be considered in the capacity allocation procedure. The
deﬁnition of (possible) market zones or bidding areas can be done in diﬀerent
14 Compare: http://www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling
15 Compare: http://www.marketcoupling.com/
16 A market zone can be described as a aggregation of substations (or system nodes) within
a power network. System nodes or substations are points in power systems where elec-
tricity can be feed-in or withdrawn from the power network. Within a market zone
congestion in the transmission network is not explicitly considered and thus a market
zone is characterized by a single zonal price.
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ways, either ﬂexible or a priori ﬁxed (Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2005).
Flexible zoning implies the separation of a single market area into a speciﬁed
number of market zones according to resulting congestion. Hence, the deﬁnition
is variable and changes with congestion situation. In case of inﬁnitesimal small
market zones so that each substation forms a market zone, the method is called
nodal pricing or locational marginal pricing. On the other hand, the deﬁnition
of market zones can be determined a priori and is thus ﬁxed. In contrast to ﬂex-
ible zoning, market zones are the same in all load situations and is therefore not
necessarily eﬃcient (Bjørndal and Jørnsten, 2001). The deﬁnition of ﬁxed mar-
ket zones is applied for example in Italy, Sweden, and Norway, where the zone
deﬁnition is made by the transmission system operator. However, the Nordic
market started with ﬂexible zoning before changing to ﬁxed zones (Ehrenmann
and Smeers, 2005). In central western Europe, pricing zones used in the market
coupling procedure on interconnectors correspond to national borders.
The zonal pricing or market splitting regime and the deﬁnition of market
zones is discussed in Bjørndal (2000) and Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001). Bjørn-
dal and Jørnsten (2001) describe a mathematical model in order to determine
the optimal zonal decomposition with respect to economic welfare. They con-
clude that zonal pricing and the deﬁnition of optimal ﬂexible market zones is
diﬃcult and aﬀects the surplus of market participants. Especially if ﬁxed (a pri-
ori determined) market zones are considered, the deﬁnition requires a detailed
analysis of welfare implications and redistribution eﬀects on market partici-
pants. Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) among others conﬁrm the concerns of
Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001) about the deﬁnition of market zones. Using a
simple six-node network, Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) analyze diﬀerent zonal
conﬁgurations under various congestion management approaches. Bjørndal and
Jørnsten (2007) provides a comparable analysis for the Nordic power market.
Imran and Bialek (2007) investigate the zonal decomposition within the Euro-
pean electricity market based on locational marginal prices. Diﬀerent methods
for zonal clustering are conceptually described and applied to a detailed repre-
sentation of the European electricity market. Imran and Bialek (2007) conﬁrm
the previous studies as they conclude that zonal clustering is diﬃcult due to sig-
niﬁcant variations in nodal prices and resulting zones are rather small. Hence,
forming zones is nearly impossible and market ineﬃciencies may be created
if zones are formed. To conclude, forming market and thus price zones is a
complicated task, especially in case of ﬁxed zones comprising more than one
substation. Therefore, it is often emphasized that a zonal aggregation is not
appropriate and locational marginal pricing or nodal pricing is more eﬃcient
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and consistent (e.g. Hogan, 1999).
2.2.3. Congestion Alleviation Methods
Congestion alleviation methods aim to manage congestion resulting from mar-
ket transactions, without inﬂuencing spot market results (Knops et al., 2001).
In contrast to capacity allocation methods, generation and load patterns are not
adjusted to the congestion situation during the spot market clearing accordingly
and the transmission system operator is in charge to manage network conges-
tion using corrective measures after clearing of the spot markets. Congestion
alleviation methods can be classiﬁed into technical and economic methods in
order to adjust physical ﬂows in the transmission network.
Technical methods make use of technical devices in order to control physical
ﬂows and to mitigate congestion. The involvement of market participants is not
necessary. Optimization of network topology or phase shifting transformers are
exemplary options. On the other hand, economic methods include the participa-
tion of selected market participants and the change of their market transactions.
Through rescheduling of generation or demand, physical ﬂows can be managed.
2.2.3.1. Technical Methods
Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (FACTS)
'Flexible alternating current systems' (FACTS) are deﬁned as "alternating cur-
rent transmission systems incorporating power electronic-based system and other
static equipment to enhance controllability and increase power transfer capa-
bility" (Edris et al., 1997, p. 1849). FACTS controllers provide control of one
or more transmission system parameters (e.g. transmission voltage, phase an-
gle) which determine the load ﬂow in the power systems. Therefore, FACTS
controllers attempt to increase actual line capacity and direct load ﬂows, thus
diminishing problems caused by loop ﬂows and make optimum use of exist-
ing network structures. FACTS controllers can be connected either in series
or in shunt with the power system, or even in a combined pattern to provide
compensation for the power system. Variable series capacitors, phase shifters
and uniﬁed power ﬂow controllers can be utilized to control load ﬂows in the
power system and thus manage congestion. Edris et al. (1997) gives a detailed
deﬁnition of the general concepts as well as the diﬀerent FACTS controllers.
Taranto et al. (1992) present a methodology for the representation of FACTS
controllers in an economic dispatch power ﬂow model. Phase shifters and series
compensations are considered as FACTS controllers and applied to the Brazilian
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power system. Lu et al. (2005) analyze diverse concepts for mitigating conges-
tion in power systems. Among various alternatives, the impact of phase shifting
devices on locational market prices is analyzed and discussed. The authors con-
clude that phase shifting transformers can help to mitigate congestion and to
reduce the need for transmission expansion. Verboomen et al. (2006, 2008) fur-
ther analyze the grid operation with phase shifting transformers and conclude
that the use of multiple phase shifting transformers in power systems requires
a careful coordination to achieve an eﬃcient use of transmission infrastructure.
The optimal placing of FACTS controllers esp. thyristor controlled phase shifter
transformers is studied by Zeraatzade et al. (2007). The authors formulate a
mixed integer economics dispatch model in order to determine the placing of
FACTS controllers and to minimize redispatching costs. They show that the
application of FACTS devices can reduce costs for redispatching generation fa-
cilities.
Network Topology Optimization
In a meshed system such as the transmission grid, energy ﬂows are distributed
across the transmission lines depending on their technical characteristics fol-
lowing Kirchhoﬀ's laws. Furthermore, meshed networks increase the security of
the system, but the resulting loop ﬂows can limit the optimal use of low cost
generation capacities and congestion may arise. The introduction of ﬂexible or
dispatchable transmission can reduce loop ﬂows as load ﬂows are directed by
switching on or oﬀ of transmission elements. In general, transmission topology
can be determined by the transmission system operator and further optimized
by speciﬁed switching actions with respect to dispatch costs or power system
security.
The basic concept of network topology optimization (or transmission switch-
ing) can be applied as a control action to either technical or economic problems.
A review of several technical publications on the use of switching control meth-
ods is presented in Rolim and Machado (1999). Most of the applications concen-
trate on aspects such as overloads (Granelli et al., 2006; Arya et al., 2000), loss
reduction (Schnyder and Glavitsch, 1990) or enhancing power system security
(Schnyder and Glavitsch, 1988). In a technical context, transmission switching
has been explored as a powerful control option and is used in real-world appli-
cations to improve technical parameters (e.g. voltage) by transmission system
operators (Fisher et al., 2008).
Regarding economic problems, O'Neill et al. (2005a) introduce the concept
of a dispatchable network in a market context. The passive behavior of trans-
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mission operators is replaced by an active participation of transmission owners
on power markets and market-based transmission pricing is introduced. They
show that the implementation of bidable, dispatchable transmission can provide
ﬁrstly the market with greater eﬃciency and competition, and secondly incen-
tives to increase transmission capacities. Another application of transmission
switching is described in Fisher et al. (2008). This paper focuses on the ap-
plication of switching actions within the DC optimal dispatch procedure to a
test network. It is shown that dispatchable transmission lines can signiﬁcantly
improve the dispatch costs by changing the status of only a few lines. The
concept is extended in Hedman et al. (2008a) and Hedman et al. (2008b) by a
sensitivity analysis and a congestion analysis. Dispatch cost savings found in
Fisher et al. (2008) can be conﬁrmed while satisfying N-1 security standards.
However, switching concepts are only applied to test networks and have to be
conﬁrmed with real networks. Görner et al. (2008) apply the switching concept
to a welfare maximization with an underlying network of Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Luxembourg. It is shown that generation costs can be reduced in
oﬀ-peak periods through changing grid topology towards a more radial struc-
ture. Kamga (2009) analyzes network topology optimization with respect to
congestion management and develops a model for optimizing network topology
subject to technical and economic constraints. He concludes that the optimiza-
tion of network topology signiﬁcantly reduces costs of congestion management
in the short-term and the need for network expansion in the long-term.
2.2.3.2. Redispatch
Redispatching aims to adjust generation (or load) patterns in order to change
the physical ﬂows in the network and to mitigate congestion. Generally two
forms of redispatching can be distinguished, which diﬀer in the determination
of the generation capacity available for the redispatch. In cost-based redispatch,
the determination of available generation capacity is based on the generation
costs, whereas in the market-based redispatch (or counter-trading) a separate
merit order curve is used to determine the available generation capacity. Both
congestion management methods are described in the following. Redispatch is
used in many electricity markets as preventive congestion management option.
E.g. in Germany cost-based redispatch is applied, whereas in Nord Pool and
Great Britain market-based redispatch is used.
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Cost-Based Redispatch
Given the stylized power system of two regions and a transmission capacity
of TC between both regions, the cost-based redispatch works as follows (see
Figure 2.4). First, the spot market is cleared and a market price p∗A = p
∗
B is
determined for the single market. The transmission capacity is not considered
in this clearing procedure. Resulting generation in Region A and B are g∗A and
g∗B, respectively. Given the market result of the spot market, it is obvious that
the exchange between both regions exceeds the available transmission capacity
TC. The amount g∗B − QB represents excess generation in Region B and thus
the planned export to Region A. However, as g∗B − QB exceeds the available
transmission capacity TC the export is operationally not feasible. Henceforth,
the generation dispatch has to be adjusted to ensure feasibility. Therefore, the
responsible transmission system operator reduced generation in Region B from
g∗B to gˆB so that the export equals available transmission capacity TC. On the
other hand, generation has to be increased in the deﬁcit Region A to ensure
equality of demand and generation. Generation is increased from g∗A to gˆA and
the ﬁnal import in Region A equals the export in Region B.
In order to implement the redispatch, generators expect compensation pay-
ments for reducing and increasing their generation. Generators in Region B pay
their avoided costs to the transmission operator as their generation is reduced
(grey area in Region B, Figure 2.4). Increased generation in Region A receive
their additionally incurred marginal costs (grey area in Region A, Figure 2.4).
For the transmission system operator, the redispatch results in additional costs,
as payments to generators in Region A are higher than avoided marginal costs
of generators in Region B.
Price
Quantity Quantity Quantity
Region A Region B
p∗A
GA +GB
GA
QA
PricePrice
p∗B
QA +QBQB gˆB
TCTC
g∗Bg
∗
A gˆA
GB
Region A+B
Figure 2.4.: Cost-based redispatch. Source: Own illustration based on de Vries and
Hakvoort (2002)
Eﬃciency is guaranteed in the short-run as the cheapest available power plants
are producing (Wawer, 2007). However, market participants do not internalize
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the congestion and only power plants involved in the redispatch procedure are
informed about congestion and receive signals on congestion (de Vries, 2001).
Therefore, the congestion management approach does not give appropriate long-
term signals to all market participants for eﬃcient siting of power plants or
demand. de Vries (2001) points out that redispatching provides eﬃcient signals
to the transmission system operator. As redispatching results in costs for the
transmission system operator, he can balance the redispatching costs against
the costs of a capacity expansion.17
Market-Based Redispatch / Counter-Trading
As in the cost-based redispatch congestion management method, the spot mar-
ket is characterized by a uniform price for electricity if a market-based redispatch
is used as congestion management method. Contrary to the cost-based redis-
patch, available redispatch capacities are now determined in a market procedure
using bids of market participants at which they are willing to increase or de-
crease generation. In this case two additional markets are created in addition
to the dayahead spot market: the redispatch market for the provision of addi-
tional capacity and the redispatch market for the shutdown of capacity (Inderst
and Wambach, 2007). This can also be seen as positive and negative redispatch
capacity. In case of congestion, the transmission system operator will counter-
trade against the ﬂow of congestion by using available redispatching capacities
until congestion is eliminated (Dijk and Willems, 2011). Thus, the market-based
redispatching is also known as counter-trading.
The general procedure of the market-based redispatch is comparable to the
cost-based redispatch (see Figure 2.5). Given the market result of the uncon-
strained energy market, the exchange between both regions exceeds the available
transmission capacity TC. Again, the amount g∗B −QB represents the planned
export from Region B to A and exceeds the available transmission capacity TC.
Therefore, the responsible transmission system operator reduced generation in
Region B from g∗B to gˆB so that the export equals available transmission capac-
ity TC. On the other hand, generation has to be increased in the deﬁcit Region
A to ensure equality of demand and generation. Generation is increased from
g∗A to gˆA and the ﬁnal import in Region A equals the export in Region B.
In order to implement the redispatch, generators receive compensation pay-
ments for reducing and increasing their generation. Generators in B should not
be willing to pay more than their avoided marginal costs (grey area in Region B,
17 The theoretical incentive to balance redispatching costs against the costs of network
expansion may be limited as it depends on the characteristics of the regulatory regime.
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Figure 2.5), whereas generators in A should not receive more than their incurred
marginal costs (grey area in Region A, Figure 2.5). For decreasing generation,
the transmission system operator accepts the highest oﬀers and the lowest bids
for increasing generation. Also in a market-based redispatch, the payments to
generators in Region A are higher than avoided marginal costs of generators in
Region B. Comparing Figure 2.4 and 2.5 indicates that resulting payments are
at least as much as in the cost-based redispatch, but most likely to be more
(de Vries and Hakvoort, 2002).
The determination and pricing of available redispatch capacities in a separate
market can be designed either as discriminatory (pay-as-bid) or uniform-price
(marginal bid) auction. Alternatively, the bids placed on the spot market or the
reserve market may be used for the determination and provision of redispatch
capacities (Inderst and Wambach, 2007; Wawer, 2007).
Price
Quantity Quantity Quantity
Region A Region B
p∗A
GA +GB
GA
QA
PricePrice
p∗B
QA +QBQB gˆB
TCTC
g∗Bg
∗
A gˆA
GB
Region A+B
Figure 2.5.: Market-based redispatch. Source: Own illustration based on de Vries
and Hakvoort (2002)
Similar to cost-based redispatch, eﬃciency is guaranteed in the short-run as
the cheapest available power plants are producing (Wawer, 2007). As a trans-
parent and market-based market procedure is applied, the prices in the redis-
patch market give generators long-run incentives to place new power plants in
the deﬁcit region (Inderst and Wambach, 2007). As in cost-based redispatch,
the transmission operator faces the costs of congestion management and can
balance the costs against the costs of a capacity expansion. Hence, eﬃcient sig-
nals are provided to the transmission system operator to invest in transmission
infrastructure.18
However, the simultaneous optimization of the bidding in the various markets
will also present a more complex decision problem for power plant operators,
which opens the possibility for an adverse behavior and resulting ineﬃciencies
in the short-run as well as long-run perspective (Inderst and Wambach, 2007;
18 Again, the theoretical incentives provided to the transmission system operator may be
limited by the characteristics of the regulatory regime.
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Wawer, 2007; Perekhodtsev and Cervigni, 2010; Dijk and Willems, 2011). The
price on the redispatch market in the deﬁcit region can be higher than the
uniform price on the spot market, as power plants that are not in-merit have
to increase their generation. This could be anticipated by power plants in the
deﬁcit region, including those who would operate at the spot market price due
to their low marginal generation costs. In order to maximize their proﬁts, they
could withhold their capacity from the spot market in order to oﬀer this capacity
in the redispatch market. However, this assumes that the congestion can be
predicted by the power plant operators. Due to the reduction of the generation
capacity in the deﬁcit region, the deﬁcit appears even greater. In particular, this
means that in comparison to the cost-based redispatch the spot price increases
(Inderst and Wambach, 2007). Due to the anticipation of the congestion in the
bidding behavior of the power plant operator and the resulting impact on the
spot price, ineﬃcient long-run incentives for generation investments are created
(Perekhodtsev and Cervigni, 2010).
2.3. Economic Evaluation of Congestion Management
Methods
Congestion management methods can be compared with respect to diﬀerent
criteria. In economic theory, the concept of economic eﬃciency is introduced
to evaluate and compare e.g. diﬀerent economic mechanisms based on resulting
outcomes. The concept of economic eﬃciency19 can be further diﬀerentiated
into a short-term and long-term perspective. Short-term economic eﬃciency
means that an eﬃcient (least-cost) dispatch of generators is used to serve a
given level of loads in the power system. In a power system, generators with
lowest generation costs should be used to serve loads with highest willingness
to pay. In a power system with transmission congestion, congestion manage-
ment methods should aim to achieve economic eﬃciency. Beside the short-term
perspective, long-term economic eﬃciency refers additionally to investing in gen-
eration and transmission facilities. Long-term economic eﬃciency is achieved
if market participants receive eﬃcient economic incentives ﬁrstly to invest in
required amounts of new facilities (e.g. power plants, transmission lines) and
secondly to place them where they are needed.
Various studies investigate the economic aspects of congestion management
methods (see e.g. de Vries, 2001; de Vries and Hakvoort, 2002; Frontier Eco-
19 A system is economically eﬃcient if a given yield is achieved with lowest eﬀort or if
highest yield is reached with a speciﬁed level of eﬀort (Feess, 2004).
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nomics and Consentec, 2004; Brunekreeft et al., 2005; Ehrenmann and Smeers,
2005; Androcec and Wangensteen, 2006; Krause, 2007). The studies point out
that congestion management methods mainly match short-term economic ef-
ﬁciency. Diﬀerences between congestion management methods are in the dis-
tribution of costs and their long-term impacts. In the following section, the
economic implications of diﬀerent congestion management regimes are analyzed
using the introduced two region example. Beside economic eﬃciency, further
criteria  for instance institutional or regulatory aspects  are available but
are neglected in this analysis as they depend on the speciﬁc characteristics of
the investigated market. The interested reader is referred to e.g. Knops et al.
(2001).
2.3.1. Short-Term Eﬃciency
Based on the previously introduced two region example, the following character-
istics can be observed given a ﬁxed price-inelastic demand. Firstly, generation
quantities and thus system generation costs are the same independently of the
applied congestion management method. As can be seen in Figure 2.6 and
Table 2.2, the ﬁnal generation and thus generation costs are identical among
diﬀerent congestion management regimes and amounts to gˆA + gˆB. The initial
generation represents the generation of the spot market. If congestion allevi-
ation methods either cost- or market-based redispatch are used, the upcoming
scarcity of transmission capacity is considered after clearing of the spot market.
Hence, market transactions are not aﬀected by congestion management and the
realized spot market generation is identical to the case with full or unlimited
transmission capacity (g∗A + g
∗
B). Afterwards, arising congestion is managed by
redispatching power plants in both regions. In Region A generation is increased
by gˆA − g∗A whereas in Region B generation is decreased to the same extent
g∗B − gˆB to ensure the balance of load and generation. In case of an explicit
or implicit auctioning of capacity, scarcity of transmission capacity is explicitly
taken into account prior or during the spot market clearing and the genera-
tion dispatch is accordingly adjusted (gˆA+ gˆB) to optimally utilize transmission
capacity.
To sum up, applying congestion alleviation methods require the redispatch
of generation in case of congestion to achieve a feasible generation dispatch,
whereas using capacity allocation methods the ﬁnal generation dispatch is al-
ready achieved in the spot market. However, all methods achieve the same
ﬁnal generation dispatch of gˆA + gˆB independently of the applied management
regime. Interpreting generation costs as an eﬃciency measure the considered
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methods are thus equally eﬃcient in the short-run under the assumption of
perfect competition and perfect foresight.
Spot mar-
ket gener-
ation
Constrained-
oﬀ genera-
tion
Constrained-
on genera-
tion
Final gen-
eration
No interconnector
capacity
gA + gB   gA + gB
Full interconnector
capacity
g∗A + g
∗
B   g
∗
A + g
∗
B
Explicit auction gˆA + gˆB   gˆA + gˆB
Implicit auction gˆA + gˆB   gˆA + gˆB
Cost-based redis-
patch
g∗A + g
∗
B g
∗
B − gˆB gˆA − g∗A gˆA + gˆB
Market-based
redispatch
g∗A + g
∗
B g
∗
B − gˆB gˆA − g∗A gˆA + gˆB
Table 2.2.: Generation under diﬀerent congestion management regimes. Source: Own
illustration
However, diﬀerent congestion management regimes result in diﬀerent distribu-
tions of costs and thus economic surpluses20 to the diﬀerent market participants.
Table 2.3 depicts the economic surpluses of diﬀerent market participants shown
in Figure 2.6 under diﬀerent congestion management regimes assuming perfect
competition and foresight.
In the case without an interconnection, the demand in both regions is sat-
isﬁed by their available generation capacities and each region shows its own
price determined by the intersection of regional merit-order curve and demand.
Due to more costly generation sources in Region A, the ﬁnal price in Region
A pA is higher than in Region B pB. This leaves consumers in Region A with
a surplus of the area A and consumers in Region B with a surplus area of
E+F1+G1. Generators receive a surplus amounting to the diﬀerence of the re-
gional price and marginal costs accounted with generation quantities (Region
A: B1+(C1+C2)+D; Region B: H). If an interconnector links both regions and
the transmission capacity is considered to be suﬃciently high21, available gener-
ation in Region B can be used to satisfy demand in Region A. Thus, generation
in Region A is replaced due to lower generation costs of Region B generation.
As transmission capacity is suﬃciently high, regional prices are equalized and
amount to p∗A = p
∗
B. In terms of surplus, consumers (generators) in Region A
20 The term economic surplus is a synonym for welfare and both terms are used interchange-
ably.
21 'Suﬃciently high' means that transmission capacity does not represent a restriction on
optimal trade between both regions.
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(B) proﬁt whereas consumers (generators) in Region B (A) loose through the in-
troduction of an interconnection and the impact on prices. However, the overall
welfare of the entire system is increased by the area B2+(C3+C4)+(F2+F3)+G2
through the linking of both regions. The increase of welfare presents the general
economic rationale for connecting regional markets.
However, if an interconnection exists and transmission capacity is not suﬃ-
ciently high to allow an unrestricted regional exchange, congestion management
methods are applied to ease arising congestion through scarce transmission ca-
pacity. If transmission capacity is allocated during the spot market clearing
through explicit or implicit auctioning, the diﬀerence of ﬁnal regional market
prices reﬂect the degree of transmission capacity scarcity. If transmission ca-
pacity is suﬃciently high, the price diﬀerence equals zero, otherwise it is greater
than zero. Based on this, the surplus of market participants varies between the
previously explained 'no interconnection capacity' and 'full interconnection ca-
pacity' cases. However, the transmission system operator faces congestion rents
in the amount of transmission capacity times regional price diﬀerence22 through
the allocation of scarce transmission capacity. With respect to the example, the
transmission system operator buys generation in the amount of the transmission
capacity in Region B at the the price pˆB in order to sell it in Region A at the
price pˆA resulting in a congestion rent of the area C4+F2. This outcome is valid
if an implicit or marginal-bid based explicit auction is applied for allocating
capacity. In case of a pay-as-bid based explicit auction, the transmission system
operator can achieve additional congestion rent in the amount of G2 as he buys
generation in Region B at their marginal costs.
If congestion is managed by alleviation methods, the scarce transmission ca-
pacity is neglected in the clearing process of the spot market and arising con-
gestion is managed by adjusting the determined generation dispatch through
redispatch. Thus, it is obvious that generators and consumers achieve the same
surplus as in the 'full interconnector capacity' case. However, if transmission
capacity is scarce, the transmission system operator is in charge of redispatch-
ing generation and ﬁnancially compensate them. This leaves the transmission
system operator with congestion costs in the amount of C3+F3 in case of a
cost-based redispatch. These congestion cost accrue from the decrease of gener-
ation in Region B in the amount of g∗B − gˆB and according increase in Region A
gˆA−g∗A (see Table 2.2). In case of market-based redispatch these congestion costs
22 In the 'no interconnector capacity' case, the transmission system operator does not re-
ceive congestion rent as the transmission capacity is zero. In case of 'full interconnector
capacity', the transmission capacity is greater than zero, but the price diﬀerence between
both regions is zero resulting in no congestion rents.
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are expected to be higher as the last accepted bid for increasing and decreasing
generation determines the ﬁnancial compensation of redispatched generation. In
the example, the amount of C2+F4 represents the additional congestion costs
for the transmission system operator, but also proﬁts for generation in Region
A and B, respectively.
Price
Quantity Quantity Quantity
Region A Region B
pA
p∗A
pB
GB
gB
GA
gA
PricePrice
pˆA
p∗B
g∗Bg
∗
A gˆA gˆB
pˆB
TC
A
B1
C1
D
B2
C2
C4
E
F1
G1
H
F2
G2
F3
G3
C3
F4
QA QB
Figure 2.6.: Distribution of surplus. Source: Own illustration
Consumer Generator Trans-
mission
operator
Region A Region B Region A Region B
No inter-
connector
capacity
A E+F1+G1 B1
+(C1+C2)
+D
H 
Full inter-
connector
capacity
A
+(B1+B2)
+(C1+C2
+C3+C4)
E D (F1+F2+F3)
+(G1+G2)
+H

Explicit auc-
tion (pay-as
bid)
A
+(B1+B2)
E +F1 (C1+C2)
+D
G1 +H C4+F2+G2
Implicit auc-
tion23
A
+(B1+B2)
E +F1 (C1+C2)
+D
(G1+G2)
+H
C4+F2
Cost-based
redispatch
A
+(B1+B2)
+(C1+C2
+C3+C4)
E D (F1+F2+F3)
+(G1+G2)
+H
−(C3+F3)
Market-
based redis-
patch
A
+(B1+B2)
+(C1+C2
+C3+C4)
E D+C2 (F1+F2
+F3+F4)
+(G1+G2)
+H
−(C2+C3)
−(F3+F4)
Table 2.3.: Distribution of surpluses of diﬀerent market participants under diﬀerent
congestion management regimes. Source: Own illustration
23 The distribution of surplus in case of an uniform-priced explicit auction is equivalent to
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Based on these considerations the following conclusions on distribution eﬀects
can be drawn.24 First, consumers proﬁt from congestion alleviation methods as
a limitation of transmission capacity is neglected in the spot market. This
leaves consumers with the high surplus as in the 'full interconnector capacity'
case. Using capacity allocation methods, consumer surplus is reduced in Region
A by C1+C2+C3+C4 but only slightly increased in Region B by F1 compared
to the 'full interconnector capacity' case.
Second, the transmission operator proﬁts from capacity allocation methods as
he faces congestion proﬁts rather than congestion costs for redispatching power
plants. In particular, in a cost-based redispatch congestion costs are in the
amount of C3+F3 which represent the costs for increasing generation in Region
A and decreased generation in Region B. Using implicit auctioning, market par-
ticipants adjust their generation pattern and the transmission operator is not in
charge of redispatching power plants. Thus, he receives proﬁts from allocating
transmission capacity in the amount of C4+F2. Resulting congestion proﬁts or
costs may vary slightly between diﬀerent implementations of congestion allevi-
ation and capacity allocation methods.
Third, generators are aﬀected by diﬀerent regimes. However, the general eﬀect
depends on the characteristics of the regional cost curves. Comparing implicit
auctioning with cost-based redispatch shows that generators in Region A gain
surplus (C1+C2), but generators in Region B loose surplus (F1+F2+F3). As can
be seen in Figure 2.6, the resulting overall impact on generators depends on the
slope of regional merit-order curves. Thus, the distributional impact depends on
the characteristics in particular the merit-order curve of the considered regions
and a general conclusion cannot be drawn.
To summarize, the considered congestion management regimes achieve short-
term eﬃciency as ﬁxed load is always served by a least-cost dispatch of available
generation assuming perfect market conditions. Diﬀerences between diﬀerent
regimes are in the distribution of costs and surplus. Consumers proﬁt from the
application of congestion alleviation methods, whereas the transmission system
operator achieves highest proﬁts when capacity is allocated during market pro-
cedure. The impact on generation is ambiguous and depends on the regional
characteristics of the merit-order curve.
an implicit auction.
24 The quantiﬁed eﬀects are limited to a price-inelastic demand and may change if a price-
elastic demand is assumed. Furthermore, the analysis abstracts from a regulatory regime
which may redistribute surplus or costs from the transmission operator to generators
and/or consumers.
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2.3.2. Long-Term Eﬃciency
In the long-run perspective, adequate incentives for transmission and generation
investments should be provided to market participants to promote investments
in the required amount of transmission and generation capacity, and their loca-
tion. In an idealized world neglecting lumpiness of investments and economics
of scale in generation and transmission, one would invest to equalize short-
run and long-run marginal cost (Rious et al., 2008). However, the real-world
characteristics of transmission and generation investments cause a diﬀerence be-
tween short-run and long-run marginal cost. Furthermore, as an eﬃcient use
of capacities is achieved by prices at short-run marginal costs this results in
the problem that investments may not be able to cover their long-run marginal
cost (Lévêque, 2006). Thus, spot market prices as a result of applied conges-
tion management methods which ensure an eﬃcient usage of existing capacity
are usually extended by additional components (e.g. network tariﬀs) to recover
investment expenditures.
With respect to the expansion of the transmission network, the transmis-
sion network operator faces costs if congestion alleviation methods are applied.
Hence, incentives exist to expand transmission infrastructure in order to re-
duce costs associated with the redispatch of power plants. In an idealized world
neglecting lumpiness of investments and economics of scale, the transmission
system operator would invest as long as marginal cost of transmission capacity
equals the marginal beneﬁt of a reduction in congestion cost. Considering re-
alistic characteristics of transmission investments, the network operator would
expand the network as long as the (expected) reduction in congestion costs justi-
ﬁes the lumpy investment expenditures. However, due to e.g. uncertainty about
the development of generation capacities and thus resulting congestion costs the
transmission operator may not be willing to adequately invest in transmission
expansion solely on the basis of congestion costs. Hence, regulated network tar-
iﬀs are important beside congestion costs to ensure the covering of investment
expenditures.
In case of capacity allocation methods, congestion rents accrue to the trans-
mission system operator, thus eliminating incentives for an adequate expansion
of the transmission network. Hence, regulatory mechanisms are required to in-
centivize the transmission operator to adequately extend existing infrastructure
or to build up new infrastructure and to recover investment expenditures as the
achievable congestion rents may not be necessarily suﬃcient (Pérez-Arriaga and
Olmos, 2006). For instance, Hogan et al. (2010) develop an appropriate incen-
tive mechanism to induce network expansion in case of network congestion which
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is proﬁtable for the transmission system operator. Rosellón and Weigt (2011)
apply the theoretical concept to a realistic electricity system and prove the func-
tioning of the incentive mechanism. Alternatively, merchant investors may be
attracted by achievable congestion rents to reinforce the transmission network.
However, as merchant investors would require a certain extent of congestion rent
to recover their investment expenditures a tendency to underinvestment would
result (Joskow and Tirole, 2005; Stoft, 2006).
On the other hand, generators and consumers receive economic signals on
congestion in capacity allocation regimes as prices may vary in case of conges-
tion. Under the assumption that incentives exist to invest in generation capacity
in general25, the received regional price diﬀerences thus give these market par-
ticipants incentives to place new generation or consumption in regions where
it is adequate. In the considered two region example, the price in Region A is
higher than in Region B. Hence, it may be proﬁtable for generators to place new
facilities in the high priced region, whereas consumption may prefer Region B
due to lower prices. Both developments would reduce congestion between both
regions and are thus eﬃcient in the long-run perspective.
If congestion alleviation methods are analyzed, the spot market price does
not reﬂect the congestion situation of the physical network. Thus, incentives
to place generation or consumption in speciﬁc regions are not provided. Also
if alleviation methods are applied, long-term incentives are ambiguous. In case
of cost-based redispatch only power plants used for redispatch are informed
about congestion. Remaining generation do not receive information on conges-
tion situation. In case of market-based redispatch, all market participants are
informed about congestion through resulting prices of the redispatching market.
However, as Perekhodtsev and Cervigni (2010) analyzed the separation of en-
ergy and redispatching market may induce adverse bidding incentives for market
participants leading to wrong investment signals in the long-run. Furthermore,
Ding and Fuller (2005) show that congestion alleviation methods are not able to
provide appropriate investment signals and can even result in contrary invest-
ment incentives. Based on the evaluation of achievable surpluses (Table 2.3),
generators in Region A receive less surplus when congestion alleviation is used
compared to capacity allocation. The diﬀerence in surplus in Region A amounts
to C1. Furthermore, generators in Region B achieve additional surplus in the
amount of F1+F2+F3 than in case of implicit auctioning of capacity. In the end,
generators would be incentivized to invest rather in Region B than in Region A.
25 This implies that electricity markets allow market participants to recover their investment
costs either through scarcity rents in the 'energy-only' spot market or an explicit capacity
market (e.g. Green, 2006).
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This outcome would aggravate the congestion situation and is thus not eﬃcient
in the long-run perspective.
To summarize, congestion alleviation methods provide correct long-term in-
centives to extend network infrastructure, whereas capacity allocation induces
eﬃcient generation and consumption investments. This raises the question
which market participant should receive adequate investment signals. de Vries
and Hakvoort (2002) argue that giving competitive market segments should
be preferred and economic signals on congestion should be provided through
locationally diﬀerentiated prices. Generation and consumption would be incen-
tivized to locate their facilities in regions where it is required and relaxes the con-
gestion situation.26 As the transmission of electricity is a natural monopoly and
therefore a regulated market segment, adequate investment incentives should
be provided through regulatory mechanisms by national regulatory authorities
independently of the applied congestion management regime. From a practi-
cal point of view, building up new transmission infrastructure probably requires
longer lead times due to administrative procedures than expansions in consump-
tion or generation. In particular, renewable generation capacity is signiﬁcantly
increased during the last years. Therefore, giving economic signals to gener-
ation and consumption could to some extent steer the location of additional
capacities. However, capacity allocation would not entirely reduce the need for
transmission expansion as locating generation expansions are additionally inﬂu-
enced by other factors (e.g. availability of fuel and/or fuel transportation costs,
meteorological conditions in case of renewable generation).
2.4. Application of Congestion Management Methods
2.4.1. Germany
The liberalization process in the German electricity market started in 1998
with the Energy Act (EnWG), which implemented the EU Energy Directive
96/92/EC. Key elements of the law are the free choice of electricity supplier
by end users and the regulation of network access. In the initial phase of the
liberalization the long-term and short-term electricity trade are rather bilateral
(so-called Over-The-Counter or OTC transactions). However, exchanges have
been implemented as central power markets and trading started in 2000. In
2001, the German power exchanges in Leipzig (LPX) and Frankfurt (EEX)
merged in the European Energy Exchange (EEX)27 in Leipzig.
26 Pérez-Arriaga and Olmos (2006) point out that the eﬃcient siting of generation and
consumption can be further improved by locational network charges.
27 Compare: http://www.eex.com/
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The commercial area of the EEX expanded over the past few years to Aus-
tria and Switzerland. In 2008 a cooperation with the French power exchange
Powernext started. This cooperation led to the creation of EPEX Spot SE28,
which performs the spot market settlement for Germany / Austria, Switzerland
and France. The EEX operates the futures market since 2008 for the men-
tioned market areas. The focus of the daily dayahead auction is the clearing
of demand bids and generation oﬀers for the following day separately for the
diﬀerent market areas. Market participants are not required to attend to the ex-
change trading and still have the option to trade bilaterally. The pricing on the
EPEX is uniform for the entire German market area. An explicit consideration
of national network constraints is not applied.
Transmission congestion arising from any dayahead generation schedules of
market participants will be managed by the responsible transmission system
operator, which receives the respective generation schedules of power plants in
advance to real-time operation. Based on the generation schedules network con-
gestion management is performed by the relevant transmission system operators
and emerging network congestion is eased by using network-related and market-
related methods ( 13 (1) EnWG,  15 (1) StromNZV). Network-related methods
include inter alia the adjustment of network topology through switching actions
(VDN, 2007, Appendix A). As a market-based method cost-based redispatch of
power plants and counter-trading are applied in the German electricity market
(VDN, 2007; Inderst and Wambach, 2007; Ockenfels et al., 2008). If those meth-
ods are not suﬃcient, the transmission system operator can make use of further
short-term options ( 13 (2) EnWG). Furthermore, if the occurrence of network
congestion cannot be prevented by using network- and market-related methods,
the transmission system operators are obliged to manage the available transmis-
sion capacity non-discriminatory according to market-oriented and transparent
procedures ( 15 (2) StromNZV).
The congestion management costs of the past years are displayed in Table 2.4.
As can be seen, redispatching costs are rather low; up to 45 million EUR in 2008
or 0.09 EUR/MWh. Hence, congestion occurs rarely in the German transmis-
sion network and thus management costs to relieve congestion are rather low.
According to Deutscher Bundestag (2010), wind generation impacts congestion
management costs and caused the increase in 2008 due to high wind genera-
tion. In 2009, wind generation is lower due to meteorological conditions and
thus costs for redispatching power plants are reduced. Therefore, generation of
renewable energy sources (esp. wind) is an determining factor for transmission
28 Compare: http://www.epexspot.com/
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Congestion costs Consumption Congestion costs
/consumption
million EUR GWh EUR/MWh
2007 30 527,351 0.06
2008 45 525,549 0.09
2009 26* 495,572 0.05
2010 48* 528,958 0.09
* Including national and international counter-trading
Table 2.4.: Congestion management costs in Germany. Source: Own illustration
based on Deutscher Bundestag (2010),BNetzA (2011b), and Eurostat
(2012)
congestion and similarly congestion management costs.
Furthermore, according to (Monopolkommission, 2011, p. 24) the phase-out of
nuclear power plants is expected to aﬀect congestion management costs. Hence,
the application of the current uniform pricing regime including congestion man-
agement by alleviation methods is not uncritical as market participants do not
receive market information (e.g. price) about network congestion. However,
market information are required to give price signals for eﬃcient placing of pro-
duction or consumption within the power system. Hence, Monopolkommission
(2011) points out, that the implementation of at least two pricing zones with
an implicit allocation of transmission capacity should be discussed in order to
achieve an eﬃcient management of national congestion. Frontier Economics and
Consentec (2011) study the economic and administrative implications of the in-
troduction of price zones and thus a market splitting in the German-Austrian
market area. It is concluded that potentially negative impacts (e.g. potential
of lower market liquidity, higher market concentration in price zones) outweigh
the positive economic implication of eﬃcient congestion signals to market par-
ticipants.
2.4.2. Nord Pool
2.4.2.1. Norway
Norway was the ﬁrst country in northern Europe, which promoted the liberal-
ization of the electricity market signiﬁcantly. The production structure is char-
acterized especially by a very high proportion of hydro (99 %), which is spread
over a large number of small companies (Hjalmarsson, 2000; Woo et al., 2003).
The four largest generating companies account for 44 % of installed generation
capacity (Woo et al., 2003). At that time, the Norwegian electricity market was
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characterized by signiﬁcant regional price diﬀerences and a high share of hydro
storage generation and their seasonal availability (Skytte, 1999). These reasons
increased the need of a coordination of production, thus oﬀsetting regional price
ﬂuctuations. In 1991, Norway passed a law to liberalize the production and dis-
tribution sector in the electricity market. However, the Norwegian electricity
market was not fully privatized and the national transmission system operator
Statnett is still owned by the Norwegian state and municipalities.
In 1993 the ﬁrst power exchange (Statnett Marked) was implemented. In 1996
the exchange was extended by the Swedish electricity market and renamed in
Nord Pool. The power exchange was further expanded to include Finland (1998),
West-Denmark (1999) and Eastern Denmark (2000). The Nord Pool is currently
designed as a voluntary power exchange, which comprises the central clearing of
auctions as well as bilateral contracts. The markets of the Nord Pool are divided
into the physical dayahead market Elspot29 and the physical intraday market
Elbas30. There is also the possibility to trade ﬁnancial products. The latter are
however not handled by Nord Pool but by NASDAQ OMX Commodities31.
The optimization of power plant operation remains in the responsibility of
producers and is not made by the Nord Pool. The price determination is based
on the bids and oﬀers of market participants and corresponds to the intersection
between supply and demand bid function for the entire market area. The prices
are determined taking into account the available transmission capacities between
the national market areas. This represents an implicit auctioning of transmission
capacity (market splitting) between the various deﬁned market areas.
Within the Norwegian market area the implicit auctioning of transmission
capacity (market splitting) is also used as internal congestion management
method. Based on the bids and oﬀers of market participants the transmission
capacities of national bottlenecks are allocated within the market clearing pro-
cedure of the Nord Pool. In case of congestion, regionally diﬀerentiated prices
are determined for the market zones. The deﬁnition of the potential market or
bidding zones including the determination of the transmission capacity between
zones is performed by the Norwegian network operator Stattnett. The zone
deﬁnition is not variable in the short term but will be adjusted according to the
load ﬂow and congestion situation. Currently the Norwegian electricity mar-
ket is divided into 5 possible market zones (see Figure 2.7; east Norway NO1,
south-western Norway NO2, central Norway NO3, northern Norway NO4, and
western Norway NO5).
29 Compare: http://www.nordpoolspot.com/
30 Compare: http://www.nordpoolspot.com/
31 Compare: http://www.nasdaqomxcommodities.com/
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Figure 2.7.: Price zones in Norway. Source: http://www.statnett.no
Due to the implicit consideration of network constraints within the wholesale
electricity market, producers receive direct information about network conges-
tion through regionally diﬀerentiated prices. This leads to a more eﬃcient al-
location of resources and creates regionally diﬀerentiated investment incentives
in the long-term perspective.
2.4.2.2. Sweden
In 1992, the Swedish state company Vattenfall was divided into the state-owned
network operator Svenska Kraftnät and the state-owned generator Vattenfall.
Svenska Kraftnät has been responsible for the maintenance and operation of the
national transmission network. This was the ﬁrst step towards the liberalization
of the national electricity market, which was completed in 1996 through the lib-
eralization of the electricity market. Due to the Swedish legislation, the national
companies were more open to private investors compared to Norway. Neverthe-
less, the large companies remained mostly owned by the Swedish government or
the municipalities (Skytte, 1999). In 1996 the Swedish electricity market joined
the Nord Pool and trade rules between both countries were harmonized.
In contrast to the Norwegian electricity market, the Swedish electricity mar-
ket is characterized by a uniform wholesale electricity price. Implicit auctioning
of transmission capacity takes only place on the interconnectors to the neighbor-
ing countries. Congestion within the Swedish market area is managed through
the national transmission system operators using the market-based redispatch
(counter-trading) within the operational phase (Svenska Kraftnät, 2007, p. 6).
Available capacities necessary for the counter-trading are procured within the
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Congestion costs Consumption Congestion costs
/consumption
million SEK* GWh SEK/MWh*
2007 213 131,082 1.62
2008 113 128,649 0.88
2009 300 123,374 2.43
2010 186 131,217 1.42
* Exchange rate (2010) EUR/SEK: 9.5373 (ECB, 2012)
Table 2.5.: Congestion management costs in Sweden. Source: Own illustration based
on Svenska Kraftnät (2008, 2009, 2010) and Eurostat (2012)
balancing market and a separate market for redispatching capacity does not
exist. The congestion management costs are depicted in Table 2.5. Due to
the uniform market price in Sweden, regionally diﬀerentiated investment in-
centives are not provided to market participants. However, in order to pass the
short-term and long-term costs of network use to market participants, regionally
diﬀerentiated network usage charges are currently applied.
However, the Swedish congestion management regime needs to be changed as
required by the European Commission in their investigation (Case COMP/39.351
- Swedish Interconnectors). In 2009 the European Commission opened the
formal proceedings with respect to the Swedish transmission system operator
Svenska Kraftnät for possible abuse of their dominant market position. The
European Commission investigated the reduction of international capacities by
Svenska Kraftnät in order to ease national congestion. Following Svenska Kraft-
nät (2007), the Swedish power system is characterized by a signiﬁcant transfer
from the Northern to Southern Sweden. Low-cost generation units are located
in the Northern part of Sweden, whereas main load centers are in the South.
Additionally, electricity from Norway is imported in the North and exports to
Denmark take place in the South. Both eﬀects results in a main ﬂow of elec-
tricity from the North to the South. Due to this characteristics of the Swedish
power system, Svenska Kraftnät denied the export of electricity to Denmark, but
allowed the import from Denmark in order to relieve congestion in the national
transmission network. Thus, Svenska Kraftnät discriminated between diﬀerent
market participants and abused their dominating market position.
Following a decision of the European Commission (European Commission,
2010) Svenska Kraftnät divided the Swedish market area into four market zones
and started to operate the transmission system on this basis on 1 November
2011. Thus, congestion management through counter-trading is replaced by an
implicit auctioning (market splitting) of transmission capacity. Hence, market
Chapter 2. Review of Congestion Management Methods 36
Figure 2.8.: Price zones in Sweden. Source: http://www.svk.se/
participants now receive market information about congestion situation through
regional diﬀerentiated market prices in case of congestion. Furthermore, the
deﬁnition of market zones is ﬁxed in the short term, but ﬂexible in the long-run
in order to anticipate changes in congestion situation. The applied price zones
are displayed in Figure 2.8.
2.4.3. Great Britain
The British government privatized and liberalized the British electricity industry
in 1990 as the ﬁrst country in Europe. Furthermore, a mandatory power pool
was implemented, which required the participation of all market participants.
The producers had to submit their bids to the National Grid Company, which
determined the least cost dispatch of power plants.
In 2001, the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) were introduced
and replaced the mandatory power pool by an electricity exchange with volun-
tary participation and bilateral trade opportunities. National Grid Company
was responsible for operating the transmission grid.
In 2005, the existing NETA has been extended to the Scottish market area
(British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements, BETTA). A single
electricity market for Great Britain with system operator (National Grid Elec-
tricity Transmission, NGET) independent from production and distribution has
been established. The ownership of the transmission grid remained with the
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Congestion costs Consumption Congestion costs
/consumption
million GBP* GWh GBP/MWh*
2005/06 152 348,676 0.44
2006/07 188 345,229 0.54
2007/08 112 342,644 0.33
2008/09 448** 341,853 1.31
2009/10 474** 322,417 1.47
* Exchange rate (2010) EUR/GBP: 0.85784 (ECB, 2012)
** Forecasted values
Table 2.6.: Congestion management costs in Great Britain. Source: Own illustration
based on OFGEM (2009) and Eurostat (2012)
three owners (the National Grid, Scottish Power, and Scottish & Southern En-
ergy). The operation of the transmission network is performed by the indepen-
dent transmission system operator NGET.
Two elements of the BETTA are of particular importance with respect to
congestion management: the forward bilateral market and the balancing mech-
anism (Perekhodtsev and Cervigni, 2010). Market participants perform bilateral
trades in the forward markets till the gate closure of the markets (1 hour be-
fore real time). The trades are geographically unlimited and physical network
constraints are considered neither explicitly nor implicitly. At the gate closure
the transmission system operator receives the ﬁnal physical positions (Final
Physical Notiﬁcation, FPN). In the remaining hours between gate closure and
real-time, the balancing mechanism takes place and the transmission system
operator collects the bids and oﬀers on a change in the physical position of
the market participants. Based on the bids and oﬀers of the balancing mech-
anism the transmission system operators performs a market-based redispatch
by adjusting the physical position in order to ease network congestion. Other
technical measures to increase network capacity and availability are also used by
the transmission system operators in the operational phase to relieve network
congestion (Paravalos et al., 2005).
Currently, signiﬁcant congestion and high congestion management costs are
observed and expected in particular at the border between England and Scot-
land (see Table 2.6). Perekhodtsev and Cervigni (2010) analyzed the reasons
for the increased congestion management costs. They point out that it is un-
clear whether this increase in congestion management costs is caused by anti-
competitive behavior of certain producers and/or resulting from the overall de-
sign of congestion management. However, the application of market-based redis-
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patch as congestion management methods turns out to result in negative eﬀects
regarding wholesale prices and congestion costs especially if network congestion
can be well predicted by market participants (Perekhodtsev and Cervigni, 2010).
2.4.4. Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM)
The electricity market was established in 1927 through the merger of three elec-
tricity distribution companies and in 1956 renamed in Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland Interconnection (PJM)32 through the integration of other electricity
distribution companies. The aim of the merger was to coordinate and optimize
the dispatch of power plants. In 1998 an independent system operator (ISO) was
implemented in the PJM electricity market and in 2001 expanded to a regional
transmission organization (RTO). Thus, the deregulation of the electricity in-
dustry according to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order
880 was established and an independent system operator was implemented.
Currently, the PJM market area comprises a large part of north-eastern states
in the United States with an installed capacity of more than 167 GW (PJM,
2011). Hence, PJM is the largest centralized electricity market in North Amer-
ica, serving more than 54 million people with a peak load of approximately
145 GW (PJM, 2011).
The PJM electricity market is characterized by a centralized market struc-
ture comprising a ﬁnancial dayahead and a physical real-time market. Both
markets are interrelated by a two-settlement system in order to enable the var-
ious market participants to participate in the markets (Ott, 2003; Fan et al.,
2008). Furthermore, PJM operates a capacity market to ensure the necessary
generation capacity in the market area. The dayahead market is designed as a
voluntary bid-based market, which includes the determination of hourly market
prices for the following day. Generating plants, which entered an Installed Ca-
pacity Contract, or have sold capacity in the PJM capacity market, are obliged
to participate (e.g. place bids) in the dayahead market (Ott, 2003). Even in
case of bilateral agreements or power plant failures, the placing of bids in the
dayahead market is required in order to consider power plants in the subsequent
optimization procedure. The possible bids in dayahead market include gener-
ation and demand bids as well as the inclusion of bilateral transactions (Fan
et al., 2010).
The dayahead market is a ﬁnancial market, which can be used to hedge against
price uncertainty in the real-time market. Additionally, congestion costs for bi-
lateral transactions are determined in the dayahead market. The bids of market
32 Compare: http://www.pjm.com
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participants which are taken into account in the dayahead market are automat-
ically considered in the subsequent physical real-time market. Market partici-
pants also have the option to adjust their bids between both markets, or to act
only in one of the markets. Based on the detailed bids of market participants, all
operational decisions regarding generation and transmission are simultaneously
optimized by PJM system operator and the least-cost dispatch of power plants
is determined taking power plant, network and security restrictions in the daya-
head and real-time market into account (Ott, 2003). The central coordination
of generation and transmission, however, requires a detailed representation of
the cost structures of market participants including economic costs and tech-
nical restrictions. The optimized power plant schedules are sent to the power
plant operators. Deviations from these optimized schedules and new or revised
bids will be considered in subsequent real-time market and included in the real-
time market optimization. The real-time market is optimized every 5 minutes,
taking into account the current system status and real-time market prices are
determined. Through the pricing and the application of two-settlement system
market participants are encouraged to follow the optimized real-time generation
schedules (Ott, 2003).
Due to the simultaneous optimization of power plant operation and the net-
work usage, the so-called 'Locational Marginal Pricing' or 'Nodal Pricing' can
be applied. Herewith, locationally diﬀerentiated prices can be determined for
each system node reﬂecting generation cost structures as well as network con-
gestion in the system. Market participants will receive or pay the price of the
system node they are connected to. The price diﬀerence between diﬀerent sys-
tem nodes reﬂects the congestion costs. The simultaneous optimization of power
plants and power usage represents an implicit auctioning of transmission capac-
ity as the capacity is allocated within the market procedure. Due to application
of nodal pricing, market participants receive information (or price signals) about
the network utilization and congestion within the system. If congestion occurs
within the market area, regionally diﬀerentiated prices are determined which
reﬂect the degree of the congestion. Thus, information on congestion through
the locationally diﬀerentiated prices are directly passed to market participants
resulting in locationally diﬀerentiated investment incentives. The congestion
costs33 are displayed in Table 2.7.
33 Congestion costs in the PJM are deﬁned as the diﬀerence of total load and generator
payments.
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Congestion costs Consumption Congestion costs
/consumption
million USD* GWh USD/MWh*
2003 464 674,471 0.69
2004 750 689,008 1.09
2005 2,092 682,441 3.07
2006 1,603 694,989 2.31
2007 1,845 724,541 2.55
2008 2,117 713,910 2.97
2009 719 680,767 1.06
2010 1,428 808,977 1.77
* Exchange rate (2010) EUR/USD: 1.3257 (ECB, 2012)
Table 2.7.: Congestion management costs in PJM electricity market. Source: Own
illustration based on Monitoring Analytics (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), PJM
(2010), and PJM (2012)
2.5. Conclusions
Diﬀerent approaches to manage congestion in transmission networks are avail-
able ranging from congestion alleviation to capacity allocation methods. Con-
gestion alleviation methods aim to manage congestion without changing trades
at the spot market. Hence, market participants (generation and consumers)
are not informed about the existence of congestion. On the other hand, capac-
ity allocation methods aim to allocate scarce transmission capacity to market
participants in an market-oriented approach. Market participants receive infor-
mation about the congestion situation and therefore internalize congestion in
their market bidding procedure. Both congestion management regimes achieve
short-term economic eﬃciency as generators with lowest generation costs are
producing. However, diﬀerences between both regimes are existent in the long-
run perspective. In a capacity allocation regime, market participants receive
information about congestion situation and hence internalize these information
in the long-term planning (e.g. generation investment planning). Thus, capac-
ity allocation methods provide eﬃcient long-term economic incentives to market
participants (generation and consumers). On the other hand, congestion alle-
viation methods provides economic signals to transmission operator whereas
market participants are left uninformed about congestion.
The application of congestion management methods depends on characteris-
tics of power systems. In Germany, congestion within the national transmission
system was rather rare and therefore congestion management is mainly per-
formed using congestion alleviation methods. As market participants do not
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internalize congestion, the transmission system operator faces the problem of
congestion management. As long as congestion remains rather limited in space
and time, congestion alleviation methods are preferred as they do not require
complex market organizations.
If congestion becomes persistent in power systems, congestion alleviation
methods can result in high congestion management costs as market partici-
pants do not internalize congestion. For instance in Great Britain, congestion
management costs are expected to increase signiﬁcantly due to congestion on
the Scottish-British border as market participants anticipate the congestion sit-
uation in their bidding strategy. Additionally, adverse bidding incentives are
provided through the application of a market-based redispatching regime which
further increases congestion management costs. Furthermore, as experienced
in the Swedish power system, limitation of international trades was required
to relieve national congestion by congestion alleviation methods. Hence, man-
agement of congestion is required to be changed to give market participants
relevant market information about the congestion situation. In Sweden, the
implementation of a zonal pricing approach including an implicit auctioning of
transmission capacity was required by the European Commission.
Nodal pricing as the implicit allocation of (all) transmission capacities is seen
in the academic literature as the optimal approach with respect to short-term
economic eﬃciency abstracting from any costs for system change and imple-
mentation. In a nodal pricing regime, the dispatch of power plants and the
utilization of the transmission network are optimized simultaneously and an
optimal usage of scarce transmission capacity is ensured. Hence, market par-
ticipants receive eﬃcient short-term signals on network congestion in the spot
market. The nodal pricing regime is successfully implemented and applied in
the PJM electricity market.
3. Quantifying Economic
Implications of Congestion
Management Regimes in Europe
3.1. Introduction
The creation of an Internal Electricity Market (IEM) is one of the main targets
of the energy policy of the European Commission (EC). The underlying moti-
vation is to increase eﬃciency by promoting competition between market par-
ticipants and ﬁnally to achieve transparent and market-based electricity prices
for ﬁnal consumers. To achieve the objective, the liberalization process was
initiated in 1996 by implementing the Directive 96/92/EC and the subsequent
adoption into national legislation in the following years. In 2001, the second
Directive 2003/54/EC was introduced with the aim to further improve compe-
tition. The directive replaced the earlier Directive 96/92/EC. The third Direc-
tive 2009/72/EC introduced in 2009 repealed the earlier directives and provides
revisions on regulations on unbundling of production/supply and network ac-
tivities, implementation of regulatory authorities including the establishment of
an European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and
the introduction of intelligent metering to promote energy eﬃciency.
Beside the re-organization of market structures within countries, the pro-
motion of cross-border trade is a key prerequisite for a functioning of an Eu-
ropean electricity market. As the ﬁrst directive did not address cross-border
trade among European countries, Regulation 1228/2003/EC was issued in com-
bination with the second directive to intensify the cross-border trade of elec-
tricity. Through the Regulation 1228/2003/EC in combination with the An-
nex 2006/770/EC an important step towards enhancement of capacity allocation
and congestion management on cross-border lines (interconnectors) has been
achieved (ERGEG, 2010b). The regulation deﬁnes rules for cross-border trade
including an compensation mechanism, harmonized transmission charges, and
the allocation of available cross-border transmission capacity. The focus of the
regulation is explicitly on cross-border trade between European countries and
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the regulation and management of national transmission networks is left to na-
tional authorities. However, the integration of national markets did not proceed
as expected (ERGEG, 2010b). Therefore, the new Regulation 714/2009/EC
was introduced together with the third directive and replaced the former Reg-
ulation 1228/2003/EC. A main shortcoming of the previous regulation was the
lack of coordination of congestion management between transmission system op-
erators. To promote the coordination and transparency, an European Network
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) is established by
the new regulation.
With respect to congestion management methods as introduced in Chap-
ter 2, the Regulation 1228/2003/EC and 714/2009/EC deﬁne that arising con-
gestion on cross-border connections shall be addressed by non-discriminatory
and market-based methods which provide eﬃcient economic signals to market
participants (Article 16(1) of Regulation 714/2009/EC). As the requested con-
gestion management methods are required to allocate cross-border capacities
prior or during the regular market procedure, explicit and implicit auction-
ing are the preferred options. Furthermore, explicit auctions are widely imple-
mented in the beginning of re-organization of the European electricity system as
they are easy to implement and compatible with diﬀerent market organizations
(Section 2.2.2). In contrast, an implicit auction requires the establishment of a
standardized market for electricity (power exchange) in both regions connected
by the cross-border link.
Historically, electricity system were planned and organized on a national level.
Cross-border links are designed to ensure security of supply rather than promot-
ing trade between connected regions. Thus, access to capacity of interconnectors
is mainly organized by corresponding transmission system operators using ad-
ministrative methods (ETSO, 2004) which are not market-based (Section 2.2.1).
Due to Regulation 1228/2003/EC, the establishment of market-based and non-
discriminatory capacity allocation methods is required and accordingly adopted
by transmission system operators. ETSO (2004) and ETSO (2006) provide an
overview of applied congestion management methods across European countries
for the years 2004 and 2006, respectively. The explicit auctioning of capacity
became the preferred option to allocate capacity in the long- and short-term.
An exemption is the Nordic power market where implicit auctions are used to
allocate cross-border capacity (Section 2.4.2). In the following years, the ad-
vancement of power exchanges enables the introduction of coordinated explicit
auctions between diﬀerent transmission system operators and even implicit auc-
tioning in some European regions (e.g. CWE Market Coupling). Figure 3.1
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depicts the currently applied short-term congestion management regimes. Es-
pecially the expansion of implicit auctions and thus the market coupling of
national electricity markets across European countries has been opted by Euro-
pean energy regulators (ERGEG, 2011).
Explicit auction
Coordinated explicit auction Central West Europe (CWE)
Coordinated explicit auction Central East Europe (CEE)
Implicit auction
Figure 3.1.: Short-term (dayahead) capacity allocation methods in Europe. Source:
Own illustration
Another issue addressed by Regulation 714/2006/EC and the former regula-
tion is the deﬁnition of the transmission capacity available for market partic-
ipants. According to Article 16(3) of Regulation 714/2009/EC, the maximum
available capacity of the interconnections complying with operational security
standard of the network shall be made available to market participants. In-
ternational capacity allocations distinguish between commercial transfer which
are used by market participants to plan their cross-border trades and physical
ﬂows as used by transmission system operators in real-time operation (ETSO,
2001b). Physical ﬂows represent the ﬂows on transmission lines which realize
from injections and withdrawals from the transmission network according to
physical characteristics of the transmission lines. This is formalized in Kirch-
hoﬀ's current and voltage law (Claussnitzer, 1965). The main characteristic of
physical ﬂows is that they do not entirely ﬂow on the direct transmission line
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between the point of injection (generation) and withdrawal (demand) but also
impact adjacent transmission lines. The eﬀect is known as loop ﬂow. On the
other hand, commercial or transactional transfers describe the transfer between
two points neglecting the characteristics physical laws. The advantage of using
commercial transfers for capacity allocation is that market participants do not
have to take into account the physical characteristics of the ﬂows when trading
electricity between diﬀerent regions. However, the maximum capacity available
for market participants has to be determined by transmission system operators
with respect to physical ﬂows in order to ensure a secure network operation.34
Within the European electricity system, the concept of commercial transfers
is currently applied for capacity allocations on each cross-border link between
neighboring countries. Following (ETSO, 2001a, p. 6f) the subsequent transfer
capacity deﬁnitions are used:35
TTC The Total Transfer Capacity (TTC) "is the maximum exchange program
between two areas compatible with operational security standards appli-
cable at each system if future network conditions, generation and load
patterns were perfectly known in advance" (ETSO, 2001a, p. 6).
TRM The Transmission Reliability Margin (TRM), is imposed to account for un-
certainties arising from the functioning of frequency regulation, emergency
exchanges, and inaccuracies in data and measurements (ETSO, 2001a).
NTC The Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) "is the maximum exchange program
between two areas compatible with security standards applicable in both
areas and taking into account the technical uncertainties on future network
conditions" (ETSO, 2001a, p. 7). It is deﬁned as:
NTC = TTC − TRM (3.1)
Capacities are deﬁned for each cross-border link and direction individually by
34 To point out the diﬀerence between physical and commercial values, one may consider
the German-Swiss border. In total 12 high-voltage transmission lines connect both coun-
tries which results in a total physical transmission capacity of approximately 15000 MVA.
The commercial capacity (NTC) for the Winter 2011/12 amounts 1500 MW from Ger-
many to Switzerland and 3500 MW in the reversed direction. Thus, commercial capacity
represents a share of 10% or 23% on total physical capacity depending on considered
direction.
35 Beside the listed capacity deﬁnitions, the Already Allocated Capacity (ATC) and the
Available Transmission Capacity are distinguished (ETSO, 2001a, p. 7). Both capacities
are the results of each stage (long-term or short-term) of the applied capacity allocation
procedure. The ATC describes the capacity allocated in previous stages of the capacity
allocation procedure and the ATC the capacity available for the current stage of capacity
allocation. Thus, the ATC can be deﬁned as ATC = NTC −AAC.
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the responsible transmission system operators. ENTSO-E publishes a table of
'Indicative values for NTCs in Europe' on its website twice a year.36 The main
complexity with commercial transfers is in the determination procedure of the
maximum available capacity as physical characteristics of electricity transmis-
sion have to be taken into account. The issue of the determination of available
commercial capacity is considered in Section 3.2.
However, the current commercial capacity deﬁnitions may not be able to
eﬃciently utilize cross-border capacities as mentioned capacity deﬁnitions ab-
stract from physical realities of electricity transmission. One particular reason
is the integration of large-scale renewable electricity generation and the eﬃ-
cient utilization into the electricity network. According to ERGEG (2010b)
current congestion management regimes are not able to suﬃciently support the
integration. Therefore, closer cooperation of national transmission system op-
erators is required. Additionally, the improvement of the existing commercial-
or transaction-based procedure towards a ﬂow-based procedure which incor-
porates the characteristics of physical ﬂows is considered by European Energy
Regulators (ERGEG) and transmission system operators (ERGEG, 2010b). For
instance, Amprion et al. (2011) investigate the feasibility of a ﬂow-based capac-
ity allocation regime within the existing market coupling in the CWE region.
A comparison of diﬀerent congestion management regimes is performed in Sec-
tion 3.3.
As shown in Chapter 2, an eﬃcient use of the existing network can provide
ﬂexibility utilizing the network more fully, can oﬀer a transparent price signal
to inform transmission system operators and regulators of the location of trans-
mission congestion and hence needed network expansion projects. European
countries and some US states have adopted two contrasting approaches to ad-
dress congestion in their market designs: European countries have opted for an
expansion of market coupling linking price zones (zonal pricing) as proposed by
ACER (2011) and ERGEG (2011), and curative congestion management within
price zones, while ﬁve regional markets in the US have adopted the implicit
auctioning of all transmission constraints which is known as nodal pricing or
locational marginal pricing (LMP) (O'Neill et al., 2005b).
As zonal pricing captures only the actual state of physical ﬂows and conges-
tion on transmission lines connecting price zones, it does not provide suﬃcient
information that is necessary to inform regulators, transmission system opera-
tors, and market participants about the congestion situation within price zones
and hence the need for transmission reinforcement and investment. To account
36 Compare: https://www.entsoe.eu/resources/ntc-values/
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for the congestion situation within price zones, ACER (2011) requires in its
Framework Guidelines that zones shall be deﬁned with respect to the conges-
tion situation.37 Currently, price zones are ﬁxed and deﬁned with respect to
national borders within the European system.
From a theoretical perspective, Schweppe (1988) and Hogan (1992) have
shown that nodal pricing leads to higher social welfare than zonal pricing. Other
papers argue that a system using nodal pricing accommodates renewable energy
sources more eﬃciently (Leuthold et al., 2008; Neuhoﬀ, 2011). Leuthold et al.
(2008) have shown the superiority of nodal pricing for the integration of wind
into the German network. Other analysis of beneﬁts from using full network
models and nodal pricing rather than zonal pricing and aggregate international
transfer capacity are provided by Barth et al. (2009) and Weijde and Hobbs
(2011).
While Chapter 2 has discussed the theoretical beneﬁts of diﬀerent conges-
tion management regimes, the purpose of this Chapter is to quantify whether
improving system design makes better use of the network capacities in the Eu-
ropean electricity system (ENTSO-E, formerly called UCTE). Therefore, the
beneﬁts in costs and surpluses of a nodal pricing regime compared to the cur-
rent zonal or national pricing regime are quantiﬁed for the European electricity
system in this Chapter. In a ﬁrst step the achievable savings in generation costs
are determined given diﬀerent shares of renewable wind generation and men-
tioned pricing regimes (Section 3.2). This Section is based on Neuhoﬀ et al.
(2011). However, as highlighted in Chapter 2 congestion management regimes
theoretically achieve short-term eﬃciency, but diﬀer in their distribution of sur-
plus among market participants. Therefore, distributional eﬀects on costs and
surpluses of market participants are evaluated in Section 3.3. Again, a zonal
pricing regime is compared with the nodal pricing regime and surplus as well as
price results are presented and discussed. Section 3.4 draws on Neuhoﬀ et al.
(2011) and provides the conclusions of the provided analysis.
3.2. Quantifying Cost Beneﬁts of Congestion
Management Regimes
As shown in Chapter 2 diﬀerent methods to manage network congestion exist
ranging from congestion alleviation to capacity allocation methods. The appli-
cation of congestion management methods varies across countries. Whereas in
37 The issue of the optimal deﬁnition of price (or market or bidding) zones is discussed in
Section 2.2.2.2.
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PJM market all network constraints are implicitly accounted in the spot mar-
ket using an nodal pricing regime, European countries mainly use congestion
alleviation methods to manage physical congestion in the national transmission
network and do not incorporate network constraints in spot markets. Capac-
ity allocation methods are used in Europe to allocate international transmis-
sion capacity through explicit and implicit auctions. The transmission capacity
available for capacity allocation (net transfer capacity, NTC) is determined by
national transmission system operators for each cross-border connection.
The current practice with respect to international as well as national conges-
tion management in Europe raises the question whether an implicit allocation
and thus a nodal pricing regime achieves beneﬁts with respect to generation
costs and international ﬂows. To answer the question two models are devel-
oped. The ﬁrst model applies the theory of nodal pricing to electricity systems.
Based on an approximation of physical ﬂows in an electricity network, genera-
tion and network usage can be optimized simultaneously. In a second model,
only international transfers are limited which refers to a zonal pricing regime.
Physical ﬂows and associated congestion are managed subsequently in a sepa-
rate model. To deﬁne the available capacity for international transfers, current
approaches are ﬁrstly reviewed and afterwards used to determine the maximum
transmission capacity between two neighboring countries.
A dataset covering the European power market is utilized in this analysis and
used to calculate the diﬀerences between nodal pricing and zonal pricing regimes
resulting from the traditional net transfer capacity (NTC) approach. To deter-
mine the diﬀerence between a nodal pricing regime and the current European
electricity system, the results of the nodal pricing regime are then compared
to a calculation representing implicit auctions with joint allocation of transmis-
sion capacity (NTC) across all international links, i.e., the optimization of the
current paradigm pursued by European Regulators (ERGEG, 2010a). For this
purpose, the model presented in this Section ﬁrst calculates the volume of total
transmission capacity (TTC) based on the calculation methodology presented
in ENTSO-E documents (UCTE, 2009). This provided TTC values that are
consistent with the model network and are used as a base for the calculation
of market results from the dayahead market with subsequent redispatch where
necessary. Afterwards, the diﬀerences between the nodal and zonal approaches
as determined in the models are evaluated.
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3.2.1. Model38
To quantify the impact of diﬀerent congestion management regimes on mar-
ket results, two mathematical models are developed. First, a nodal pricing
model applies the theory of locational marginal prices, thus it determines a
cost minimal generation dispatch of power plants considering the physical char-
acteristics of the transmission network. Thus, the model assumes an implicit
allocation of all transmission capacity during the spot market. The model is
described in Section 3.2.1.1. Second, a zonal pricing model is introduced in
Section 3.2.1.2 which replicates the described current market regime in Europe.
Thus, the model optimizes the dispatch of generation units subject to restric-
tions on transactional cross-border trade. Afterwards, the physical network
characteristics are included and the new generation dispatch is determined by
applying congestion alleviation methods. Additionally, the zonal pricing model
requires the deﬁnition of available capacities for cross-border trade. Therefore,
the general calculation procedures are ﬁrstly reviewed and the applied method-
ology is described in Section 3.2.1.3.
3.2.1.1. Nodal Pricing Model
The nodal pricing model determines the cost minimizing unit commitment Up
and dispatch Gp of power plants p (Equation (3.2)) respecting economic and
technical restrictions, namely the energy balance (Equation (3.3)), minimum
and maximum generation capacity limits (Equations (3.4) and (3.5)), and line
capacity limitations (Equation (3.9)). Generally, an electricity system can be
described by transmission lines l connecting nodes or substations n. At nodes
generation Gp as well as demand qn are located and through the transmission
lines electrical energy can be transfered between nodes.
The energy balance (Equation (3.3)) ensures the balance of demand qn, gener-
ation of thermal power plants Gp located at node n, renewable wind generation
Gwindn , and nodal injections or withdrawals from the network NIn. The energy
balance has to be valid in equality in order to ensure the stable and secure
operation of the electricity system. Thermal power generation is restricted by
their minimum generation requirement gminp (Equation (3.5)) and the maximum
available capacity gmaxp (Equation (3.4)). To incorporate minimum generation
constraints, a binary status variable Up is introduced, indicating the operating
38 The following notation is used throughout the thesis. Capital letters are variables and
small letters describe parameters and sets. Subscripts indicate the set(s) the variable
or parameter depends on, whereas superscripts provide additional information on the
variable or parameter. The nomenclature of the used mathematical notation is given in
the beginning of the thesis.
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status of a power plant p. In a unit commitment model, Up is a decision vari-
able; in a dispatch model, it is predetermined. To allow for the possibility of
wind spillage, wind generation Gwindn is variable and bounded by the available
wind generation gmaxwindn (Equation (3.6)). The power ﬂow LFl on transmission
line l and resulting nodal injection or withdrawal NIn are based on DC load
ﬂow equations (Equations (3.7) and (3.8)) and restricted by maximum thermal
transmission capacity pmaxl (Equation (3.9)). The parameters hl,n and bn,nn
describe the physical characteristics of the underlying transmission network and
are deﬁned by the topology of the network and the resistance and reactance
of transmission lines. The DC load ﬂow equations are derived from the AC
power ﬂow equations for active and reactive power. Through the assumptions
of (i) small voltage angle diﬀerences (∆n−∆nn), (ii) constant voltages, and (iii)
absence of reactive power ﬂows the AC power ﬂow equations can be simpliﬁed
to the so called DC load ﬂow (DCLF) equations (Schweppe, 1988; Wood and
Wollenberg, 1996; Stigler and Todem, 2005; Leuthold et al., 2012). The approx-
imation of AC power ﬂows reduces the mathematical complexity of the opti-
mization problem and are therefore widely used for techno-economic purposes.
Transmission losses are neglected in this approach as well as intertemporal as-
pects. Locational marginal prices are deﬁned as the dual variable of the energy
balance (Equation (3.3)).
min
Up,Gp,Gwindn
∑
p
mcpGp (3.2)
qn =
∑
p
Gp +G
wind
n −NIn ∀n (3.3)
Gp ≤ gmaxp Up ∀p (3.4)
Gp ≥ gminp Up ∀p (3.5)
Gwindn ≤ gmaxwindn ∀n (3.6)
NIn =
∑
nn
bn,nn∆nn ∀n (3.7)
LFl =
∑
n
hl,n∆n ∀l (3.8)
|LFl| ≤ pmaxl ∀l (3.9)
Gp, G
wind
n ≥ 0
Up = {0, 1}
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3.2.1.2. Zonal Pricing Model
As mentioned previously, the zonal pricing model abstracts in the ﬁrst step
from physical realities of transmitting electricity as it is designed to replicate
the current spot market design of European electricity systems. In a second
step, physical network constraints are introduced and the generation dispatch
is optimized given the previous decision on the spot market. The second step
therefore represents the optimization problem of national transmission system
operators who have to ease national congestion.
Firstly, the unit commitment of power plants Up is optimized (Equation
(3.10)) subject to the energy balance (Equation (3.11)), technical restriction on
thermal generation (Equations (3.12) and (3.13)), renewable generation (Equa-
tion (3.14)), and limitations on international trade ttcco,cco (Equation (3.15)). In
contrast to the nodal pricing model physical international and national network
constraints are neglected, as transfers TFn,nn refer to transactional exchanges
between nodes n and nn. Transfers between nodes within one country co are
unrestricted, whereas transfers between nodes of diﬀerent countries co and cco
are limited (Equation (3.15)). The total transfer capacity ttcco,cco represents the
upper limit on international trades between neighboring countries co and cco.
The determination procedure of the total transfer capacity ttcco,cco is described
in Section 3.2.1.3.
This step represents the stylized dayahead market procedure in most Euro-
pean countries. The mixed integer linear program is as follows:
min
Up,Gp,Gwindn
∑
p
mcpGp (3.10)
qn − gwindn =
∑
p
Gp +
∑
nn
TFnn,n −
∑
nn
TFn,nn ∀n (3.11)
Gp ≤ gmaxp Up ∀p (3.12)
Gp ≥ gminp Up ∀p (3.13)
Gwindn ≤ gmaxwindn ∀n (3.14)∑
n∈co
∑
nn∈cco
TFn,nn ≤ ttcco,cco ∀co, cco (3.15)
Gp, TFn,nn ≥ 0
Up = {0, 1}
Once the unit commitment of power plants Up is optimized in the ﬁrst step
subject to transactional exchange limitations, the power plant dispatch Gp is
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optimized in the second step using the nodal pricing model (Section 3.2.1.1)
subject to physical network constraints (power ﬂow limitations and DC load
ﬂow constraints). Hence physical network congestion is introduced and has
to be managed using short-term congestion alleviation methods in the form of
redispatching of power plants. However, the ﬂexibility of power plants is limited
as the unit commitment Up is ﬁxed to the values of the ﬁrst optimization step.
The exception is that the unit commitment of fast starting gas-turbine power
plants is not ﬁxed due to their technical ﬂexibility. Beside the power plant
dispatch, wind spilling and load shedding are introduced as additional short-
term congestion alleviation options.
3.2.1.3. Calculation of Total Transfer Capacity
As mentioned in the introduction of this Chapter, international capacity alloca-
tions distinguish between commercial transfer which are used by market partici-
pants to plan their cross-border trades and physical ﬂows as used by transmission
system operators in real-time operation (ETSO, 2001b). The abstraction from
physical characteristics of transmitting electricity in the deﬁnition of commer-
cial transfers requires a speciﬁed calculation procedures which are described in
UCTE (2009). The available calculation methods are subsequently presented
followed by the description the applied methodology.
The computation of TTC starts with establishing a Base Case Exchange
(BCE), based on the best available information on network conditions, gen-
eration and load patterns, and planned cross-border transactions. To compute
the TTC from area A to area B, generation is increased stepwise in area A and
decreased in area B, maintaining loads the same, until security limits in either
system A or B are reached:
TTC = BCE +∆E = NTC + TRM (3.16)
where∆E is the maximum increase in transfer before security limits are breached.
Operationally, there are three available methods for determining the max-
imum transfer of generation between two areas in TTC calculations (UCTE,
2009):
 Method A: Each chosen injection is scaled in proportion to the remaining
available capacity at the relevant generator node. The value of ∆Emax
(i.e., TTC − BCE) is determined when either all generators reach their
maximum outputs, or if a network operational limit is reached. This
method brings the key advantage that physical generator output limits
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are respected. UCTE (2009) states that it should therefore be used under
normal circumstances.
 Method B: If the necessary data on generation limits for the ﬁrst method
are not available, the generator outputs may be scaled without consider-
ation of output limits.
 Method C: The generator outputs are modiﬁed according to merit order,
with limits on output being respected.
Hence detailed information are available on methods for TTC calculation.
However, NTC determination is more diﬃcult, as the public information on
methods used for determining the transmission reliability margins (TRM) is
limited. ETSO (2001b) suggests that the margin required for load-frequency
control can be determined by statistical analysis of historical time series, and
that the margins required for reserve sharing and emergency transfers should
be agreed upon between transmission system operators. It also discusses how
these components of the TRM should be combined. However, the precise cal-
culations are not described in that source, and cannot be duplicated based on
that information.
Operational experience from three control areas illustrates the diﬀerences in
the methods that diﬀerent transmission system operators use to determine trans-
mission reliability margins.
 For Nordpool, ENTSO-E (2010a) states that in practice, the TRMs be-
tween areas in Nordpool are based on transfers due to frequency regulation
only. It gives the current TRM values used as 100 MW between Sweden
and Finland, 150 MW between Sweden and southeastern Norway, and
50 MW for most of the remaining connections. A further description for
the speciﬁc case of Finland is given in Fingrid (2009).
 To determine the TRM, a number of the German transmission system op-
erators (EnBW Transportnetze AG, 2010; Vattenfall Europe Transmission
GmbH, 2010; RWE Transportnetz Strom GmbH, 2010) use a heuristic for-
mula. They multiply the square root of the number of connection circuits
between control zones with 100 MW to obtain the TRM. Some examples
of the numbers of cross-border circuits are 4 (Germany to France), 6 (Ger-
many to Netherlands), 15 (Germany to Switzerland), and 12 (Germany to
Austria).
 Information supplied by the Polish System Operator (PSE Operator S.A.)
conﬁrms that there are no universal regulations deﬁning the TRM deter-
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mination process (Neuhoﬀ et al., 2011). The TRM is said to be lower for
shorter time horizons, when uncertainty is reduced.
This diversity of methods prevents a comparison of modeled and actually an-
nounced values by the transmission system operators, as discussed in Section
3.2.3.
The applied TTC calculation approach follows 'Method C' using an economic
dispatch model with DC load ﬂow constraints which speciﬁes the generation
of power plants following the merit order principle. In order to calculate the
TTC between neighboring countries, the nodal pricing model (Section 3.2.1.1)
is extended by Equations (3.17) and (3.18). Each country co is characterized by
a speciﬁed net export position netexportBCE , which corresponds to an agreed
base case (BCE) and deﬁned international transactional exchanges. To allow
an adjustment of the net export position and henceforth the calculation of the
total transmission capacity TTC, the parameter netexport is introduced and
successively increased in country co and decreased in country cco during the
calculation procedure. The change in the net export position of a country has
to be counterbalanced by the generation dispatch which is determined by the
economic dispatch model (Equation (3.17)).
∑
p∈co
Gp −
∑
n∈co
qn = netexport
BCE
co +∆netexport
co→cco
co ∀co (3.17)
∆netexportco→ccocco = −∆netexportco→ccoco (3.18)
The calculation procedure works as follows (see Figure 3.2). In the ﬁrst step
the generation dispatch and power plant status is optimized for the deﬁned base
case (BCE). In order to determine the additional bilateral exchanges, the net
export position of two neighboring countries (co and cco) is changed (a stepwise
increase of ∆netexportco→ccoco in one country and vice versa).
The unit commitment Up and the dispatch of power plants Gp in both coun-
tries (co and cco) is optimized using the economic dispatch model. The unit
commitment in the remaining countries is ﬁxed to the base case commitment
whereas redispatching of power plants within these countries is allowed. The
demand is ﬁxed at the initial demand q and not changed during the optimiza-
tion procedure. If a feasible commitment and dispatch is found, the calculation
procedure continues and the net export position ∆netexportco→ccoco is further in-
creased in country co and decreased in country cco, respectively. Otherwise if the
economic dispatch is infeasible meaning that a transmission limit is violated the
procedure stops and the total increase of bilateral exchanges (∆netexportco→ccoco )
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reﬂects the maximum additional exchange (∆E) between country co and cco ac-
cording to the TTC deﬁnition (Equation (3.16)). In the following, the procedure
continues for the next combination of neighboring countries.
Initialization
Set netexportBCEco
Solve the economic dispatch model
Save the generation quantities Gp and power plant status Up
LOOP co
LOOP cco
IF neighborco,cco = Y ES THEN
Set iter = 1
Set ∆netexport = 0
Solve the economic dispatch model
WHILE economic dispatch is feasible
Save COSTS and ∆netexportco→ccoco
Set ∆netexportco→ccoco = ∆netexport
co→cco
co + iter ∗ 50
Solve the economic dispatch model
Set iter = iter + 1
END WHILE
END IF
END LOOP
END LOOP
Figure 3.2.: Pseudo code of the TTC calculation procedure. Source: Own illustration
The calculation procedure is performed for each combination of neighboring
countries. Finally, the total transfer capacity (TTC) is calculated as the ini-
tial transfer of the base case plus the maximum possible additional transfer
∆netexport following the deﬁnition in Equation (3.16). The calculated total
transfer capacity ttcco,cco reﬂects the maximum exchange, which can be techni-
cally managed by the national power systems through adjustments of generation
commitment and dispatch. Corresponding generation costs can be considered
as an additional economic criterion for the determination of the maximum al-
lowable additional exchanges.
3.2.2. Data and Scenarios
The UCTE-Study Model (UCTE-STUM) dataset is used for the network study,
which was provided by ENTSO-E for research purposes. The UCTE-STUM is
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a limited version of the UCTE reference data set for each seasonal period pro-
duced for third-party analysis. The dataset comprises a forecast for the static
operation of the UCTE control area for the 3rd Wednesdays in January for the
year 2008 and includes a detailed representation of the former UCTE network
of approximately 4,300 buses, 6,300 lines and 1,100 transformers together with
their loads and generation in-feeds. The dataset allows the calculation of the
AC load ﬂow for the respective snapshot of the system operation. To perform
network studies, the UCTE-STUM dataset was enhanced to allow dispatch op-
timization (Neuhoﬀ et al., 2011).
In Figure 4.1, the network topology is presented, where diﬀerent line colours
are used for the diﬀerent voltage levels and equivalent elements are represented
with dotted lines. The capacity of transmission lines is de-rated to 80% of their
nominal capacity to approximate the N-1 security constraints in the network
(Leuthold et al., 2012).
A European generation database was matched to the nodes including power
plants with capacities exceeding 100 MW. The matching was performed on
the basis of geographic proximity and according to information provided at
the ENTSO-E network map (ENTSO-E, 2011b). The total installed capacity
amounts to approximately 430 GW, comprising 10 generation technologies39. To
counterbalance the impact of distributed generation, nodal loads were decreased
pro-rata on a country basis based on the load values published by ENTSO-E
(ENTSO-E, 2011a). The derived total system load for the obtained snapshot
amounts to approximately 300 GW.
In order to investigate the impact of renewable generation on the power sys-
tem, a single load scenario and three wind scenarios are speciﬁed and analyzed.
Beside a scenario without wind production, two wind production snapshots
(high: 38 GW and medium: 13 GW) were selected as representative scenarios
of the total wind feed-in in the system corresponding to a total installed wind
capacity of approximately 63 GW (EWEA, 2009). Wind feed-in scenarios were
calculated and matched to the network nodes based on the 'high scenario 2008'
of the TradeWind study (Van Hulle et al., 2009, p. 21).
39 Combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), open cycle gas turbine (OCGT), gas-ﬁred steam
turbine, coal power plant, lignite power plant, oil-ﬁred power plant, nuclear power plant,
wind power, hydro power plant (reservoir), and pumped hydro power plant.
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Figure 3.3.: Geographic representation of the network model (Red: 380 kV, Green:
220 kV, Black: 150 kV, and dotted lines correspond to equivalent ele-
ments). Source: Neuhoﬀ et al. (2011)
3.2.3. Results
3.2.3.1. Nodal Pricing Results
In this section the results from the nodal pricing model (Section 3.2.1.1) are
compared considering diﬀerent wind generation scenarios across the observed
region of continental Europe. Table 3.1 illustrates the operating costs as well
as volume weighted nodal price for the considered European countries. As ex-
pected, operating costs decrease with higher wind generation as marginal costs
are zero. This is additionally reﬂected in the volume weighted nodal prices.
No Wind Mean Wind Max Wind
Operating costs
million EUR/h 7.80 6.99 5.59
Avg. price
EUR/MWh 72.87 68.05 62.84
Table 3.1.: Operating costs and prices of nodal pricing regime. Source: Own illustra-
tion
Figure 3.4 depicts the volume weighted nodal price by country as an indicator
of the prices that would be experienced under nodal pricing. For the depicted
countries, data on dayahead market prices as well as average hourly prices was
available for comparison for the hour of the reference case (10 a.m.11 a.m.,
Wednesday 16 January 2008). The dayahead spot price for that hour is closest
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Figure 3.4.: Comparison of selected actual market prices for power products for
Wednesday 16 January 2008 (bars) and simulated prices (lines). Source:
Own illustration
to the speciﬁc situation of network and generation assets, but additional fac-
tors (contract positions, intraday changes to dispatch) might have impacted the
price or network conﬁguration. Hence, the average price for this hour across
all Wednesdays in the month is additionally depicted to abstract from speciﬁc
aspects of the day. The overall price levels are similar between simulated and
observed prices, with the largest discrepancy occurring in Austria. This can
be attributed to the complex congestion structure combined with the impact of
international ﬂow patterns in Austria (see Figure 3.5).
In Figure 3.5, the nodal price distribution within Europe for two operational
snapshots, the no wind case and the maximum wind case, are presented. The
impact of wind integration in Northern and South West Europe can be seen
by the reduction in nodal prices. Diﬀerences between nodal prices indicate
congestion, either across borders (e.g. between France and Italy) or internally
(e.g. North - South Germany). The calculations show the existence of areas in
Europe with comparable prices that ﬁrstly do not necessarily match the national
borders and secondly vary with diﬀerent wind in-feeds.
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(a) No wind scenario
(b) Max wind scenario
Figure 3.5.: Geographic representation of nodal prices for selected wind scenarios
(Bar represents energy prices at nodal level: from 10 EUR/MWh in blue
to 100 EUR/MWh in red). Source: Neuhoﬀ et al. (2011)
Regarding the utilization of transmission capacity, about 50 out of about the
6,000 lines are loaded up to their thermal transmission limit, the majority of
which correspond to branches within national zones (internal congestion). In
particular, only two branches are cross-border lines while six are transformers.
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In Figure 3.6, the line loadings for the European network for the maximum wind
scenario are presented, where the geographic extent of congestion can be seen.
High line loadings can be observed on single transmission lines in nearly each
country, whereas the majority of transmission lines shows a low loading. Thus,
a general pattern of congested transmission lines restricted to speciﬁc countries
or regions cannot be noticed.
Figure 3.6.: Line loading representation for the maximum wind scenario (Line loading
is depicted with a respective colour: from blue colour (low loading) to
red (high loading)). Source: Neuhoﬀ et al. (2011)
3.2.3.2. Zonal Pricing Results
Based on the parameterization of the network representation, and after conﬁrm-
ing that nodal prices provide consistent results, the implicit allocation of inter-
national transmission capacity within a zonal pricing regime is analyzed. There-
fore, the optimal dispatch model described in Section 3.2.1.3 is used to calculate
the TTC values for available transmission capacity between countries. Using
these TTC values a TTC-constrained optimization (Section 3.2.1.2) then allows
a consistent comparison with model results under the nodal pricing regime. As
described in Section 3.2.1.3, the NTC (published by ENTSO-E) is calculated by
the diﬀerence between TTC and TRM. The TRM is however not available for
all transmission lines, thus preventing a direct comparison of calculated TTC
values and NTC values actually announced by the TSOs. The calculated TTC
values are listed in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
Next, the model described in Section 3.2.1.2 is used to optimize the dispatch
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of power plants using implicit auctions allocating transmission capacity (TTCs)
between European countries. Therefore a two step approach is chosen: ﬁrst,
initial trading is carried out among generators and demand, respecting inter-
national transmission constraints as deﬁned by the TTC values, but not trans-
mission constraints within countries. This trading is based on a transshipment
(path-based) model. Second, national TSOs then resolve congestion on lines
within their respective country by redispatching national generation, which is
online. National TSOs are restricted to national generation and cannot make
use of international generation to relieve congestion (e.g. international redis-
patch). The second step allowed the introduction of load shedding and/or wind
spilling for balancing purposes with marginal costs of this procedure arbitrarily
set at 500 EUR/MWh (greatly exceeding the marginal costs of other genera-
tion). This two step approach likely yields higher operating costs than the nodal
pricing model because the nodal model does not impose the limitation on in-
ternational transfers, and only imposes the line constraints without restricting
the international transfers to possibly suboptimal values found in the ﬁrst TTC
run.
No Wind Mean Wind Max Wind
Operating costs (1st step)
million EUR per h 7.47 6.53 5.33
Operating costs (2nd step)
million EUR per h 8.03 7.29 5.88
Load shedding and
wind spillage costs (2nd step)*
million EUR per h 1.18 0.85 0.46
Redispatching costs**
million EUR per h 0.570.74 0.761.00 0.560.77
Avg. price (1st stage)
EUR/MWh 75.94 52.65 44.05
* Load shedding and wind spillage are accounted with marginal costs of 500
EUR/MWh.
** The lower limit of the cost range corresponds to cost-based redispatch and the
upper limit represents market-based redispatching cost.
Table 3.2.: Operating costs and prices of zonal pricing regime. Source: Own illustra-
tion
Table 3.2 provides the cost and price results for diﬀerent wind scenarios. The
average price reﬂects the volume weighted price across EU countries. Operating
costs are depicted for both steps of the optimization procedure. Again, operat-
ing costs decline with higher wind generation comparable to the nodal pricing
results. The diﬀerence between both cost values represents the management
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costs to relieve congestion in national physical transmission network. Hence,
costs of the second step are likely to be higher than the ﬁrst case as physical
network constraints become relevant.
Two options to translate the redispatch of power plants through the intro-
duction of physical network constraints into redispatch costs are listed as a cost
range in Table 3.2. First, it is assumed that each country's TSO can price
discriminate when redispatching, and thus limit redispatch costs. Hence, all
upward response (constrained-on generation) is paid their marginal generation
costs and all downward responses (constrained-oﬀ generation) pay their gener-
ation costs to the TSO. This corresponds to a cost-based congestion alleviation
regime (Section 2.2.3.2) and results in the lower value of the redispatching cost
range depicted in Table 3.2. Second, it is assumed that constrained-on genera-
tion is paid the maximum price which corresponds to the highest marginal cost
of constrained-on generation within the country. Similarly all constrained-oﬀ
production pays the lowest price for such buy-back within the country. The
lowest prices represents the lowest marginal costs of constrained-oﬀ generation.
This congestion alleviation approach corresponds to market-based redispatch
procedure (Section 2.2.3.2) and causes higher redispatching costs than the cost-
based method (Table 3.2).
Typically the TSO has to pay the market price rather than remunerating gen-
erators at cost. The market-based redispatch thus corresponds to a competitive
market outcome. With market power, where generators submit bids for upward
or downward response that diverge from their variable cost, the prices could
further increase. In fact, if generators anticipate payments that are available in
the redispatch market, then they are likely to bid in this manner, raising prices
and congestion management costs above those depicted in Table 3.2.
3.2.3.3. Comparison of Results
Firstly operating costs reﬂecting total variable costs incurred for power gen-
eration are analyzed. Variable costs of generating power plants are summed
(reﬂecting both fuel and carbon costs of generators), but ignored ﬁxed start-up
and minimum run costs. As not all demand is met by available generation ca-
pacity across the scenarios in the zonal pricing case, additional costs for load
shedding and wind spillage occur.
Figure 3.7 depicts the operational costs of considered congestion management
regimes. Based on operational costs, cost savings that are achievable through
the system wide optimization possible with nodal pricing relative to zonal pric-
ing market designs vary between 0.14 and 0.3 million EUR per hour excluding
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Figure 3.7.: Operational costs of congestion management regimes. Source: Own il-
lustration
costs of load shedding and wind spillage. Relative to operational costs of zonal
pricing regime, cost saving represent 1.7%3.6% depending on the wind scenario.
According to Neuhoﬀ et al. (2011), this yields estimates of annual savings that
range from 0.82.0 billion EUR.
Subsequently, the level of network utilization under both congestion manage-
ment regimes is considered. Table 3.3 depicts the total volume of international
transfers that is observed in each of scenarios. International transfers in the
zonal pricing regime represent absolute ﬂows of the second step. The nodal
pricing approach leads to an increase in international transfers that take place
between countries, up to 32% more in the mean wind scenario. Neuhoﬀ et al.
(2011) calculates an increase in international transfers up to 34%. Thus, existing
network capacity is better utilized to accommodate increasingly large volumes of
intermittent energy sources. The results indicate that this diﬀerence is greatest
in the scenario with high wind penetrations.
No Wind Mean Wind Max Wind
Zonal Pricing
GW per h 31.4 31.9 33.5
Nodal Pricing
GW per h 35.9 41.9 41.2
Table 3.3.: International transfers of pricing regimes. Source: Own illustration
The calculated increase of the volume of ﬂows resulting from nodal pricing is
likely to provide a lower bound to the beneﬁts of nodal pricing for two reasons.
Firstly, the maximum possible TTC values are calculated for each pair of neigh-
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boring countries. It is assumed that the values for all pairs are simultaneously
possible, but in practice the TTC values have to be reduced to ensure that they
are jointly viable. Secondly, the redispatch volume as determined in the model
causes congestion management costs for TSOs and would ample opportunities
for gaming if these are high. Therefore in practice the TSO could issue lower
TTC values to constrain international transfers in order to limit the level of
domestic transmission constraints as experienced in the Swedish power market
(Section 2.4.2.2).
3.2.4. Discussion
Models have to abstract from many details of reality because of the lack of ad-
equate data or computational limitations. Thus, trade-oﬀs are necessary when
deciding upon the level of detail of the physical representation of the grid, gen-
eration and demand. In addition, the temporal dimension can be captured to
diﬀerent levels of detail or accuracy ranging from long-term investment choices
to daily unit-commitment requirements or short-term representation of system
ﬂows and stability. As interconnected power systems are no longer operated
according to one system-wide optimization algorithm, models could also aim
to represent market design and strategic behavior of market participants. The
focus of this Chapter is on the role of congestion management in the European
network. Hence a detailed representation of the transmission grid and spatial
distribution of generation and load was necessary. To allow for a comparison of
diﬀerent power market designs, the main characteristics of both nodal pricing
and of the implicit and joint allocation of international transmission capacity
had to be captured in the model.
The simpliﬁcations inherent in a model thus raise the question, to what ex-
tent do the qualitative and quantitative model results provide evidence for the
impacts of nodal pricing on real power systems. As many of the detailed char-
acteristics of power stations, as well as system requirements like reserve require-
ments, are not explicitly modeled, the interpretation is focused on the model
results concerning overall congestion and pricing patterns rather than locational
prices or constraint volumes of a speciﬁc line, and the comparison between power
market designs based on the same system and demand conﬁguration. Those ag-
gregations are likely to be more reliably projected than, for instance, prices at
individual buses or ﬂows through individual lines. For these comparisons the
results of the diﬀerent models are broadly consistent with each other and with
observed market prices.
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3.2.4.1. Results from Other Studies
The achieved model results conﬁrm observations from existing nodal pricing-
based systems in the US. Mansur and White (2009) studied PJM and AEP /
Dayton / ComEd operations before and after their merger. Their studies show
that the volume of commercial transaction between the geographical regions
increased by approximately 42% after the integration of both markets. The
increase is consistent without optimization results that showed up to a 34% in-
crease in international ﬂows. The incremental beneﬁt of extending nodal pricing
to the AEP / Dayton / ComEd areas to PJM was 180 million USD annually,
which multiplied by the size ratios (50 GW for the three states, 820 GW EU)
translates to a gain of 2.95 billion USD. As US fuel prices in 2009 measured in
USD roughly correspond to EU fuel prices in Euro, the results can be interpreted
as system savings of 2.95 billion EUR. PJM estimates that the overall beneﬁts
of integrated operation of their system are 2.2 billion USD (approximately 1.8
billion EUR) annually (Ott, 2010). Analysis from nodal pricing-based oper-
ations in Texas (Watson, 2011) revealed that the ERCOT system could have
helped avoid potentially "millions, or hundreds of millions [USD]" if it had been
implemented before a 2008 spike in power price. The system, which went fully
operation December 2010, has reportedly already reduced prices by 25%33%
compared to December 2009 because the increased granularity of the power
market design allows for more precise operations.
In addition to this experience, other simulations have quantiﬁed the beneﬁts
of nodal pricing for international coordination of dispatch. For instance, Weijde
and Hobbs (2011) simulate both nodal and zonal power market designs on a
four-node model and ﬁnd that coordinated international redispatch can save up
to 10% of system unit commitment and dispatch costs relative to a TTC-type
market outcome. As the coordinated international redispatch reinstates a con-
ﬁguration of power production that is similar to nodal pricing, the 10% savings
can be interpreted as the savings of nodal pricing relative to TTC-type approach.
Most of these savings are due to the ability to adjust international ﬂows in bal-
ancing markets. If international rebalancing is allowed in a TTC system, then
the cost savings of instead using nodal pricing are an order of magnitude smaller,
but still signiﬁcant. The high value of these savings, compared to results pre-
sented in Section 3.2.3, relates to the higher level of congestion in the network,
and the additional constraints imposed by the small number of generators in
the model that can contribute to resolving the constraint.
In another study, Barth et al. (2009) obtain an estimated LMP beneﬁt (com-
pared to an NTC system) of 0.1% of system variable cost for the EU in the
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year 2015 under more than 125 GW of wind capacity. These beneﬁts are a
combination of improved eﬃciency of international transactions, within-country
dispatch, and dayahead unit commitment that considers all international net-
work constraints instead of NTCs. However, they treat each country as a single
zone with no consideration of individual circuits between countries or congestion
within countries, therefore, this estimate should be viewed as a lower bound.
Oggioni and Smeers (2009) use a simple six-node network to examine the bene-
ﬁt of coordinated international balancing markets. Market coupling based upon
nodal pricing is found to be more eﬃcient than using NTCs. Meanwhile, Van-
dezande et al. (2009) provide an estimated beneﬁt of coordinated balancing be-
tween Belgium and the Netherlands (compared to no international redispatch)
to be approximately 40% of total balancing costs. Other studies have examined
the beneﬁts of LMP, but not speciﬁcally relative to NTC-based management
of international constraints. Green (2007) estimates that LMP would provide
eﬃciency beneﬁts equal to about 1.5% of generator revenues in the UK due to
better dispatch and demand response to prices. Leuthold et al. (2005) estimate
that LMP would provide a 0.61.3% increase in economic surplus in the German
power markets. A further 1% gain would result if more wind capacity is built
because of increased congestion. Weigt (2006) extends that model to include
unit commitment of aggregations of power plants and international transmis-
sion. He obtains a beneﬁt equal to 0.06% of the market surplus for all of Europe,
including a net 0.79% increase in consumer surplus which is partially oﬀset by
decreases in proﬁts. Thus, results from other modeling conﬁrm that signiﬁcant
cost savings would likely result from a shift to nodal pricing-based congestion
management on a European scale.
To the extent that initial implementation of a nodal market design will be
limited to part of the EU region, only parts of these savings will be generated.
However, improvements to the power market design can also oﬀer additional
savings where system-wide intraday optimization (as possible in nodal pricing
related power market designs) allows for eﬀective use of the better wind forecasts
that appear during the day. Also, the beneﬁts of transparent information on
congested lines for network expansion decisions and public engagement during
the planning process have not been quantiﬁed.
3.2.4.2. EU Transition to Nodal Pricing Market Design
Shifting to a nodal power market design would require considerable changes in
the institutional settings in Europe towards a more centralized market struc-
ture. The current separation of power exchanges and grid operation would have
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to be abandoned in favor of an integrated ISO (Independent System Operator)
or closely coordinated ISOs, at least for the dayahead and intraday market. Fu-
ture and other derivative markets can be handled by one or several institutions
distinct from the system and spot market operator. Nevertheless, such institu-
tional changes raise several objections even beyond the evident self-interests of
some of the current players in the markets. According to Neuhoﬀ et al. (2011)
four major concerns may be identiﬁed:
 Feasibility. The entire European system is larger (600+ GW) than the
PJM area (160+ GW), therefore the algorithms for optimal commitment
and dispatch will require more computation time. This clearly has to
be checked carefully, but the improvements in computer and algorithm
performance have been tremendous over the last decade, and further im-
provements are expected to come. Thus, the importance of this constraint
is likely to fade away over time; even if it is possibly relevant today at a
full European scale, it is certainly not relevant for an implementation in
a limited number of European states in the next years.
 Security. Today accountability for system security in Europe rests on the
shoulders of the control zone operators (TSOs) at a decentralized level.
Shifting this responsibility to a more central level is feared by some to
reduce system security. The PJM experience shows that centralized oper-
ation does not mean increased unreliability, e.g., the territory covered by
PJM was saved from the large scale August 2003 blackout across the north-
east USA and some Canadian provinces because an integrated real time
dispatch algorithm provided timely and accurate information that allowed
for quick responses. A coordination of real-time responses to disturbance
may hence even contribute to increased system security. Alternatively, it
is possible to maintain the real-time operation and security responsibility
at a decentralized level even with centralized dayahead and intraday dis-
patch. The shift in responsibility would then occur at gate closure (e.g.,
12 hours from real time). This would obviously raise several coordination
issues, but these would be of a technical nature and could be solved, see
Baldick et al. (1999) and Aguado and Quintana (2001).
 Market Liquidity. The argument here is that large areas with uniform
prices encompass multiple agents, thus inducing more liquid markets. In
turn, this creates more hedging possibilities, helping in particular smaller
power plant operators. This issue certainly requires further investigation,
yet the ﬁnancial hedging using derivatives may still be concentrated on one
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reference product (like Brent or WTI in the oil market). This reference
product may correspond to some particular node in the system (like Henry
Hub for US gas contracts), or it may be a virtual system point or system
average (like the Nordpool system marginal price). Locational deviations
from this reference price, as far as they are temporary and stochastic,
will largely level out over a month or year and thus do not constitute a
major risk for the individual plant operator. If the deviations by contrast
are systematic, then they provide a clear locational signal for power plant
investors. Moreover, Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) may be used
to hedge locational spreads (O'Neill et al., 2006).
 Lack of institutional competition. Ockenfels et al. (2008) argue that the
centralization of operation decisions eliminates the competition between
diﬀerent trading institutions (e.g., power exchanges vs. OTC trading).
Also the competition between diﬀerent power plant operation strategies
 typical for today's bilateral and voluntary trading arrangements  is
at ﬁrst sight replaced by one centralized dispatch algorithm. However, in
the US, organized markets, independent power exchanges coexist with the
formal ISO markets, and there are multiple trading institutions that deal
in forward products. Obviously in this dispatch algorithm, power plant
owners still may inﬂuence the operation of their power plants through the
bids which they submit to the system operator, or they can self-schedule,
accepting whatever prices the market oﬀers. An important issue is to
what extent cost-based bids will be required by the ISO: PJM and the
California ISO, for instance, require them as a back-up to be used in the
case congestion creates opportunities for exercising local market power
(O'Neill et al., 2006).
These and other issues have to be discussed in detail when it comes to im-
plementing nodal pricing in practice. Yet the analysis presented here at least
provides an economic rationale for introducing an implicit allocation of trans-
mission capacity and thus nodal prices.
3.3. Quantifying Distributional Eﬀects of Congestion
Management Regimes
Section 3.2 analyzes the impact of diﬀerent pricing regimes only on system
operating costs. However, Chapter 2 pointed out that all market-based conges-
tion management regimes achieve a least-cost generation dispatch and are thus
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eﬃcient in short-run perspective. Furthermore, it is stated that distributional
eﬀects are dominating and market participants (consumer, generators, transmis-
sion system operator) face diﬀerent costs and beneﬁts. As the previous analysis
in Section 3.2 concentrates on cost saving in generation achieved through better
allocation of transmission capacity, the subsequent Section aims to quantify dis-
tributional eﬀects of costs, beneﬁts, and surpluses among market participants. A
model is described which reﬂects the currently applied congestion management
procedure based on transaction-based allocation of international capacity and
national redispatch to ease congestion. The current procedure is compared to a
ﬂow-based allocation of international transmission capacity and to a complete
allocation of all transmission capacity within the spot market. The last proce-
dure is known as a nodal pricing regime, whereas other approaches represent
zonal pricing regimes.
The structure of the section is as follows. The nodal and the zonal pricing
model are described in Section 3.3.1 including a description of the transaction
and ﬂow-based allocation methods. Underlying data for the European electricity
market is described in Section 3.3.2. Section 3.3.3 presents and discusses the
achieved results.
3.3.1. Model
To quantify the distributional implications of a change in the European conges-
tion management regime a nodal and a zonal pricing model are applied. The
general model speciﬁcations are already known from Section 3.2. However, the
exact model formulations diﬀer to Section 3.2 as the high voltage direct current
transmission (HVDC) is introduced mainly due to the inclusion of neighbor-
ing Scandinavian countries, the binary status variable of power plants including
minimum generation requirements is omitted, and a separate congestion man-
agement model is formulated to optimize the least cost redispatch of power
plants. Therefore the description of the models is subsequently repeated to
maintain readability.
Within this analysis, a nodal pricing model serves as a benchmark as it en-
sures the optimal usage of generation and transmission infrastructure. Second,
a zonal pricing model is described comprising the allocation of international ca-
pacities and the alleviation of national congestion by responsible transmission
system operators. Within the zonal pricing model, a spot market model con-
siders the allocation of international transmission capacities while determining
the dispatch of generation units. Afterwards, the redispatch of generation is
optimized on a national basis in a congestion management model.
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3.3.1.1. Nodal Pricing Model
The nodal pricing model optimizes the power dispatch Gp of individual power
plants p by minimizing total generation cost
∑
pmcpGp (Equation (3.19)) sub-
ject to physical network restrictions. Physical load ﬂows of the entire trans-
mission network and occurring congestion are considered while optimizing the
generation dispatch of individual power plants. The objective function is con-
strained by the energy balance (Equation (3.20)), maximum generation capac-
ity of thermal power plants (Equation (3.21)), and the restrictions on power
transmission (Equations (3.24) and (3.25)). In contrast to Section 3.2 HVDC
transmission is added to the model beside the alternating current (AC) trans-
mission.
The nodal energy balance (Equation (3.20)) ensures the equality of thermal
generation Gp located at node n, renewable wind generation gwindn , nodal de-
mand qn, and net input or withdrawal from the AC transmission grid NIn and
HVDC lines HVDCn,nn. As the transmission of electricity within the AC trans-
mission grid is characterized by the physical characteristics, a direct current load
ﬂow (DCLF) approach is used to determine the load ﬂows LFl on individual
transmission lines l. Based on the technical network characteristics bn,nn and
hl,n, the power ﬂow on physical transmission lines LFl (Equation (3.23)) as well
as the physical netinput at each system node NIn (Equation (3.22)) are deter-
mined by the load angle ∆n. In contrast to the AC network, the ﬂow on HVDC
lines can be directly controlled and thus does not depend on physical character-
istics of the AC network. Therefore the HVDC transmission HVDCn,nn from
node n to nn is directly considered in the energy balance depending on their
direction. The maximum capacity of AC and HVDC transmission lines limits
the absolute physical exchanges between system nodes (Equations (3.24) and
(3.25)).
min
Gp
∑
p
mcpGp (3.19)
qn − gwindn =
∑
p
Gp −NIn
−
∑
nn
HVDCn,nn +
∑
nn
HVDCnn,n ∀n (3.20)
Gp ≤ gmaxp ∀p (3.21)
NIn =
∑
nn
bn,nn∆nn ∀n (3.22)
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LFl =
∑
n
hl,n∆n ∀l (3.23)
|LFl| ≤ pmaxl ∀l (3.24)
HVDCn,nn ≤ HVDCmaxn,nn ∀n, nn (3.25)
Gp ≥ 0
3.3.1.2. Zonal Pricing Model
The zonal pricing model follows a two step approach consisting of a spot market
and a congestion management model. Given the results of the spot market and
the generation dispatch determined considering international trade limitations,
the congestion management applies cost-based redispatch of generation units to
ease arising congestion in national transmission networks.
Spot Market Model
Comparable to the nodal pricing model, the spot market model also minimizes
the total generation costs of the entire system
∑
pmcpGp for a predeﬁned level
of load qn. Again, the minimization of total generation costs (Equation (3.26))
is subject to the energy balance (Equation (3.27)), the capacity restrictions of
power plants (Equation (3.28)), and the restriction of international trade from
country c to cc (Equation (3.29)). The dual variable on the energy balance
condition is interpreted as the marginal spot market price priceDAn . Renewable
wind generation is introduced as a parameter gwindn and thus reduces the load
at each node. Generation of thermal power plants is restricted by the installed
capacity gmaxp of power plant p (Equation (3.28)).
In contrast to the nodal pricing model, the transactional trade TFn,nn between
system nodes n and nn is introduced rather than physical exchanges. The
trade between nodes n belonging to countries c depends on the direction and
is restricted by the net transfer capacity ntcc,cc between country c and country
cc (Equation (3.29)). Thus, international transfer between nodes in diﬀerent
countries is limited whereas transfers between national nodes is unlimited. The
allocation regime of international capacity refers to an implicit auction (see
Section 2.2.2.2) as the usage of capacity is optimized simultaneously with the
generation dispatch.
min
Gp
∑
p
mcpGp (3.26)
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qn − gwindn =
∑
p
Gp −
∑
nn
TFn,nn +
∑
nn
TFnn,n ∀n (3.27)
Gp ≤ gmaxp ∀p (3.28)∑
n∈c
∑
nn∈cc
TFn,nn ≤ ntcc,cc ∀c, cc (3.29)
TFn,nn, Gp ≥ 0
Congestion Management Model
As the spot market model takes only restrictions on international transfers into
account, a separate congestion management model has to be speciﬁed to manage
physical congestion within the countries. Thus, congestion alleviation methods
are applied given the results of the spot market model. Cost-based redispatching
of power plants is therefore considered as market-based congestion management
methods.
Given the spot market dispatch of individual power plants gDAp , the congestion
management model optimizes redispatch of generation units by minimizing total
redispatching costs (Equation (3.30)). The spot market generation gDAp can
be adjusted by increasing (GUPp ) or decreasing (G
DOWN
p ) the generation of
power plants. Power plants which increase their generation are accounted with
their marginal cost mcp. The decrease of generation saves the marginal costs
mcp. Again, the energy balance condition (Equation (3.31)) and the generation
capacity restriction (Equation (3.32)) have to be ensured. Furthermore, the
redispatch of power plants is restricted to national power plants meaning that
the increase of generation GUPp equals the decrease of generation G
DOWN
p for
each country c (Equation (3.37)). Thus, international redispatch of power plants
to ease national network congestion is not allowed.
As the congestion management model determines redispatching costs result-
ing from physical network constraints, a DC load ﬂow approach is introduced to
reﬂect the physical speciﬁcs of transmitting electrical energy. Based on the tech-
nical characteristics of the transmission network (bn,nn and hl,n), the AC power
ﬂow LFl (Equation (3.34)) as well as the physical netinput at each system node
NIn (Equation (3.33)) are determined by the load angle ∆n. The AC power
ﬂow is limited by the available transmission capacity pmaxl (Equation (3.35)).
Physical ﬂow on high voltage direct current (HVDC) lines is considered sepa-
rately and restricted by corresponding capacity (Equation (3.36)). To ensure
the feasibility of the congestion management model, options to reduce nodal
load and wind generation are introduced. Marginal costs for these options are
arbitrarily set to 500 EUR/MWh signiﬁcantly higher than marginal generation
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costs.
min
GUPp ,G
DOWN
p
∑
p
mcpG
UP
p −mcpGDOWNp (3.30)
qn − gwindn =
∑
p
(gDAp +G
UP
p −GDOWNp )−NIn
−
∑
nn
HVDCn,nn +
∑
nn
HVDCnn,n ∀n (3.31)
GUPp −GDOWNp ≤ gmaxp − gDAp ∀p (3.32)
NIn =
∑
nn
bn,nn∆nn ∀n (3.33)
LFl =
∑
n
hl,n∆n ∀l (3.34)
|LFl| ≤ pmaxl ∀l (3.35)
HVDCn,nn ≤ HVDCmaxn,nn ∀n, nn (3.36)∑
p∈c
(GUPp −GDOWNp ) = 0 ∀c (3.37)
GUPp , G
DOWN
p ≥ 0
Assignment and Allocation of International Transmission Capacity
The assignment and allocation of international transmission capacity within the
spot market can be designed in diﬀerent ways as highlighted in Section 3.1. The
assignment can be distinguished into transaction based and ﬂow based. Both
diﬀer in the inclusion of physical characteristics of transporting electrical energy.
The ﬁrst approach is based on transactional transfers between countries ab-
stracting from resulting physical ﬂows. If a transfer between two countries A and
B is settled (see Figure 3.8), the according transmission capacity between both
countries has to be procured by market participants up to the available transfer
capacity NTCA,B. However, this approach abstracts from physical characteris-
tics of transporting electricity energy in a meshed network as a transfer between
two countries aﬀects other national as well as international transmission lines
beside the direct transmission lines between both countries. E.g. transmission
lines connecting country A and C, A and D, B and C, and B and D are physi-
cally impacted to a certain extent by the transaction. This impact is known as
loop ﬂow and is caused physical characteristics as described by Kirchhoﬀ's elec-
trical laws (Claussnitzer, 1965). To account for this characteristics, the available
transmission capacity is determined with respect to impacts on physical ﬂows by
transmission system operators. In this analysis, published values on net transfer
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capacity for the Winter 2007/08 are used (ENTSO-E, 2011c).
A
B
C
D
Interconnector affected by
Interconnector affected by
the physical transfer
the transactional and physical transfer
Example
1. Transaction
A→ B = 100MW
2. Required transactional capacity
A→ B = 100MW
3. Resulting physical ﬂow
A→ B = 60MW
A→ C = C → B = 30MW
A→ D = D → B = 10MW
Figure 3.8.: Transaction based allocation of transmission capacity. Source: Own il-
lustration
The second approach takes the characteristics of the transmission network
and physical ﬂows into account. The approach is known as ﬂow-based alloca-
tion of transmission capacity. If the same transaction between country A and
B is considered, market participants have to procure transmission capacity not
only on the direct interconnection between countries A and B but also on other
interconnections aﬀected by the transaction (see Figure 3.9). The amount of
capacity that has to be contracted on the aﬀected interconnections depends
on the physical characteristics of the transmission network. Based on this, a
Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) matrix can be calculated express-
ing the relation between transactional ﬂows and resulting physical ﬂows in the
deﬁned network. As available transmission capacity, the physical transmission
capacity of international links is used instead of an aggregated capacity value
as considered in the ﬁrst approach.
Once the assignment regime is speciﬁed, the allocation of transmission ca-
pacity takes place prior or during the spot market clearing (see Section 2.2.2).
Explicit auctioning of available transmission capacity requires a separation of
the energy spot market and the market for transmission capacity as described
in Section 2.2.2.1. Hence, market participants procure transmission capacity
prior to the clearing of the energy market. On the other hand, both markets
are integrated when using an implicit allocation of transmission capacity (see
Section 2.2.2.2). Within this approach, transmission capacity is automatically
or implicitly allocated during the energy spot market clearing and a separate
transmission capacity market is not required. Market coupling and market split-
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A
B
C
D
Interconnector affected by
the transactional and physical transfer
Example
1. Transaction
A→ B = 100MW
2. Required ﬂow based capacity
A→ B = 60MW
A→ C = C → B = 30MW
A→ D = D → B = 10MW
3. Resulting physical ﬂow
A→ B = 60MW
A→ C = C → B = 30MW
A→ D = D → B = 10MW
Figure 3.9.: Flow based allocation of transmission capacity. Source: Own illustration
ting are possible implementations of an implicit auctioning procedure. In this
analysis, transmission capacity is implicitly allocated within the spot market
model.
3.3.2. Data and Scenarios
The model data is based on the ENTSO-E high voltage network (ENTSO-
E, 2011b) including continental European countries and electrically connected
neighboring countries (United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark East).
The topology of the underlying physical network for the considered region is
depicted in Figure 3.10. The physical network is characterized by substations
and transmission lines, connecting two substations. Electrical parameters re-
quired for the determination of physical ﬂows on transmission lines are based
on Fischer and Kießling (1989). A detailed description is given in Leuthold
et al. (2012).
Beside network data, data on demand as well as generation needs to be spec-
iﬁed. Used average demand, generation capacities, as well as renewable wind
capacities are depicted in Table 3.4 for each considered country. In order to
retrieve a load value for each substation of the physical network, regional data
on population and gross domestic product are used to distribute national de-
mand to individual nodes (Leuthold et al., 2012). On the other hand, power
plants are considered individually based on VGE (2008) and are assigned to the
nearest location of the physical network. However, as only power plants with
a capacity above 100 MW are considered for this procedure, the remaining de-
centralized generation capacity is approximated for each country and national
demand is accordingly adjusted. Data on total net generation capacities as listed
in ENTSO-E (2008) and ENTSO-E (2009) are used to determine capacities of
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Figure 3.10.: European high voltage transmission network. Source: Own illustration
based on ENTSO-E (2011b)
decentralized generation for considered countries by subtracting the power plant
capacities as listed in VGE (2008) from the total net generation capacities. Re-
newable wind generation capacities are based on EWEA (2010). Generation is
characterized by diﬀerent generation technologies which diﬀer in their main fuel
and generation eﬃciency. The considered conventional generation technologies
and their assumed marginal generation costs for 2008 are displayed in Table 3.5.
In this analysis regional diﬀerences in marginal generation costs are neglected.
In order to capture the changes in demand and wind generation during a
year, diﬀerent hourly scenarios are speciﬁed. Changes in demand and wind
are captured in three scenarios (Low, Mean, and High) resulting in nine ﬁnal
scenarios. To cumulate results of each scenario to annual results, probabilities
are determined based on experienced demand and wind generation for Germany
for the year 2008. The deﬁned scenarios and probabilities are displayed in
Table 3.6. Percentage values in Table 3.6 refer to average demand and wind
generation capacity, respectively. However, the chosen scenario deﬁnition allows
only an approximation of annual results and further analysis should aim to
use experienced hourly values instead of characteristic scenarios. Additionally,
characteristics of individual countries are neglected as German load curves and
wind generation in-feeds are used. Interregional smoothing eﬀects which are
expected to be relevant on an European scale especially for wind generation
are not taken into account due to missing publicly available data and to reduce
computational eﬀort.
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Country Average Demand Wind Capacity Conventional
Generation Capacity
MW MW MW
AL 468 0 1,399
AT 7,784 995 16,871
BA 1,318 0 3,547
BE 10,185 384 15,011
BG 3,922 158 11,409
CH 7,335 14 14,947
CZ 7,416 150 15,014
DE 63,429 23,903 89,663
DK-E 4,126 1,590 3,676
DK-W 2,472 1,590 3,530
ES 30,842 16,740 77,744
FR 56,295 3,404 107,038
GR 6,411 985 12,468
HR 2,033 18 3,087
HU 4,700 127 12,053
IT 38,648 3,736 69,930
LU 760 35 1,450
ME 522 0 855
MK 984 0 1,664
NL 13,683 2,225 16,093
NO 14,665 428 29,557
PL 16,263 472 32,915
PT 5,940 2,862 8,833
RO 6,286 10 18,627
RS 4,438 0 8,342
SE 16,389 1,021 29,912
SI 1,444 0 1,843
SK 3,146 3 7,870
UA 473 0 0
UK 38,101 3,241 77,719
Total 370,477 64,091 693,067
Table 3.4.: Average demand, wind generation capacity, and conventional generation
capacity in Europe. Source: Own illustration based on VGE (2008);
ENTSO-E (2008, 2009); EWEA (2010)
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Technology Marginal Costs
EUR/MWh
Nuclear 9.71
Lignite 26.61
Hard Coal 50.36
CCGT 65.04
Gas Steam 90.38
OCGT 103.68
CCOT 69.58
Oil Steam 89.20
OCOT 102.32
PSP 42.30
Table 3.5.: Marginal generation costs for 2008. Source: Own calculations based on
Nitsch (2008)
Demand Wind Probability
Low (85%)
Low (20%) 19%
Mean (40%) 4%
High (60%) 1%
Mean (100%)
Low (20%) 34%
Mean (40%) 16%
High (60%) 2%
High (115%)
Low (20%) 13%
Mean (40%) 9%
High (60%) 2%
Table 3.6.: Deﬁnition of considered demand and wind scenarios. Source: Own calcu-
lations
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3.3.3. Results and Discussion
The analysis of the achieved results concentrates on the presentation and dis-
cussion of ﬁrstly cost and surplus results and secondly price results. The results
of the nodal pricing model are compared to zonal pricing results considering
a transaction- and ﬂow-based allocation of international transmission capacity
within the spot market model. To formalize the presentation and the discussion
general remarks are provided in the beginning of each section.
3.3.3.1. Surplus and Cost Results
Within this analysis, consumer or demand cost DC is deﬁned as the sum of the
product of nodal demand qn and nodal or zonal spot market price priceDAn , re-
spectively (Equation (3.38)). The dual variable on the respective energy balance
(Nodal Pricing: Equation (3.20); Zonal Pricing: Equation (3.27)) is interpreted
as the spot market price priceDAn . Generation cost GC refer to the costs of the
ﬁnal generation dispatch thus including generation costs of redispatched power
plants used for congestion management RC. Generation proﬁts or beneﬁts GB
describe the proﬁts earned in the spot market plus proﬁts from redispatch-
ing power plants if required during the congestion management procedure RB.
Subtracting generation costs from generation proﬁts results in respective sur-
plus of generation (Equation (3.39)). Finally, the transmission system operator
faces ﬁrstly costs CC for resolving national congestion through compensation
of constrained-on generation reduced by payments of constrained-oﬀ generation
−(RB −RC) and secondly rents or proﬁts from congestion CR. In zonal pric-
ing regime, proﬁts for the transmission system operator result from allocation of
international transmission capacity during the spot market clearing. In a nodal
pricing regime, additionally congestion in national electricity networks results
in nodal price diﬀerences and thus proﬁts for the transmission system operator.
Hence, congestion rent or proﬁts can alternatively be describes as the diﬀer-
ence of spot market payments received from consumers DC and spot market
payments to generators GB (Equation (3.40)).
DC =
∑
n
priceDAn qn (3.38)
GS = GB −GC +RB −RC (3.39)
=
∑
n
(
priceDAn
∑
p∈n
gDAp
)
−
∑
p
mcp(g
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p − gDOWNp + gUPp )
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The overall surplus and cost results are depicted in Table 3.7. Regional surplus
and cost results of considered pricing regimes are listed in Appendix B. The
analysis is restricted to short-term cost and surplus values and abstracts from
long-term aspects. As can be seen in Table 3.7, total generation cost is the
lowest in the case of nodal pricing as generation and transmission utilization
is simultaneously determined and thus optimally utilized (e.g. Schweppe, 1988;
Hogan, 1992). Hence, the nodal pricing regime can be seen as a benchmark
with respect to generation costs. Zonal pricing regimes show comparable but
higher overall generation cost results. Total generation costs increase by 1.3
billion EUR per year or 2.0% if international transmission capacity is allocated
transaction based during the spot market. In the ﬂow based zonal pricing case,
generation costs rise even more by 1.6 billion EUR or 2.5%.
Following de Vries and Hakvoort (2002) and Ding and Fuller (2005), economic
eﬃciency  meaning that a least cost dispatch of power plants is achieved 
is ensured with all congestion management methods independent of their exact
procedure under the assumption of a ﬁxed (inelastic) demand. The presented
cost picture shows contrary results. Diﬀerences in generation cost among the
investigated congestion management regimes are obvious and amount to 2.5%
in the maximum. However, these diﬀerences to nodal pricing can be explained
by the restriction on national congestion management. As only national power
plants can be used to alleviate national congestion in the zonal pricing regime,
generation costs are higher than in nodal pricing. Thus, through a closer coop-
eration of national transmission system operators and the application of inter-
national redispatch the diﬀerence in generation costs is reduced to the level of
the nodal pricing regime. Introducing the opportunity for international redis-
patch in the transaction based pricing regime and thus relaxing the restriction
to national redispatching capacities (Equation 3.37) results in generation costs
of 61.5 billion EUR per year. Hence, generation costs are reduced to the level
of the nodal pricing regime if a close cooperation of national transmission sys-
tem operators in managing national congestion is assumed. Thus, short-term
economic eﬃciency is achievable in this investigated setup independently of the
Chapter 3. Congestion Management in Europe 81
applied congestion management methods, but depends on the level of inter-
national cooperation of national transmission system operators in managing
network restrictions.
Nodal Pricing Zonal Pricing
Transaction based Flow based
billion EUR billion EUR billion EUR
per year per year per year
Consumer costs (DC) 148.1 140.1 144.3
Generation beneﬁts (GB) 136.9 138.2 144.9
Generation costs (GC) 61.5 62.8 63.1
Generation surplus (GS) 75.4 75.4 81.8
Congestion rent (CB) 11.1 3.6 2.7
Congestion costs (CC) 0 1.8 3.4
Congestion surplus (CS) 11.1 1.8 -0.7
Table 3.7.: Surplus and cost results of considered pricing regimes in billion EUR per
year. Source: Own illustration
Beside the absolute diﬀerences, pricing regimes vary in the distribution of
surplus among market participants. As described in Section 2.3, consumers and
in some cases also generators proﬁt from the application of congestion alleviation
methods thus neglecting transmission constraints within the spot market. The
transmission operator proﬁts from capacity allocation methods as he is not in
charge to manage congestion through congestion alleviation methods. Looking
at the achieved results, gives comparable ﬁndings. Consumers proﬁt most in the
zonal pricing regime as spot market prices do not reﬂect national congestion.
If a nodal pricing regime is applied, consumer cost increase by 8 billion EUR
per year (5.7% of consumer cost) through locationally diﬀerentiated prices. As
demand is assumed to be price-inelastic throughout all considered cases, the
change in consumer cost is caused by spot market prices (see Table 3.8).
Beside consumers, generators should be similarly aﬀected by diﬀerent pricing
regimes. However, generation beneﬁts decline by 1% in the nodal pricing regime
compared to the transaction based regime, but generation costs are similarly re-
duced in a comparable amount of generation surplus in the nodal pricing regime.
The reduction of generation cost is one reason for the similar level of generation
surplus. However, the introduction of national transmission constraints in the
nodal pricing case causes price increases in countries with signiﬁcant national
congestion (esp. in Italy, see Table 3.8) leading to only slightly decreased gen-
eration proﬁts as prices reﬂect national congestion. With respect to the ﬂow
based zonal pricing regime, generation surplus shows a signiﬁcant increase to
82 billion EUR per year caused by highest generation beneﬁts among pricing
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regimes. As the allocation regime of international capacity is changed towards
a ﬂow based regime, spot market prices are aﬀected in various countries (esp.
in France and South East Europe) resulting in higher generation beneﬁts. Fur-
thermore, signiﬁcant amounts of redispatching costs occur further increasing
the beneﬁts of generators. However, it has to be noted that the results are
sensitive to available transmission capacity allocated in the spot market. If the
international transmission capacity is speciﬁed more conservatively, a decrease
in generation beneﬁts is expected.
Finally, the nodal pricing regime results in the highest surplus for the trans-
mission system operator of 11 billion EUR per year. As the entire transmission
network is considered during the spot market optimization, the transmission
system operator does not face costs for redispatching power plants. Whereas
in the zonal pricing regimes, the transmission system operator faces both con-
gestion proﬁts from international capacity allocation within the spot market as
well as congestion costs due to required redispatch and the corresponding pay-
ments to generation. In the transaction based zonal pricing regime, congestion
costs are overcompensated by congestion rents leaving a surplus of 1.8 billion
EUR per year to the transmission system operator. However, if ﬂow based allo-
cation is considered, congestion management costs are greater than congestion
rents. This is caused by the available transmission capacity assumed in the ﬂow
based approach which refers to the physically available transmission capacity of
international lines. The transmission system operator faces negative overall sur-
plus as costs for redispatching power plants exceed congestion rents. In reality,
transmission system operators would deﬁne a more conservative capacity value
to ensure stability of the system and to reduce congestion management costs.
However, this would not change the overall picture, but the distribution of costs
is expected to change increasing congestion surplus on the one hand and prob-
ably decreasing consumer as well as generation surplus on the other hand. The
assumption of rather high available transmission capacity additionally impacts
zonal prices as well as generation proﬁt and consumer costs which are raised
signiﬁcantly especially in France and in South East Europe (see Table 3.8).
To subsume, the transmission operator proﬁts most from an implicit allo-
cation of network constraints within the spot market especially if all network
constraints are considered. However, the results are sensitive to the deﬁnition of
available transmission capacity. Comparing diﬀerent pricing regimes, the gain
of surplus for the transmissions system operator results from a distribution of
surplus from consumers and partly generators to the transmission system op-
erator. Especially consumers face a signiﬁcant increase in consumer costs due
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to locationally diﬀerentiated prices in the nodal pricing regime. The impact on
generators however is twofold and depends on the level of physical congestion
within countries. Some countries show lower generation surplus, whereas other
countries generators proﬁt from higher spot market prices in the nodal pricing
regime if national congestion is signiﬁcant. However further analysis is required
to underline these impacts for the European network as achieved results depend
on the quality of underlying data.
3.3.3.2. Price Results
As discussed previously, demand is assumed to be ﬁxed (or price-inelastic) and
thus changes in surpluses depend mainly on the spot market prices. Achieved
regional prices are depicted in Table 3.8 on an aggregated level and in Fig-
ure 3.11(a) and 3.11(b) on a detailed nodal level. In general, nodal prices reﬂect
marginal generation costs of the corresponding spot market. In the zonal pricing
regimes, the dual variable on Equation (3.27) is interpreted as price of the spot
market. The dual variable on Equation (3.20) is considered as nodal price in
the nodal pricing regime. According to spot pricing theory (Schweppe, 1988),
spot prices are viewed as the sum of diﬀerent components:
 Marginal value of generation: The marginal value of generation includes
marginal fuel and maintenance costs as well as a quality of supply com-
ponent. Under normal operational conditions, the fuel and maintenance
cost dominate the spot price component and the quality component is very
small, but in critical situations (e.g. limitation of generation capacity) the
quality component may dominate the price component.
 Marginal value of network operation: The marginal value of network op-
eration comprises a part associated with operating costs and a second
quality of supply part. The operating costs with in the network result
from network losses and the costs associated with balancing it. The qual-
ity component is analogous to the marginal value of generation, but with
respect to network capacity. Thus, if network capacity is limited and
the congestion occurs, the quality component may dominate the marginal
value of network operation.
Thus, the spot market price ﬁrstly depends on the generation technology and
corresponding marginal costs which is used to meet the additional unit of de-
mand. As transportation is essential in an electricity system, network congestion
may hinder the use of the cheapest available generation technology as this would
exceed available transmission capacity. Hence, a second component of the spot
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market price reﬂects costs due to congestion. An operational network cost part
may arise from network losses, but are neglected in this analysis. A mathemati-
cal derivation of the diﬀerent price components is given in Schweppe (1988) and
Stigler and Todem (2005).
With respect to the analysis, the network price component reﬂects only con-
gestion on international transmission links within the zonal pricing calculations.
Thus, spot market prices vary between countries, but within a country simi-
lar prices occur as innernational transmission is not restricted. On the other
hand, all network constraints (international and national) are considered in the
nodal pricing regime leading to prices varying between system nodes of the
same country due to national congestion. These general eﬀects are displayed in
Figure 3.11(a) and 3.11(b).
Zonal Pricing Nodal Pricing
Transaction based Flow based
EUR/MWh EUR/MWh EUR/MWh
BE, NL, LU 53.63 55.49 53.50
AT, CH 47.85 44.30 43.01
DE 47.85 48.34 48.13
FR 47.68 51.16 52.70
IT 67.23 67.77 77.90
South West* 52.39 52.84 54.75
Central East** 46.82 45.44 48.91
South East*** 32.74 41.37 41.11
UK 53.88 53.88 55.02
North**** 9.29 11.53 10.17
Average 46.35 47.97 49.46
* ES, PT
** PL, CZ, SK
*** SI, HR, HU, RO, BA, RS, ME, MK, AL, BG, GR
**** DK, NO, SE
Table 3.8.: Average consumption weighted price of considered pricing regimes in EUR
per MWh. Source: Own illustration
As can be seen in Table 3.8, prices increase with the introduction of additional
transmission constraints from 46.35 EUR per MWh to 49.46 EUR per MWh rep-
resenting an increase of 6.7%. The price level is the lowest in the transaction
based zonal pricing regime. Highest prices occur in the nodal pricing regime as
all network constraints are taken into account. If prices of the transaction based
zonal pricing regime and the nodal pricing regime are compared, the impact on
average prices in twofold. Some regions show lower prices (e.g. BE, NL, LU),
whereas in other regions e.g. Italy the average price is raised signiﬁcantly up to
ca. 10 EUR per MWh. On the one hand, through introduction of ﬂow based
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capacity allocation in both nodal and zonal pricing available transmission ca-
pacity is increased between countries on an international level. This leads to
a reductive impact on spot market prices. On the other hand, prices increase
due to incorporation of national congestion. Especially in countries with high
congestion management costs (e.g. France and Italy) a signiﬁcant price increase
can be observed. However, as mentioned previously prices  especially if ﬂow
based zonal pricing is considered  strongly depend on the available transmis-
sion capacity. If transmission capacities are more conservatively speciﬁed, prices
would change in both directions depending the characteristics of the country.
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Figure 3.11.: Geographic representation of average nodal prices. Source: Own illus-
tration
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3.4. Conclusions
An important issue for the implementation of an Internal Electricity Market
across Europe is the more eﬃcient use of and development of additional net-
work capacities, and managing congestion problems. This Chapter sets out to
explore whether the choice of the design of European spot power markets makes
a diﬀerence and quantiﬁes the distributional eﬀects associated with it. Two
market designs are compared across Europe. Firstly, an optimized approach
of implicit auctions of transmission capacity between nationally deﬁned price
zones, and secondly a nodal pricing approach. The national or zonal pricing
is additionally separated into transaction and ﬂow-based allocation of interna-
tional transmission capacity.
A model is described to calculate TTC values for limits to commercial trans-
fers between countries. As no formal standardized method exists for TTC cal-
culations, and national transmission system operators do not report on their
speciﬁc methodology, a range of methodologies is explored that capture some of
the variations that might be inherent in current TTC calculations. These TTC
values are then used as a basis for modeling the single price zones according to
national boundaries with one implicit auction for all international transmission
capacity.
The analysis has some limitations. In particular, the quality of the available
data is insuﬃcient to allow for the evaluation of individual lines or investment
projects. However, for the aggregated analysis presented here, the data is ad-
equate. Additionally, speciﬁc operation constraints, e.g. intertemporal genera-
tion constraints or system security aspects, are omitted since generally these are
not formally implemented or published by European transmission system opera-
tors but instead are carried out informally by the operators based on established
practices.
Applying a nodal pricing regime to the European system with the used data
set provides a set of insights that conﬁrms previous studies. Most of the trans-
mission constraints are not associated with lines between countries, but with
lines within countries. The current European power market design (outside
of Scandinavia and Italy) does not make this explicit within the spot market.
This creates incentives for system operators to limit international ﬂows to avoid
domestic congestion that requires redispatching of power stations within their
boundaries to resolve remaining constraints. Furthermore, the nodal pricing
results illustrate that the congestion  and price  patterns vary considerably
between wind scenarios. This suggests that approaches that aim to deﬁne price
zones within countries are not suitable to address internal congestion as the
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zones would either have to vary depending on system conditions or be small
and thus be essentially equivalent to nodal pricing.
The comparison with the nodal pricing results suggests that generation cost
savings are achievable with nodal pricing. The costs savings accrue from a co-
ordinated generation scheduling across European countries taking all network
constraints into account. However, cost savings refer only to generation costs
and ignore the distributional eﬀects of diﬀerent pricing regimes. In particular
consumers will loose due to locationally diﬀerentiated prices and face higher
costs. On the other hand, transmission system operators will proﬁt from inter-
national as well as national congestion. Based on these results, further research
should address the issue whether the resulting improvements in generation costs
and increased transparency justiﬁes the cost of implementing new systems, and
whether the political eﬀort necessary to change the current design is achiev-
able. For instance, Poland is already anticipating the need for a change of the
current system towards nodal pricing (Newbery, 2012). Additionally, Baldick
et al. (2011), Bell et al. (2011) and Newbery (2011) recommend a nodal pricing
regime for the British electricity system to ensure an eﬃcient operation of the
existing system.
4. Improving Congestion
Management in Germany - How
to Facilitate the Integration of
Renewable Generation in
Germany
4.1. Introduction
Several European countries have implemented special support schemes for re-
newable energy sources in electricity generation in order to achieve the RES-E
targets set by the European commission and to reduce domestic emissions of
carbon dioxide in the energy sector. Especially in northern Europe, wind en-
ergy became the dominating renewable energy source due to the geographical
conditions. Renewable electricity generation especially wind generation is char-
acterized by high capital and low operational costs. Hence, wind generation
is placed in the beginning of the merit order and should be dispatched ﬁrst in
the short run. Furthermore, the location of wind turbines strongly depends on
regional wind conditions. In Germany signiﬁcant wind capacities are located in
the northern part of the country. On the other hand, electricity load is mainly
located in the mid-western and southern part of Germany. Both aspects will
result in an increasing ﬂow of electricity from northern to southern Germany.
Especially in years with high wind generation, network congestion increases and
congestion management costs are aﬀected (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).
As described in Section 2.4.1, the German electricity market is characterized
by a decentralized market structure and market participants are responsible
for planning their unit commitment without considering physical transmission
restrictions. Given the commitment decisions of the market participants deter-
mined in the markets (futures, dayahead, intraday market or bilateral trading)
the transmission system operators are in charge of managing physical transmis-
sion restrictions and of maintaining the balance between generation and demand.
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To manage transmission limitations the transmission system operators have two
general control options to ease network congestion, namely technical and market
based methods ( 13 (1) EnWG). Active power ﬂow management can be done
technically through adjustments of network topology (e.g. switching actions)
or network characteristics (e.g. changes of transformer taps). On the other,
hand market-based congestion management methods comprise the adjustment
of nodal generation or load through market-based methods. In Germany cost-
based redispatching of power plants is applied (Section 2.4.1). As described in
Section 2.2.3.2, power plants in regions with excess generation have to decrease
their output to reduce congestion in the transmission network. On the other
hand, the reduced generation output in the surplus region has to be compen-
sated by an increase of generation output in the deﬁcit region to ensure equality
of demand and supply. The increase and decrease of generation is associated
with costs which are interpreted as congestion management costs.
The current level of congestion management costs in Germany is rather low
as described in Section 2.4.1. However, in the future an increase of congestion
management costs is expected ﬁrstly due to higher wind generation and sig-
niﬁcant fossil generation investments in northern Germany. Therefore, recent
studies emphasize the need for signiﬁcant investments in transmission capacity
to reduce future network congestion (50Hertz Transmission et al., 2010). On the
other hand, the option to adjust or extend the current congestion management
regime could reduce the need for transmission investments through a better uti-
lization of the transmission network. Furthermore, price signals resulting from
congestion management could give market participants adequate incentives to
locate generation or demand.
This Chapter investigates the impact of physical network constraints on spot
market results in Germany and quantiﬁes the development of congestion man-
agement costs given higher shares of renewable generation. Therefore, a model is
described which replicates the current market regime in Germany consisting of a
spot market and a congestion management model. After clearing of the uniform
pricing spot market the ﬁnal power plant dispatch is determined by the system
operator given the physical network constraints. Redispatching of power plants
and optimization of network topology are considered as congestion alleviation
methods and interpreted as lower and upper bound on congestion management
costs. The results of the uniform pricing model are compared to an implicit
allocation of national transmission within the spot market known as nodal or
locational pricing.
The Chapter draws on Kunz (2011) and is structured as follows. The mod-
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els and the underlying dataset are described in Section 4.2. The results are
presented and discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 provides the conclusions.
4.2. Model
The general setting of the uniform and nodal pricing model follows Section 3.2
and 3.3. In contrast to the previous applications, technical congestion allevia-
tion methods are introduced as congestion management methods in the uniform
pricing model beside the already known cost-based redispatch of power plants.
Therefore, the uniform pricing model and the nodal pricing model are subse-
quently described in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively. Again, the uniform
pricing model comprises a spot market and a congestion management to reﬂect
the German market regime.
The general assumptions of the model are that ﬁrstly a competitive behavior
of market participants is assumed and secondly an independent system operator
optimizes the system variables for the entire regional scope of the model. The
model optimizes a representative hour, thus intertemporal aspects are neglected.
4.2.1. Uniform Pricing Model
4.2.1.1. The Spot Market Model
The spot market model minimizes the total generation costs
∑
pmcpGp for a
given level of load qn. The load is deﬁned for each system node n representing
substations of the physical transmission network. The minimization of total gen-
eration costs (Equation (4.1)) is subject to the market clearing constraint, the
individual power plant capacity restrictions, and the restriction of international
trade. The market clearing constraint (Equation (4.2)) ensures the equality of
load qn, renewable generation gwindn +g
solar
n , generation of thermal power plants
Gp, and international exchanges TFn,nn. The dual or marginal on the market
clearing condition is the marginal price priceDAn . Renewable generation is de-
ﬁned as a parameter and reduces the load at each node. This assumption is
founded in the priority feed-in of renewable generation according to the Ger-
man renewable energy sources act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG). On the
other hand, generation of thermal power plants is an optimization variable of the
model and restricted by the installed capacity gmaxp of power plant p (Equation
(4.3)). As the model aims to optimize the spot market, trade TFn,nn between
system nodes refers to transactional volumes rather than physical exchanges.
The trade between countries depends on the direction and is restricted by the
net transfer capacity ntcc,cc between country c and country cc (Equation (4.4)).
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Thus, international transfer is limited whereas transfers between national nodes
is unlimited.
The ﬁnal linear problem is optimized for one hour.
min
Gp
∑
p
mcpGp (4.1)
qn − gwindn − gsolarn =
∑
p
Gp −
∑
nn
TFn,nn +
∑
nn
TFnn,n ∀n (4.2)
Gp ≤ gmaxp ∀p (4.3)∑
n∈c
∑
nn∈cc
TFn,nn ≤ ntcc,cc ∀c, cc (4.4)
TFn,nn, Gp ≥ 0
4.2.1.2. The Congestion Management Model
Given the results of the spot market model, the diﬀerent congestion manage-
ment methods are evaluated using a congestion management model. Cost-based
redispatching of power plants and network topology optimization methods are
considered as options for market-based and technical congestion management
methods.
The congestion management model optimizes the total redispatching costs (Equa-
tion (4.5)) based on the results of the spot market model, namely the con-
tracted generation of power plants gDAp . Contracted spot market generation
can be adjusted by increasing (GUPp ) or decreasing (G
DOWN
p ) the generation
of power plants. Power plants which increase their generation are paid their
marginal cost mcp whereas the decreased generation pays their saved fuel costs
mcp to the TSO. Similar to the spot market model, the market clearing condi-
tion (Equation (4.6)) and the generation capacity restriction (Equation (4.7))
are considered as constraints of the optimization problem. Furthermore, as the
congestion management model aims to determine redispatching costs resulting
from physical network constraints, a DC power ﬂow approach is used to reﬂect
technical restrictions of the transmission network. Given the technical network
characteristics (bn,nn and hl,n), the power ﬂow on physical transmission lines
LFl (Equations (4.9) and (4.10)) as well as the physical netinput at each sys-
tem node NIn (Equation (4.8)) are determined by the load angle ∆n. Physical
transmission limits are represented by pmaxl (Equation (4.11)).
In contrast to the model formulations in Section 3.2 and 3.3, ﬂexibility of
the network topology is considered as a congestion management method and
reﬂected by the binary variable ONLINEl in the model (Fisher et al., 2008).
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The scalar m used in Equations (4.9) and (4.10) is a large number. If a line
is switched oﬀ (ONLINEl = 0) the transmission capacity is set to zero ac-
cording to Equation (4.11). Additionally, Equations (4.9) and (4.10) result in a
large positive and negative number representing the upper and lower limitation
on load angle diﬀerences
∑
n hl,n∆n. Otherwise if a transmission line is online
(ONLINEl = 1), Equations (4.9) and (4.10) collapse to an equality constraint
LFl =
∑
n hl,n∆n and determine the power ﬂow on transmission lines. The
introduction of two separate equations for the power ﬂow is necessary to put
no restriction on load angle diﬀerences.40 Optimization of network topology
goes in hand with reliability issues as switching lines may reduce the N-1 se-
curity meaning that the system may not be able to withstand the outage of
single transmission equipment. Hedman et al. (2008b) present an approach to
incorporate reliability constraints in a network topology optimization problem.
However, the solution time of the network topology problem increases substan-
tially, if security constraints according to Hedman et al. (2008b) are introduced.
To approximate reliability requirements in the presented model transmission
capacity of lines is downgraded by 20% (Leuthold et al., 2012).
The presented congestion management model is solved in a two-step procedure
to diﬀerentiate between congestion costs resulting from congestion on interna-
tional and national transmission lines. Firstly, only international transmission
lines are considered and congestion management costs are determined. After-
wards, national transmission lines are added and redispatching costs for relieving
national congestion are determined. As the net transfer capacities used in the
spot market model are assumed to be ﬁxed and thus do not necessarily reﬂect
resulting congestion situation, the separation is useful. National congestion can
be managed by redispatching power plants and optimizing network topology.
If only redispatching of power plants is considered41, congestion management
costs are interpreted as an upper bound. The lower bound on congestion man-
agement costs is achieved if both methods (redispatching and network topology
optimization) are incorporated as topology optimization is available at no direct
costs. In this case the mixed integer problem is solved in the relaxed version to
reduce computation time.42 The ﬁnal linear problem is optimized for one hour
40 If Equations (4.9) and (4.10) are replaced by the equality constraint for the power ﬂow
LFl =
∑
n hl,n∆n the power ﬂow on line l will be zero if a line is switched oﬀ due to the
reduction of transmission capacity. More importantly the load angle diﬀerence between
nodes connected by line l will be zero, too. This would result in zero exchanges between
both nodes, which is not necessarily the case as power ﬂows are just rerouted with in the
transmission network if a line is switched oﬀ.
41 In this case the binary variable ONLINEl is ﬁxed to one for all transmission lines.
42 Solving the network topology optimization to an optimal integer solution increases com-
putation time substantially (e.g. Fisher et al., 2008). As the analysis focuses on general
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given the results of the spot market model.
min
GUPp ,G
DOWN
p
∑
p
mcpG
UP
p −mcpGDOWNp (4.5)
qn − gwindn − gsolarn =
∑
p
(gDAp +G
UP
p −GDOWNp )−NIn ∀n (4.6)
GUPp −GDOWNp ≤ gmaxp − gDAp ∀p (4.7)
NIn =
∑
nn
bn,nn∆nn ∀n (4.8)
LFl ≤
∑
n
hl,n∆n + (1−ONLINEl) ∗m ∀l (4.9)
LFl ≥
∑
n
hl,n∆n − (1−ONLINEl) ∗m ∀l (4.10)
|LFl| ≤ pmaxl ONLINEl ∀l (4.11)
GUPp , G
DOWN
p ≥ 0
ONLINEl = {0, 1}
4.2.2. Nodal Pricing Model
The nodal pricing model now includes physical network characteristics and op-
timizes the power dispatch Gp by minimizing total generation cost
∑
pmcpGp
(Equation (4.12)) subject to physical network restrictions. The previously de-
scribed uniform pricing spot market model takes only transfer limitations on
international exchanges into account and congestion in the physical national
transmission network is solved afterwards using the congestion management
model. In the nodal pricing model, physical load ﬂows of the entire trans-
mission network and occurring congestion are considered while optimizing the
generation dispatch of individual power plants. Thus, the generation dispatch
of power plants does not necessarily follow the national merit-order curve (com-
pared to the uniform pricing model) as physical load ﬂows and their restrictions
may require more costly plants to be online in case of congestion. Again, the
nodal energy balance (Equation (4.13)) has to ensure the equality of nodal gen-
eration including renewable generation from solar and wind capacities (gwindn
and gsolarn ), nodal load qn, and net input or withdrawal from the transmission
grid NIn. To account for physical characteristics of transmitting electricity, a
DCLF approach is used to determine the load ﬂows LFl on individual trans-
mission lines l (Equation (4.16)). The maximum capacity of transmission lines
results rather than detailed impacts on network topology, the relaxed solution of the
integer problem provides suﬃcient information.
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limits the absolute physical exchanges between system nodes (Equation (4.17)).
The ﬁnal linear problem is optimized for one hour assuming an independent
system operator.
min
Gp
∑
p
mcpGp (4.12)
qn − gwindn − gsolarn =
∑
p
Gp −NIn ∀n (4.13)
Gp ≤ gmaxp ∀p (4.14)
NIn =
∑
nn
bn,nn∆nn ∀n (4.15)
LFl =
∑
n
hl,n∆n ∀l (4.16)
|LFl| ≤ pmaxl ∀l (4.17)
Gp ≥ 0
4.3. Data and Scenarios
The model comprises the region of Germany on a detailed level and the neighbor-
ing countries Denmark (West), the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland,
Austria, the Czech Republic, and Poland on an aggregated level. Data for the
year 2008 is used as input.
Generation is divided into twelve plant types: hydro (run-of-river and reser-
voir), nuclear, lignite, coal, gas and oil steam, combined cycle gas and oil turbine,
open cycle gas and oil turbine, and pump storage plants. National power plant
capacities are based on VGE (2008) and include existing power plants with a
capacity above 100 MW. The development of the German power plant ﬂeet un-
til 2020 assumes decommissioning of existing power plants based on technical
lifetimes (50Hertz Transmission et al., 2010) and proposed power plant invest-
ments till 2018 (BDEW, 2011). The phase-out of 12.3 GW out of 20.5 GW
nuclear generation capacities in Germany till 2022 is taken into account. The
shutdown of eight nuclear plants in 2011 as well as the stepwise phase-out of
remaining nuclear capacities till 2022 is based on Deutscher Bundestag (2011).
Marginal costs of power plants are based on fuel and CO2 certiﬁcate price for
2008 (Table 3.5).
Renewable electricity generation comprises wind as well as solar generation
and is accounted with marginal costs of zero. Thus, the node-speciﬁc load
will be lowered by corresponding nodal renewable generation. In 2008, gener-
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ation capacities of installed wind turbines sum to 27 GW and are expected to
increase to 37 GW onshore and 14 GW oﬀshore in 2020 (50Hertz Transmis-
sion et al., 2010). However, only 4.3 GW oﬀshore wind capacity are currently
planned to be commissioned until 2020 (BDEW, 2011). On the other hand, so-
lar electricity generation capacities increased substantially during the last years.
Installed solar generation capacity in 2008 is 5.3 GW. Following Nitsch et al.
(2010), installed capacity raises to 38.4 GW in 2015 and 51.8 GW in 2020.
Renewable generation capacities in Germany are distributed among all system
nodes according to data on regional renewable capacities published by national
transmission system operators. Renewable generation capacity of neighboring
countries is aggregated.
Demand values for 2008 represent the average hourly demand of 63.4 GW
as published by ENTSO-E. In 2020, demand is expected to decrease by 8% in
Germany (50Hertz Transmission et al., 2010). Within Germany, nodal demand
is determined by taking the regional population and gross domestic product into
account. Further information can be found in Leuthold et al. (2012).
The underlying physical grid for Germany is based on the European high-
voltage grid ENTSO-E. The neighboring countries of Germany are represented
on an aggregated level. Hence, national congestion in those countries is ne-
glected. The transmission network is depicted in Figure 4.1. The development
of the physical transmission grid until 2020 is based on ENTSO-E (2010b).
Transactional restrictions used in the spot market model between countries are
based on the net transfer capacity (NTC) published by the European Network of
Transmission System Operator for Electricity (ENTSO-E) (ENTSO-E, 2011c).
The indicative NTC values for summer 2008 are used and considered constant
until 2020. The development of the physical transmission grid until 2020 is
based on the Ten-Year Network Development Plan published by the ENTSO-E
(ENTSO-E, 2010b). Based on this report, network extensions of a total length
of 1,946 km are added to the existing transmission grid until 2020, of which
504 km are upgrades of existing transmission lines and remaining 1,442 km are
new overhead lines. 974 km of network extensions are considered to be realized
before 2015. The network extensions comprise both regional network extension
projects with only a few kilometers length as well as interregional ones mainly
from Northern to Southern Germany. Main purpose of planned network exten-
sions is the integration of renewable energy sources in the Northern part of the
country in the existing transmission network. Additionally, ensuring security of
supply, reduction of redispatching costs, as well as connection of thermal gener-
ation capacities are listed as expected beneﬁts of planned network extensions.
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Figure 4.1.: German high voltage transmission network. Source: Own illustration
To analyze the impact of diﬀerent load, wind, and solar levels on congestion
management costs 27 representative hours are speciﬁed as scenarios based on
data for 2008. Load is deﬁned relative to average hourly load and classiﬁed into
three scenarios representing low (85%), medium (100%), and high (115%) load
levels. Wind generation is deﬁned by three diﬀerent scenarios and varied be-
tween low (20% of installed capacity), medium (40% of installed capacity), and
high (60% of installed capacity) wind generation. Solar generation is divided
into a low (0% of installed capacity), medium (10% of installed capacity), and
high (20% of installed capacity) generation scenario.43 Models are optimized for
each hourly scenario separately, thus representing a static optimization neglect-
ing intertemporal aspects. Deﬁned scenarios are weighted to achieve annual
results. Scenario weights are based on hourly load and renewable generation
data for 2008 published by ENTSO-E and national transmission system opera-
tors.
4.4. Results and Discussion
In total 27 diﬀerent scenarios are considered which are simulated for the years
2008, 2015, and 2020. Proposed power plant investments, expected wind and
43 The utilization values of solar generation capacities are deﬁned to meet the yearly average
of solar generation.
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solar generation capacities, electrical load, and proposed network extensions for
Germany are adjusted for the 2015 and 2020 optimizations. Data related to
neighboring countries as well as generation costs are not changed. Yearly or
total costs represent the costs for consumers44 and are the weighted costs of the
presented scenarios. The following analysis ﬁrstly presents cost and price results
of the uniform and nodal pricing regime using the models described previously.
Afterwards, results of both pricing regimes are compared and discussed.
4.4.1. Uniform Pricing
Total yearly costs for consumer in Germany are 25.0 billion EUR in 2008 (Fig-
ure 4.2) representing the product of market price and national load of the spot
market model. In 2015 and 2020 total yearly costs decrease to 22.3 and 21.3 bil-
lion EUR. The decrease of the total costs is caused ﬁrstly by the increase of
renewable generation capacity. Wind capacity is expected to rise from 23.9 GW
in 2008 to 37 GW onshore and 4.3 GW oﬀshore in 2020. Additionally, solar
generation capacity changes from 5.3 GW in 2008 to 51.8 GW in 2020. As re-
newable generation is accounted with marginal costs of zero, load is reduced and
thus cost for consumers decrease. Secondly, load decreases by 8% and thirdly,
signiﬁcant generation investments in relatively cheap hard coal power plants are
planned. All three factors impact the total costs and lead to a decrease of spot
market costs by roughly 17%. Among the impacting factors, renewable genera-
tion has the strongest impact causing a reduction of consumer costs of ca. 9%.
Comparing renewable generation, wind generation accounts for a reduction of
37 million EUR per 1000 MW installed capacity, whereas solar generation re-
duces consumer costs for 11 million EUR per 1000 MW installed capacity. The
diﬀerence between both technologies results from the utilization of installed
renewable generation. As wind generation shows on average higher utilization
factors, generation and thus cost reduction potential is higher compared to solar
generation in Germany. As spot market model does not take physical transmis-
sion constraints into account and the dispatch is characterized by the national
merit order cost curve of available fossil and renewable generation. Thus, the
impacts of renewable generation on costs represent the merit order eﬀect of ad-
ditional renewable generation as market prices decline by increased generation
from renewable sources (e.g. Sensfuß et al., 2008).
However, the spot market model does not take physical transmission con-
44 Costs for consumers represent short-run marginal costs and are deﬁned as the product
of load and market price (dual variable on Equation (4.2)). Additional costs resulting
from the promotion of renewable sources, capital costs of transmission and generation
equipment as well as taxes are not considered in this analysis.
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straints into account as only international transfers are limited by the net trans-
fer capacity. In order to match the dispatch determined in the spot market model
with transmission limitations of the physical transmission network, additional
actions have to be undertaken by national TSOs to ensure secure operation of
the transmission network. In the described modeling approach two diﬀerent
congestion management methods are implemented.
Firstly, redispatching of power plants in order to ease national physical net-
work congestion is considered. Power plants in regions with excess generation
have to decrease their output to reduce congestion in the transmission network.
On the other hand, the reduced generation output in the surplus region has to
be compensated by an increase of generation output in the deﬁcit region to en-
sure equality of load and supply. In this modeling approach all power plants are
allowed to be redispatched in order to retrieve limits on congestion management
costs. Technical or administrative restrictions which may limit the adjustment
of generation output are not taken into account.
Secondly, the redispatching of power plants is extended by the option to opti-
mize network topology in order to manage power ﬂows. The physical transmis-
sion network is characterized by substations and transmission lines connecting
diﬀerent substations. Within substations, transformers and switches are the
main components and enable the TSO to optimize power ﬂows in the network
through switching actions. In order to reﬂect the technical ﬂexibility of the TSO,
switching of transmission lines is considered as a congestion management op-
tion. The mathematical representation is rather simpliﬁed as transmission lines
can only be switched on or oﬀ and further switching options within a substation
are neglected.
In both congestion management methods the increase and decrease of gener-
ation is associated with costs which are interpreted as congestion management
costs. As network topology optimization does not cause direct costs to the
TSO, the second congestion management method (network topology optimiza-
tion and redispatching of power plants) can be interpreted as a lower bound on
congestion management costs. On the other hand, the management of conges-
tion using only redispatching of power plants is interpreted as an upper bound
on congestion management costs. Additionally, international and national con-
gestion management costs are diﬀerentiated. The national costs of considered
congestion management methods are displayed in Figure 4.2 and listed in Ta-
ble 4.1 for the considered years and for the diﬀerent network expansion cases.
The line represents consumer cost and the bars reﬂect the range between the
lower and the upper bound of national congestion costs.
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Figure 4.2.: Total spot market (line, left axis) and congestion management (CM)
costs45 (bars, right axis). Source: Own illustration
It can be seen in Figure 4.2 that the option to redispatch power plants results
in additional dispatch costs as power plants which are dispatched in the spot
market model have to be redispatched due to national network congestion. On
the other hand, network topology optimization reduces the need for power plant
dispatch adjustments as network topology optimization does not cause direct
costs to the TSO.
For 2008, national congestion management costs within the model range be-
tween 0 and 1.7 million EUR per year. Comparing calculated costs with ex-
perienced costs of 45 million EUR (see Table 2.4) the calculations conﬁrm the
relatively low need for congestion management. Diﬀerences between experienced
and calculated redispatching costs can be explained by the approximations in-
herent in the modeling approach in particular the abstraction from intertemporal
aspects and the scenario deﬁnition. Furthermore, at the moment the TSOs can-
not decide over all available generation units and are limited to pre-contracted
redispatching capacities which may increase congestion management cost.
In 2020, congestion management costs increase to 147 million EUR per year
(ca. 0.7% of total spot market costs) in the maximum if no network expansion is
considered (Figure 4.2(a)). The signiﬁcant increase in congestion management
costs can be explained by the location of new renewable and fossil generation
in northern Germany. In combination with the regional distribution of load
this leads to a signiﬁcant physical ﬂow from northern to southern Germany and
thus increases the need for congestion management. Among renewable sources,
wind generation shows the strongest impact on redispatching costs resulting in
1.7 million EUR per 1000 MW installed capacity (Table 4.1). On the other hand,
45 The upper (lower) end of the bar represents the upper (lower) bound on yearly congestion
management costs.
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additional solar generation decreases redispatching costs by -0.3 million EUR per
1000 MW installed capacity. As solar generation is mainly located in southern
Germany and closer to load centers, the speciﬁc impact on redispatching costs
is negative. Through optimization of network topology congestion management
costs are reduced to 12.0 million EUR per year in 2020 (ca. 0.1% of total spot
market costs). Hence, switching of transmission lines leads to a reduction of
congestion management costs but cannot ease all network congestion as it is the
case in 2008 and (costly) redispatching of power plants is still needed to ensure
secure network operation. Costs for international congestion management are
178 million EUR in 2008 and decline to only 2.4 million EUR in 2020. The costs
for international congestion management strongly depend on the deﬁnition of the
net transfer capacity which limits international transfers. Whereas in 2008, the
net transfer capacity used in the spot market model allows more international
transactions as physically possible. Thus, additional redispatch is required to
ease network congestion. In future years, the opposite occurs and more trades
are possible from a physical perspective and hence international redispatch is
beneﬁcial as costly generation is replaced by cheaper ones. This eﬀect accrues
mainly from the assumption that the values for the net transfer capacity are left
unchanged during the investigated years. In reality, TSOs would adjust the net
transfer capacity between countries during the hours and years taking impacts
on international congestion management costs into account.
The overall picture does change if network extension is introduced in the
model (Figure 4.2(b)). Costs of the spot market remain unchanged as physical
network constraints are not considered. However, national congestion manage-
ment costs are reduced through planned network extension stated in ENTSO-E
(2010b). In 2020, yearly congestion management costs are reduced and range be-
tween 0 million EUR and 39.6 million EUR (ca. 0.2% of total spot market costs).
Compared to the case without network extension (Figure 4.2(a)), the need for
redispatching power plants decreases signiﬁcantly as the physical network from
northern to southern Germany is strengthen. This is especially true in 2020 as
interregional transmission lines are expected to come online. However in 2015,
congestion management costs show a steep increase which is mainly caused by a
heterogeneous development of generation and transmission capacity. At selected
locations within the transmission network, generation capacity is expected to
come online, but existing transmission capacity is not suﬃcient to transport the
additional generation resulting in higher redispatching costs for these plants. In
2020, additional transmission capacity is available at these locations and hence
congestion management costs decrease. It is likely that both developments are
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coordinated to some extent especially if a new power plant is commissioned.
Regarding the impact of renewable sources on congestion management costs,
additional wind as well as solar generation show a speciﬁc impact of 1.7 and
-0.04 million EUR per 1000 MW installed capacity, respectively. The impact
is comparable to the case without network extension. Costs for international
congestion management decrease to 4 million EUR in 2020 considering network
extensions.
2008 2020 2020
No Network Network
extension extension
Spot market costs
million EUR per year 24,983 21,322 21,322
International congestion
management costs
million EUR per year 178 2 4
National congestion
management costs
million EUR per year 01.7 12147 040
Max spot market and
congestion management costs46
million EUR per year 25,162 21,471 21,366
Avg. spot market price
EUR/MWh 47.90 44.70 44.70
Table 4.1.: Results of the uniform pricing regime. Source: Own illustration
4.4.2. Nodal Pricing
In a second step, it is assumed that the German market implements a nodal
pricing regime meaning that national as well as international transmission lines
are taken into account in the optimization of the power plant dispatch. In
the nodal pricing regime, an independent system operator is assumed which
optimizes the entire electricity system subject to physical network constraints.
Physical characteristics of transporting electrical energy is reﬂected by a DC
power ﬂow approach. In contrast to the uniform pricing, only a spot market
is considered and a separate congestion management regime is not required as
those are already accounted in the spot market.
Comparing the spot market costs deﬁned as product of nodal price and nodal
load, the results are generally comparable to the uniform pricing. In 2008, spot
market costs amount 25.6 billion EUR and decrease 15% to 21.8 billion EUR
46 Cost of the current market regime represent spot market cost, international and the upper
bound of national congestion management cost.
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per year in 2020 neglecting transmission expansion (Table 4.2). If network
expansion is taken into account, spot market costs are aﬀected as congestion
situation and hence the dispatch of power plants changes. Therefore, costs
decrease to 21.8 billion EUR per year compared to 2008.
Comparing both network extension cases indicates that spot market costs
slightly increase by 0.2% with additional transmission capacity. This is surpris-
ing, but a result of regional diﬀerentiated prices. In the case without network
extension, nodes in the northern part of the country beneﬁt from low cost wind
generation. Due to network congestion, nodal prices reﬂect the low generation
costs of wind. In case of network expansion local network congestion is relieved
and prices in the northern part of Germany increase. Hence, additional trans-
mission lines increase the transmission capacity between nodes especially in the
northern part, but do not lead to a signiﬁcant reduction of spot market costs.
2008 2020 2020
No Network Network
extension extension
Spot market costs
million EUR per year 25,626 21,751 21,805
Avg. nodal price
EUR/MWh 49.14 45.60 45.71
Table 4.2.: Results of the nodal pricing regime. Source: Own illustration
4.4.3. Comparison and Discussion
Comparing the spot market and congestion management cost results between
the considered years with the nodal pricing results indicates the impact of in-
ternal congestion management given higher shares of wind generation and the
development of the thermal power plant ﬂeet. Table 4.3 depicts the cost and
surplus results of both pricing regimes for 2008 and 2020. The results comprise
all countries considered in the modeling approach in contrast to the previous
focus on Germany. The consumer cost are equivalent to spot market costs
and reﬂect the product of price and demand of the corresponding spot mar-
ket. Generation cost comprise the cost of the ﬁnal generation dispatch valued
with marginal costs. The beneﬁt of congestion describes the congestion rent of
implicit auctioning of net transfer capacity in the uniform pricing and of trans-
mission capacity in the nodal pricing, respectively. Congestion costs are the
previously described international and national congestion management costs
occurring in the uniform pricing model neglecting network topology optimiza-
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tion. In the following short-term as well as long-term economic implications of
both pricing regimes are discussed.47
Uniform Pricing Nodal Pricing
2008 2020 2008 2020
Network Network
extension extension
million EUR million EUR million EUR million EUR
Consumer cost 77,928 72,281 77,193 71,419
Generation beneﬁt 45,374 41,532 44,937 41,163
Generation cost 30,677 28,603 30,676 28,573
Congestion rent 2,056 2,191 1,581 1,683
Congestion cost 180 44  
Table 4.3.: Comparison of cost and beneﬁt results for uniform and nodal pricing
regime. Source: Own illustration
In the short-term perspective, pricing regimes are expected to show compara-
ble overall cost results, but the distribution of costs among the market players
may vary. Using a stylized two-node electricity system, de Vries and Hakvoort
(2002) and Frontier Economics and Consentec (2004) analyze various congestion
management regimes and their impact on cost and revenues of market partici-
pants. They conclude that in the short-run all congestion methods achieve an
eﬃcient dispatch, but the distribution of costs and beneﬁts diﬀers. Consumers
and generators proﬁt when using congestion alleviation methods (e.g. redis-
patch or counter-trading) as the TSO rather pays congestion costs than receives
congestion revenues. If capacity allocation methods (e.g. implicit auctioning)
are applied, de Vries and Hakvoort (2002) found opposite eﬀects as prices are
regionally diﬀerentiated depending on congestion situation. Thus, overall con-
sumer costs increase while generation beneﬁts decrease. The TSO beneﬁts as he
faces congestion revenues rather than congestion costs. Ding and Fuller (2005)
analyze distributional eﬀects using a realistic dataset for the Italian transmis-
sion system. However, the provided analysis concentrates on a comparison of
individual congestion management regimes and does not take into account the
interaction of diﬀerent congestion methods. Contrasting to the existing aca-
demic literature, the uniform pricing regime applied in this analysis comprises
the capacity allocation of international capacities as well as the congestion al-
leviation of national congestion in a second step. As can be seen in Table 4.3
47 Beside the economic implication additional aspects exist which may reduce economic
advantages. See (e.g. Knops et al., 2001) for an evaluation of congestion management
regimes with respect to institutional and legal aspects. Concerning the implementation of
nodal pricing in Europe, Neuhoﬀ et al. (2011) lists additional aspects which are relevant
when changing the current market design towards nodal pricing.
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the previously mentioned aspects on overall eﬃciency and distributional eﬀects
are comparable, but not identical. Due to the interaction of two congestion
management regimes deteriorating eﬀects can be observed. Interpreting gener-
ation cost as an eﬃciency measure, the uniform pricing shows higher generation
cost as only national generation in Germany is allowed to be redispatched to
ease national congestion. In 2008, the eﬀect is rather marginal whereas in 2020
generation costs increase to 30 million EUR per year reﬂecting 0.1% of gener-
ation costs. Thus, the limitation of available capacities for redispatch causes a
loss of eﬃciency. On the other hand, consumers do not necessarily proﬁt from
the application of congestion alleviation methods. Due to characteristics of the
uniform pricing spot market model, prices and thus consumer costs are higher
than in nodal pricing. Hence, consumer rent48 is distributed to the TSO who
proﬁts from higher prices and receives congestion rents through the allocation
of international transfer capacity. A participation of demand within the redis-
patch procedure would redistribute rent from the TSO to consumer. However,
the eﬀect on consumers as well as other market participants varies between con-
sidered countries. E.g. consumer in Germany proﬁt from the uniform pricing
regime as costs are lower compared to nodal pricing.
In the long-run perspective, investment incentives provided by pricing regimes
become relevant. Following de Vries and Hakvoort (2002) congestion alleviation
gives the TSO economic incentives to extend the network in order to reduce
costs for alleviating congestion. Comparing the savings of congestion manage-
ment costs in Germany through network extension of 107 million EUR per year
with annualized investment costs of 183 million EUR per year49, show that
both are in a comparable range. However, transmission extensions provide ad-
ditional beneﬁts such as increased security of supply which are not explicitly
considered in this approach. Hence, annualized investment costs are higher
than direct savings in congestion management costs. On the other hand, Con-
sumers and generators do not receive economic signals about congestion when
using congestion alleviation methods. Furthermore, Ding and Fuller (2005)
show that a uniform pricing regime with congestion alleviation gives even per-
verse incentives for generation expansion. Contrary to congestion alleviation
methods, capacity allocation methods provide generators as well as consumers
with economic signals on network congestion through regionally diﬀerentiated
prices while the TSO receives no or negative incentives. Thus, it is impossi-
48 Assuming an arbitrary demand function, consumer rent can be determined by subtracting
consumer costs from the integral of the speciﬁed demand function.
49 Annualized investment costs are based on investment costs of 800,000 EUR/km (L'Abbate
and Migliavacca, 2011) and an annuity factor of 11.75% (Leuthold et al., 2009).
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ble to give all market participants economically eﬃcient signals in a long-run
perspective. This raises the question which market participant should receive
congestion signals. de Vries and Hakvoort (2002) conclude that giving economic
signals to consumers and generators should be preferred as it may be easier to
control the network planning process of regulated TSOs. As the results have
shown, congestion management costs depend on a homogeneous development
of generation and transmission infrastructure and tend to increase signiﬁcantly
if both developments diverge. Economic signals on congestion given to gener-
ators and consumers can at least to some extent achieve a homogeneous de-
velopment, but investment in generation may also depend on other locational
speciﬁc factors (e.g. fuel costs). On the other hand, if no economic signals are
provided through diﬀerentiated prices, extension of transmission infrastructure
is of special importance and has to anticipate the development of thermal and
renewable generation, and demand. With respect to Germany, the Federal Net-
work Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA) stated in their network monitoring
report (BNetzA, 2011a) that 49 out of 151 transmission expansion projects are
delayed caused by missing administrative approvals due to diverse reasons (e.g.
public resistance, uncertainty about renewable capacity extension). Especially
in the context of renewable generation and the expected capacity development
(17 GW wind and 46 GW solar capacities till 2020) the relevance of an ap-
propriate development of both transmission as well as conventional generation
infrastructure is important to achieve a secure, economically eﬃcient, and envi-
ronmentally friendly electricity system.
The modeling approach bears shortcomings with respect to consideration of
security constraints of the physical transmission network as the N-1 security cri-
terion is considered in an approximated way. Furthermore, transmission switch-
ing is roughly modeled as only complete transmission lines can be switched on
or oﬀ. Technical ﬂexibility resulting from switching of individual circuits esp.
in substations, as well as other technical options are not considered. Regarding
the input data, only data for Germany is adjusted between considered years.
Therefore, the impact of adjusted generation and load in neighboring countries
is not taken into account. The spot market and the congestion management
model are rather simple as only one hour is optimized. A better representa-
tion of the current market regime and intertemporal optimization aspects can
be achieved by a 24h spot market model including unit commitment of power
plants.
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4.5. Conclusions
This Chapter ﬁrstly investigates the impact of physical network constraints
on spot market and congestion management costs. Therefore, an approach
is described which replicates the current uniform pricing market regime in
Germany consisting of a spot market and a congestion management model.
Re-dispatching of power plants and optimization of network topology are con-
sidered as congestion alleviation methods. Secondly, uniform pricing results
are compared to a nodal or locational pricing regime as an integrated conges-
tion management regime. The results indicate that both investigated pricing
regimes achieve comparable overall results in the short-term perspective, but
both regimes diﬀer in the distribution of costs. However, as international capac-
ity is allocated within the spot market and national congestion is eased through
congestion alleviation in the uniform pricing model, diﬀerences to theoretical
analyzes occur. More importantly, pricing regimes provide diﬀerent incentives
to market participants to adjust their long-term investment behavior. The uni-
form pricing regime provides incentives to the TSO to appropriately extend
network infrastructure, whereas generators and consumers receive economic sig-
nals through locational diﬀerentiated prices in the nodal pricing regime. This
raises the question, which market participant should receive long-term signals,
either the TSO or generators/consumers. The analysis for the German elec-
tricity system shows that a homogeneous development of transmission as well
as generation infrastructure is required to reduce congestion management costs
otherwise management costs increase signiﬁcantly. However, German TSOs are
currently in charge to appropriately extend the network to expected genera-
tion and consumption developments. Given the expected capacity expansion
of renewable energy sources and the current delays of transmission expansion
projects, it is concluded that long-term economic signals should be given to
market participants rather than TSOs to achieve a homogeneous development.
Based on the presented analysis, the need for improving the current congestion
management regime arises in order to manage expected congestion and result-
ing congestion management costs in Germany given higher shares of renewable
generation and the development of the conventional power plant ﬂeet.
5. Integrating Intermittent
Renewable Wind Generation -
Insights from the Stochastic
Electricity Market Model
stELMOD
5.1. Introduction
Electricity markets across Europe are experiencing a major restructuring pro-
cess towards a competitive market environment in which power generators face
the fundamental task to optimally dispatch their power plants. In contrast to
former monopolistic times generators now have to recover their generation costs
and investments solely through market based prices. Furthermore, the concerns
on climate change initiated the de-carbonization of the electric power industry
through the promotion of renewable energy sources. Therefore, support schemes
for renewable energy sources have been implemented in several European coun-
tries to reduce domestic emissions of carbon dioxide and import dependency
on fossil fuels in the energy sector. In particular wind energy has become a
dominating renewable energy source due to natural conditions, technological
progress, and political support. However, the characteristics of wind energy
limit the response to market signals and thus aﬀect electricity markets.
Firstly, wind generation is characterized by low operational costs and is thus
dispatched ﬁrst in the short run.50 Secondly, wind generation depends on mete-
orological conditions and hence cannot be dispatched in a controlled manner like
conventional power plants. This results in variability of wind generation and un-
certainty about realized wind generation, which can be partly reduced through
appropriate wind forecasts. However, uncertainty has always been present in
electrical power systems, in the form of possible unit outages or errors in load
prediction. In the last years, electricity production from wind has increased
50 In some European countries (e.g. Germany) the feed-in of renewable energies is prioritized
independently of their marginal generation costs.
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signiﬁcantly and thus uncertainty about wind output and its variability. Thus,
wind energy and its characteristics have to be taken into account when planning
and operating power systems.
Unit commitment and economic dispatch are used in power systems to achieve
a secure and economic generation scheduling as well as grid management. As
most power systems are dominated by thermal generation capacities, the aim of
the short-term planning is to determine the least-cost generation mix of diﬀer-
ent power plants required to meet electrical load taking operational limitations
of thermal generation into account (e.g. minimum on-time, minimum oﬀ-time,
ramping constraints). In Baldick (1995) a generalized formulation of the unit
commitment is presented. A review of various contributions to the unit commit-
ment problem is given in Padhy (2004). However, the variability and uncertainty
associated with renewable wind generation imposes new challenges to the short-
term planning. To capture the characteristics of renewable wind generation, the
unit commitment and economic dispatch problem is extended by introducing
stochastic optimization. However, stochastic optimization has been introduced
in unit commitment problems before to reﬂect uncertainty about other relevant
factors e.g. demand (Takriti et al., 1996, 2000). In general, stochastic models
are characterized by uncertainty of at least one input parameter, whereas in de-
terministic optimization models all input parameters are assumed to be certain.
Fundamentals of stochastic optimization can be found in e.g. Birge and Lou-
veaux (1997) and Kall and Wallace (1994). With respect to the energy sector,
Wallace and Fleten (2003) provide a survey of diﬀerent stochastic programming
models and their application to the energy sector. Herein, stochastic versions
of the unit commitment, generation dispatch, as well as optimal power ﬂow
are presented and solution methods are discussed. Additionally, an overview of
diﬀerent applications of stochastic programming with focus on power systems
is given in Weber (2005), Kallrath et al. (2009), Möst and Keles (2010), and
Conejo et al. (2010).
Recent contributions focus on the large-scale integration of wind generation
in power systems as installed wind generation capacities increased substantially,
e.g. an amount of 75 GW wind capacity are installed between 2000 and 2010 in
Europe resulting in a share of 10% on European power capacity mix (EWEA,
2011). This leads to various challenges in short-term operation as well as long-
term planning of power systems. In the long-term, the appropriate development
of transmission as well as generation infrastructure has to ensure a secure and
eﬃcient integration of renewable energy sources. In the short-term operation,
the variability and uncertainty inherent in wind generation is a dominating as-
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pect aﬀecting the unit commitment of thermal generation units (e.g. Bouﬀard
and Galiana, 2008; Wang et al., 2008; Delarue and D'haeseleer, 2008). How-
ever, most studies do not consider the subsequent clearing of daily dayahead
and hourly intraday electricity markets, and focus on optimal unit commitment
strategies within the dayahead market considering stochastic wind generation.
Weber et al. (2009) describe a stochastic programming model to assess the
impact of large-scale wind power generation on electricity systems and the dif-
ferent electricity markets using a rolling planning procedure. The described
model was developed during the Wind Power Integration in Liberalised Elec-
tricity Markets (WILMAR) research project51. The stochastic behavior of wind
generation as well as forecast errors on wind generation are explicitly taken into
account and the model thus allows to assess the impact of increased wind gener-
ation on reserve needs and usage, power plant operation and system cost. Tuohy
et al. (2009) present an updated version including a mixed-integer unit commit-
ment model. However, physical characteristics of electricity transmission are
neglected in Weber et al. (2009) and Tuohy et al. (2009) as only transactional
transfers between regions are taken into account. In other words, congestion
in the physical transmission network which may inﬂuence utilization of thermal
as well as renewable capacities is not considered. Leuthold et al. (2012) de-
scribe a deterministic techno-economic electricity market model with a detailed
representation of the European high voltage network. Physical characteristics
of power transmission are represented by a DC-loadﬂow approach. In various
applications, the impact of wind power generation on the power system in par-
ticular on the physical transmission network are analyzed (e.g. Leuthold et al.,
2009; Weigt et al., 2010). The approach presented in this Chapter combines the
characteristics of the diﬀerent electricity markets with the technical speciﬁcs of
thermal generation as well as the transmission of electricity. In addition, the
uncertainty of wind generation is explicitly taken into account by employing
stochastic programming techniques.
Thus, in this Chapter a stochastic ELectriticty Market MODel (stELMOD)
is described. The model is used to investigate the impact of stochastic wind
generation on the unit commitment and dispatch of power plants taking limi-
tations through physical network congestion into account. To do so, a math-
ematical model is presented which rebuilds the successive clearing process of
the dayahead and intraday market given the arrival of improved information on
wind generation forecasts. After clearing of the daily dayahead and the sub-
sequent hourly intraday market the ﬁnal power plant dispatch is determined
51 http://www.wilmar.risoe.dk
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by the system operator given the unit commitment decisions of the generators.
Uncertainty about wind generation is represented by a two-stage multi-period
scenario tree and updated for each optimization step within the intraday model.
A DC-loadﬂow approach is used to determine electricity transmission within the
interconnected system based on technical characteristics of physical transmis-
sion network. An implicit auctioning of transmission constraints corresponding
to a nodal pricing regime is assumed due to their characteristics in providing an
optimal usage of transmission generation facilities as indicated in Section 2. The
model is applied to evaluate the impacts of stochastic wind power availability
in the German electricity market.
This Chapter is based on Abrell and Kunz (2012) and the remainder is struc-
tured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the current market setup and the daily
market procedure in Germany. Based on the German market procedure two
distinct models, a dayahead and intraday market model, are developed and cou-
pled by a rolling planning procedure to reﬂect the subsequent clearing of both
models. The mathematical model and the coupling procedure are described
in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the data used including the derivation of
wind generation forecasts. In Section 5.5 indicative results are shown and ana-
lyzed given diﬀerent degrees of uncertainty about wind generation. Section 5.6
provides the conclusions.
5.2. The German Electricity Market
5.2.1. The Structure of the German Electricity Market
The German electricity market is characterized by a decentralized market struc-
ture as market participants are responsible for planning their unit commitment
and dispatch without considering physical restrictions of the power system.
Given the commitment decisions of the market participants the system operator
is in charge of managing physical transmission restrictions and of maintaining
the balance between generation and demand.
The German electricity market comprises four sub-markets namely the futures
or forward market, dayahead or spot market, the intraday market, and the
reserve market. Whereas futures market, dayahead and intraday market are
organized by the EPEX, the reserve market is organized by the system operators.
Beside the organized (standardized) markets, market participants can trade on
a bilateral basis except for reserve capacities. An overview of the diﬀerent sub-
markets is given in Table 5.1.
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5.2.2. The Daily Market Procedure
The daily market procedure is displayed in Figure 5.1 and described in this
section.
The dayahead market is organized as a power exchange and operated by the
EPEX Spot SE in Paris. The standardized dayahead market comprises a central
daily auction which is cleared at 12.00 a.m. for all hours of the following day.
Market participants are not obliged to trade at the power exchange and can
also trade bilaterally 'over the counter'. Based on the contractual obligations
of the dayahead market and bilateral trading power plant generators have to
inform the responsible transmission system operator of their proposed dispatch
timetable at 2.30 p.m. dayahead ( 5 (1) StromNZV).
14.30 D-1
Tertiary reserve market clearing
Intraday market
Dayahead market clearing
10.00 D-1 12.00 D-1 15.00 D-1 RT-45min RT
Preliminary Dispatch to TSO Adjusted Dispatch to TSO
RT-45min
Figure 5.1.: Daily market procedure of the German electricity market. Source: Own
illustration
The intraday market starts at 3.00 p.m.. Market participants can trade elec-
tricity either standardized through the market platform provided by the EPEX
or on a bilateral basis. Standardized trading at the intraday market is possible
till 45 minutes before physical delivery. Furthermore, generators are obliged to
inform the transmission system operator of their adjusted power plant dispatch
45 minutes prior to real time for each 15 minute interval ( 5 (2) StromNZV).
Contrary to the initial dispatch timetable, transmission system operators can
reject dispatch adjustments caused by intraday trades ( 5 (2) StromNZV).
Given the initial and ﬁnal dispatch timetables the transmission system oper-
ators are in charge of managing physical network limitations. To do so the
transmission system operators have two general options to ease network conges-
tion, namely technical or market-based methods ( 13 (1) EnWG). As described
in Section 2.4.1, active loadﬂow management can be done technically through
adjustments of network topology (e.g. switching actions) and network charac-
teristics (e.g. changes of transformer taps). On the other hand, market-based
congestion management methods comprise the adjustment of nodal generation
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or load (redispatch or counter-trading).
5.2.3. Real Time Balancing of Load and Generation
After clearing of the markets, physical delivery based on contractual obligations
takes place at real time. Due to the technical characteristics of the electricity
system electricity has to be generated and consumed in real time. Hence, the
balance between demand and generation is immanent for the operation of the
electricity systems, but cannot be completely ensured through trading activities.
An imbalance between generation and demand is caused by two factors namely
forecast errors and unexpected events (Jarass et al., 2009, p. 256). Examples
are unexpected outages of power plants or deviations of forecasted demand or
generation. Small disturbances are balanced by the self-regulating eﬀect of the
system.
Time
30 sec 5 min 15 min
Capacity
Primary reserve regulation through all TSOs
Secondary regulation through affected TSO
Regulation through balancing responsible party
Tertiary regulation through affected TSO
60 min
Figure 5.2.: Scheduling of reserve energy. Source: Own illustration based on (UCTE,
2009, Policy 1)
In order to settle large and long-lasting imbalances, reserve capacities have to
be contracted through monthly and daily tendering by the transmission system
operator. Following UCTE (2009), reserve capacities are classiﬁed according to
their technical characteristics and their application in three groups (primary,
secondary, and tertiary reserve, see Figure 5.2). Primary reserve (PR) is called
ﬁrst and comprises operating and fast adjustable power units, mainly ther-
mal power plants producing in part load. If frequency of the system drops
signiﬁcantly, primary reserve allows a balance to be reestablished at a system
frequency other than the frequency reference value of 50 Hz (UCTE, 2009, Pol-
icy 1). After a time period of normally ﬁve minutes secondary reserve (SR)
replaces primary capacities and restores the system to the reference frequency
value. Technically, secondary reserve capacity has to be started within 5 minutes
and is called for 15 minutes. Tertiary reserve (TR) capacity is called 15 minutes
after the frequency drop and has to set free secondary reserve. Finally, tertiary
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reserve capacity is replaced by adjusted generation of the responsible balancing
party after 60 minutes. Further information on technical speciﬁcations can be
found in (UCTE, 2009, Policy 1 and Appendix 1). In Germany, the transmis-
sion system operator is responsible for the secure operation of the electricity
system ( 12 EnWG) and the commitment of contracted reserve capacity. The
application of reserve energy lasts at least one hour after the event. For de-
viations longer than one hour the balancing responsible party is in charge of
compansating the deviation (see Figure 5.2).
5.2.4. Market Integration of Wind Generation
Regarding market integration of wind generation in Germany, wind generators
are neither responsible for balancing deviations nor responsible for bringing
generated energy to market. Until 2009, wind generation had to be taken by
distribution system operator (DSO) to whose grid the wind generator was phys-
ically connected and by the transmission system operator (TSO) the DSO was
connected to. Based on a monthly basis, the TSO was obliged to transform
the forecasted wind generation into a regular baseload band for the correspond-
ing month (EEG-Veredelung). Deviations between wind forecast and desired
baseload product had to be managed by the TSO. The ﬁnal baseload product
was delivered to suppliers and ﬁnally to consumers. Financially, the tariﬀs for
renewable generation were paid by the DSO the wind generator was connected
to. Additional costs of transformation to baseload product and feed-in tariﬀs
were ﬁnally passed through to consumers.
However, since 2010 the physical process has been changed ( 64 (3) EEG). In-
stead of transforming the wind generation to a baseload product, TSOs are now
obliged to bring renewable generation to the market, either dayahead or intra-
day market ( 2 (2) AusglMechV). Received revenues from renewable generation
are oﬀset with costs for paid feed-in tariﬀs. Deﬁcits between both positions are
ﬁnally paid by consumers.
5.3. Model
In order to represent the German electricity market two diﬀerent models are
used: In the dayahead model, the system operator decides about the quanti-
ties of electricity and reserve delivered on the next day based on the expected
renewable generation supply. In the intraday model, the operator takes these
quantities as given. Based on new informations about the renewable supply he
has the possibility to correct the pre-contracted electricity quantities by trad-
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ing in the intraday market. The models are combined in a rolling planning
procedure which passes the pre-contracted quantities as well as the plant sta-
tus between the models. The two single model are described in Section 5.3.1
and 5.3.2. Afterwards the rolling planning approach is explained in detail in
Section 5.3.3.
5.3.1. Dayahead Market Model
In the dayahead model, the system operator decides about the generation and
contribution to reserve requirements of the diﬀerent plants in order to minimize
the total cost. Power plants, denoted by p ∈ P , are characterized by their
marginal generation cost cp and costs that occur if the plant is started or shut
down, csp and c
d
p, respectively. The installed capacity is given by g
max
p and the
required minimum generation if the plant is online by gminp . Furthermore, power
plants have to fulﬁll technical requirements in the form of minimum oine and
online time requirements: After a plant has been started it has to be online for
tonp . Similarly, t
off
p denoted the periods the plant has to be oine if it has been
shut down. Generation in period t ∈ T is denoted by Gpt, the contribution to
reserve market r ∈ R by R+p,r,t and R−p,r,t depending on whether it is upward
or downward reserve, and the plant status by Up,t which becomes one if the is
plant online and zero else.
Beside power plants, the model also includes pump storage facilities j ∈ J .
The release or generation of these facilities is denoted by Vj,t and pumping or
withdrawal from the market by Wjt. Both, generation and pumping of the
storage facilities are upper bounded by vmaxj and w
max
j [MW], respectively, and
the pumping process causes losses expressed by ηj ∈]0, 1]. Furthermore, the
storage capacity puts a natural bound lmaxj on the level of the storage facility
Lj,t. The reserve contribution of storage facilities is denoted by RH+j,t and R
H−
j,t ,
respectively.
Renewable sources are denoted by w ∈ W . In the dayahead model, there
exists a unique forecast for the supply from these sources sw,t. The generation
of renewable sources Sw,t [MWh] is equal to this forecast reduced by the amount
of renewable supply curtailed Cw,t. The curtailment of renewable sources causes
a penalty payment cCw .
The electricity grid is represented by a set of nodes n ∈ N and lines l ∈
L ⊂ N × N connecting these nodes. Lines are characterized by their thermal
capacity capl. The power transmission distribution factors ptdfl,n determine the
ﬂow on line l caused by net injection Yn,t at node n. The locational information
of plants, storage facilities, and renewable sources is expressed using the two-
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dimensional set Ψ ⊂ (P ∪ J ∪ W ) × N , e.g. if plant p is located at node n
(p, n) ∈ Ψ.
The load at node n in period t is given by qn,t. The possibility of diﬀerent
reserve markets is included into the model. The reserve markets are denoted
by r ∈ R and are characterized by their positive and negative reserve demand
qr+r,t and qr
−
r,t. Depending on the technical pre-qualiﬁcation requirement of
the reserve market, plants and storage facilities are allowed to contribute to
these markets. These pre-qualiﬁcation requirements are expressed via the two-
dimensional set A ⊂ (P ∪ J)×R.
min
∑
t,p
[cpGp,t + CSp,t + CDp,t] (5.1)
+
∑
t,w
cCwCw,t
CSp,t ≥ csp
(
Up,t − Up,(t−1)
) ∀p, t (5.2)
CDp,t ≥ cdp
(
Up,(t−1) − Up,t
) ∀p, t (5.3)∑
n
qn,t =
∑
p
Gp,t
+
∑
j
(Vj,t −Wj,t) +
∑
w
Sw,t ∀t (5.4)
qn,t + Yn,t =
∑
p∈Ψ(n)
Gp,t
+
∑
j∈Ψ(n)
(Vj,t −Wj,t) +
∑
w∈Ψ(n)
Sw,t ∀n, t (5.5)
qr+r,t =
∑
p∈A(r)
R+p,r,t +
∑
j∈A(r)
RH+j,r,t ∀r, t (5.6)
qr−r,t =
∑
p∈A(r)
R−p,r,t +
∑
j∈A(r)
RH−j,r,t ∀r, t (5.7)
Up,tg
max
p ≥ Gp,t +
∑
r
R+p,r,t ∀p, t (5.8)
Gp,t −
∑
r
R−p,r,t ≥ Up,tgminp ∀p, t (5.9)
Up,t˜ ≥ Up,t − Up,(t−1) ∀p, t, t˜ ∈ Oonp,t (5.10)
1− Up,t˜ ≥ Up,(t−1) − Up,t ∀p, t, t˜ ∈ Ooffpt (5.11)
Lj,t = Lj,(t−1) + ηjWj,t − Vj,t ∀j, t (5.12)
wmaxj ≥ Wj,t +
∑
r
RH−j,r,t ∀j, t (5.13)
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vmaxj ≥ Vj,t +
∑
r
RH+j,r,t ∀j, t (5.14)
lmaxj ≥ Lj,t +
∑
r
RH−j,r,t ∀j, t (5.15)
Sw,t = sw,t − Cw,t ∀w, t (5.16)
capl ≥
∑
n
ptdfl,nYn,t ∀l, t (5.17)∑
n
ptdfl,nYn,t ≥ − capl ∀l, t (5.18)
Gp,t, Vj,t,Wj,t, Lj,t, Cw,t, CSp,t, CDp,t, R
+
p,r,t, R
−
p,r,t, R
H+
j,r,t, R
H−
j,r,t ≥ 0
Yn,t free
Up,t ∈ {0, 1}
The objective function (5.1) of the dayahead model minimizes the sum of
the marginal, startup CSp,t, and shutdown CDp,t costs as well as the renew-
able curtailment penalty payment. The startup and shutdown cost are deﬁned
in Equations (5.2) and (5.3) in terms of a change of the plant status variable.
The market clearing Equation (5.4) equates the total demand and supply in
the market. In contrast, the node based market clearing Equation (5.5) equates
demand and supply at each node. This equation is necessary to deﬁne the net-
injection variable Yn,t. Equations (5.6) and (5.7) ensure the provision of the
reserve requirements. Equations (5.8) and (5.9) implement the minimum and
maximum generation constraints. Equations (5.10) and (5.11) are the mini-
mum online and oine time requirements. For the ease of notation the sets
Oonp,t := {t + 1, · · · ,min[t + tonp , T ]} and Ooffp,t := {t + 1, · · · ,min[t + toffp , T ]}
are introduced which deﬁne the periods in which the plant has to be online and
oine. Equation (5.12) is the law of motion for the reservoir level of storage
facilities. The restrictions on the pumping and release processes as well as the
reservoir levels are given in Equations (5.13) to (5.15). The supply of renewable
energy sources Sw,t is deﬁned in Equation (5.16) in terms of the exogenously
given supply and the curtailed amount. Equations (5.17) and (5.18) restrict the
ﬂows on the lines of the electricity network to stay within the thermal limit.
5.3.2. Intraday Market Model
The intraday model is similar to the dayahead model in terms of technical
restrictions for thermal plants and storage facilities. However, in this model the
pre-contracted generation quantities and reserve contributions are given from
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the dayahead model. In order to express the pre-determined character of the
given variables they are denoted by upper bars, i.e.: Gp,t, Vj,t,Wj,t, and Cw,t are
the ﬁxed generation, pumping, release and curtailment variables determined in
the dayahead market. The reserve quantities are denoted in the same manner,
i.e. R+p,r,t, R
−
p,r,t, R
H+
j,r,t, and R
H−
j,r,t are the reserve contribution contractes in the
dayahead market and ﬁxed in subsequent intraday markets. In the intraday
market, the system operator has the possibility to correct these quantities by
additional trading actions. Due to the corrective character of these variables,
they are free in sign. The notation is maintained, but the intraday variable
are denoted by a tilde sign. Given these notations, the total generation in the
intraday market is deﬁned as the sum of the pre-determined dayahead quantity
and the corrective intraday action.
As the second major diﬀerence between the dayahead and intraday market
model, the stochasticity of the renewable sources supply is explicitly incor-
porated by introducing a scenario tree. This tree represents the underlying
stochastic process by a set of nodes k ∈ K which belong to a certain period.
The subset of nodes that belong to period t is denoted by Ωt ⊂ K. The proba-
bility of reaching node k is given by πk. Except the root node, each node has a
unique predecessor node which is denoted by γ(k). Furthermore, the set of all
nodes in the route from the root node to node k is denoted by Γ(k) ⊂ K. With
this notation at hand, the intraday model becomes:52
min
∑
k,t,p
πk [cpGp,k,t + CSp,k,t + CDp,k,t] (5.19)
+
∑
k,t,w
πkc
C
wCw,k,t
Gp,k,t = Gp,t + G˜p,k,t ∀p, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.20)
Vj,k,t = Vj,t + V˜j,k,t ∀j, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.21)
Wp,k,t = Wp,t + W˜j,k,t ∀j, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.22)
Cw,k,t = Cw,t + C˜w,k,t ∀w, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.23)
CSp,k,t ≥ csp
(
Up,k,t − Up,γ(k),(t−1)
) ∀p, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.24)
CDp,k,t ≥ cdp
(
Up,γ(k),(t−1) − Up,k,t
) ∀p, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.25)∑
n
qn,k,t =
∑
p
Gp,k,t +
∑
w
Sw,k,t
52 In general the notation given above is continued. However, due to stochastic programming
approach, the variables are additionally indexed by the set of nodes in the scenario tree.
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+
∑
j
(Vj,k,t −Wj,k,t) ∀t, k ∈ Ωt (5.26)
qn,k,t + Yn,k,t =
∑
p∈Ψ(n)
Gp,k,t +
∑
w∈Ψ(n)
Sw,k,t
+
∑
j∈Ψ(n)
(Vj,k,t −Wj,k,t) ∀n, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.27)
Up,k,tg
max
p ≥ Gp,k,t +
∑
r
R+p,r,t ∀p, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.28)
Gp,k,t −
∑
r
R−p,r,t ≥ Up,k,tgminp ∀p, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.29)
Up,k˜,t˜ ≥ Up,k,t − Up,γ(k),(t−1) ∀p, t, t˜ ∈ Oonp,t
∀k ∈ Γk˜, k˜ ∈ Ωτ˜ (5.30)
1− Up,k˜,t˜ ≥ Up,γ(k),(t−1) − Up,k,t ∀p, t, t˜ ∈ Ooffp,t
∀k ∈ Γk˜, k˜ ∈ Ωτ˜ (5.31)
Lj,k,t = Lj,γ(k),(t−1) + ηjWj,k,t − Vj,k,t ∀j, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.32)
wmaxj ≥ Wj,k,t +
∑
r
RH−j,r,t ∀j, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.33)
vmaxj ≥ Vj,k,t +
∑
r
RH+j,r,t ∀j, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.34)
lmaxj ≥ Lj,k,t +
∑
r
RH−j,r,t ∀j, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.35)
Sw,k,t = sw,k,t − Cw,k,t ∀w, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.36)
capl ≥
∑
n
ptdfl,nYn,k,t ∀l, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.37)∑
n
ptdfl,nYn,k,t ≥ − capl ∀l, t, k ∈ Ωt (5.38)
Gp,k,t, Vj,k,t,Wj,k,t, Lj,k,t, Cw,k,t, CSp,k,t, CDp,k,t ≥ 0
G˜p,k,t, V˜j,k,t, W˜j,k,t, C˜w,k,t, Yn,k,t free (5.39)
Up,k,t ∈ {0, 1}
Equations (5.20) to (5.23) deﬁne the total quantities as the sum of the pre-
determined dayahead quantities and the intraday corrective trading actions.
Hereby G˜p,k,t is the intraday electricity trading amount which is free in sign and
Gp,k,t is the total generation of plant p at the node k in the scenario tree in period
t. The notation generally follows this reasoning. The remaining Equations
(5.24) to (5.38) are similar to the corresponding ones in the dayahead model
and explained above. Due to the use of the diﬀerent sets for the expression
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of the scenario tree further non-anticipativity constraints are not required. In
equations directly related to the previous period the direct predecessor γ(k) are
used. Furthermore, in the online and oine time requirements, Equation (5.30)
and (5.31), the set of all predecessors in the path to the root node are used. The
periods before the actual period t are denoted by t˜ and the predecessor notes
by k˜.
5.3.3. Rolling Planning Procedure
As described in Section 5.2 and depicted in Figure 5.1 the German electricity
market is characterized by a sequential clearing of diﬀerent markets. In the
reserve and dayahead markets the commitments regarding reserve contribution
and generation quantities are determined for all hour of the next day. After
the clearing of the dayahead market, intraday trading is possible for each indi-
vidual hour of the next day starting at 3.00 p.m. the day before and ending
45 minutes before realtime. During this time frame market participants can
trade continuously for a speciﬁc hour as for instance new information on un-
certain parameters (e.g. demand, renewable generation, unplanned outages of
generation units) become available.
The described models are designed to reﬂect these characteristics, in partic-
ular the sequential clearing of markets and the improvement of forecasts on
uncertain parameters over time. First, the dayahead market model optimizes
the generation and reserve commitments for all hours of the next day given the
current information on uncertain parameters. The time horizon of the model
covers 36 hours comprising 24 hours of the next day and additional 12 hours
to account for terminal conditions. Second, the intraday model reoptimizes the
dayahead commitments as the information on uncertain parameters improve.
The optimized time frame of the intraday model covers 36 hours. However,
the intraday model speciﬁcation abstracts from the market procedure in two
ways: First, the intraday model for a speciﬁc hour t is optimized subject to
the ﬁnal realization of uncertain parameters. Thus, the time gap of 45 minutes
between the ﬁnal clearing of the intraday and realtime is neglected. Second,
the intraday model abstracts from the continuous trading as the ﬁnal adjust-
ments of the dayahead commitments for hour t are determined in the intraday
optimization of the speciﬁc hour t given the improved information on uncer-
tain parameters compared to the dayahead clearing. Furthermore, the future
development of uncertain parameters beyond hour t is taken into account by
employing a stochastic programming approach. Thus, the continuous trading is
substituted by a centralized intraday clearing.
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The sequential clearing of the dayahead and intraday market is achieved by
applying a rolling planning procedure. The procedure is initialized by running
the dayahead model determining the contracted quantities and reserve contribu-
tion for the ﬁrst 24 hours. Given these values, the intraday model is optimized
for hour one resulting in the realized generation, storage facility actions, and
plant status for hour one. Moving one hour forward, the intraday model is
solved again. In this second run the plant status as well as the level of the stor-
age facilities are used as initial values. Furthermore, status variables are ﬁxed
if a startup or shutdown occurred within the previous periods depending on the
minimum oine and online times. Having solved the model for hour two, the
necessary information to solve the intraday model are available for hour three.
This procedure rolls until hour 12. At hour 12, the intraday model is solved
ﬁrst. From this model run the expected value for the plant status, generation,
and storage values for the next day hour one are obtained. Given these expected
values as initial conditions, the dayahead model is solved subsequently to de-
termine the pre-contracted generation quantities and the reserve contribution
for day two hour one to 24. This procedure is repeated until the end of the
considered time horizon is reached.
5.4. Data
In order to apply the described model a realistic electricity system is chosen
comprising Germany as well as its neighboring countries. The underlying data
concerning conventional and renewable generation, electrical load, and the trans-
mission network are described in this section. In addition, the applied wind
forecast approach is presented. Wind generation is considered as solely source
of uncertainty, thus uncertainty resulting from other renewable generation (e.g.
solar), electrical load, and unplanned outages of generation units are neglected.
The time horizon used for the application covers the time frame from 9th Novem-
ber till 15th November 2010. The week has been chosen due to the a high amount
of wind generation and unexpected deviations between expected and ﬁnal wind
generation.
5.4.1. Conventional Generation
Generation and storage facilities are divided into 12 diﬀerent technology types
reﬂecting diﬀerent generation technologies as well as fuel types: run-of-river
hydro, nuclear, lignite, coal, gas and oil steam, combined cycle gas (CCGT)
and oil turbines plants (CCOT), open cycle gas (OCGT) and oil turbines plants
Chapter 5. Stochastic Electricity Market Model 123
(OCOT), hydro reservoirs and pump storage plants. Installed generation capac-
ities are based on VGE (2008) and include power plants with a capacity above
100 MW. The technical characteristics of each technology are given in Table 5.2.
These include the heat eﬃciency, the minimum generation as percentage of the
installed capacity, the emission factors, and the obliged online and oine time
restrictions.
Average Minimum Emission Ontime Oﬀtime
eﬃciency generation factor
in % in % in t per MWhel in h in h
Nuclear 30 45 0 12 8
Lignite 37 40 0.98 8 8
Hard Coal 42 38 0.85 8 8
CCGT 54 33 0.37 4 2
OCGT 34 20 0.59 1 0
Gas Steam 39 38 0.52 4 2
CCOT 50 33 0.56 4 2
OCOT 34 20 0.82 1 0
Oil Steam 39 38 0.71 4 2
Table 5.2.: Technical characteristics of thermal generation types. Source: Bagemihl
(2003), IPCC (2006), Hundt et al. (2009), and own assumptions.
The marginal cost are derived from the fuel cost which are given in Table
5.3 and the carbon cost based on a CO2 price of 14.89 EUR/t, both accounted
with the technology-speciﬁc heat eﬃciency. Market prices of fuels and CO2
certiﬁcates for the considered time horizon are used for the calculation of the
technology-speciﬁc marginal costs. Beside the marginal costs, ﬁxed startup cost
incurring for each startup of generation unit are considered for each technology
type based on DEWI et al. (2005). Shutdown cost are assumed to be zero.
Fuel cost Marginal cost Startup cost
in EUR/MWh in EUR/MWh in EUR/startup and MW
Nuclear 3 9.71 164
Lignite 4.39 26.50 77
Hard Coal 11 39.02 168
CCGT 19.63 41.77 137
OCGT 19.63 66.58 74
Gas Steam 19.63 58.04 317
CCOT 37.72 83.74 274
OCOT 37.72 123.14 132
Oil Steam 37.72 107.35 604
Table 5.3.: Economic characteristics of thermal generation types. Source: DEWI
et al. (2005) and own assumptions
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5.4.2. Wind Generation
The model uses three diﬀerent inputs for wind generation: First, the realization
of wind output per hour; second, the dayahead forecast of wind output which
enters the dayahead model; ﬁnally, the distribution of wind output in the sce-
nario tree is used in the intraday model. The realized wind power generation
as well as dayahead wind power forecast is taken from the EEX Transparency
Platform53 and depicted in Figure 5.3. The ﬁgure reveals that the forecast
has a high quality, i.e. low forecast error, for hours zero up to 120. However,
afterwards predicted and realized wind generation show a high deviation.
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Figure 5.3.: Expected and realized wind generation in Germany from 9th November
till 15th November 2010. Source: EEX Transparency Platform
Uncertainty about wind power generation, considered in the intraday model,
is represented by diﬀerent wind speed scenarios reﬂecting the increasing wind
speed forecast error for future time periods. The simulation approach for wind
forecast errors is based on Barth et al. (2006) using an auto regressive moving
average (ARMA) approach. The ARMA-series is characterized as follows:
W errft = αW
err
ft−1 + Zft + βZft−1 (5.40)
whereW errft is the wind speed forecast error for forecast time period ft and Zft is
a random Gaussian variable with a standard deviation of σ. The parameters of
the ARMA-series α and β are assumed to be 0.95 and 0.02, respectively (Barth
et al., 2006). The standard deviation σ is set to 0.5. For ft = 0 the forecast
error W errft=0 and the random variable Zft=0 are zero as the ﬁnal realization is
already known. If one looks into the future (ft > 0) forecast error depends
ﬁrstly on the forecast error in the previous period and secondly on a stochastic
53 http://www.transparency.eex.com/en
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component. An exemplary set of simulated forecast errors is displayed in Figure
5.4. As can be seen, the forecast error increases with forecasting length.
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Figure 5.4.: Exemplary set of simulated wind speed forecast errors. Source: Own
illustration
Once wind speed errors are simulated, they are added to the realized wind
speeds and converted to wind power utilization using mean wind power curves
of diﬀerent wind turbines. In order to incorporate the large amount of simulated
wind power series in the stochastic modeling approach a one-stage scenario tree
is implemented comprising a reduced number of three representative scenarios
or branches. In the literature diﬀerent algorithms are described to achieve a rep-
resentative scenario reduction (e.g. Dupacová et al., 2003; Heitsch and Römisch,
2003). However, the applied method to reduce the simulated wind power se-
ries to scenarios is rather simple as scenarios represent the 35%, 50%, and 65%
quantiles of the simulated wind power series. Further research therefore aims to
improve the approach to reduce wind scenarios.
In order to derive node-speciﬁc wind power supply regional data on wind
power installations is taken from 50Hertz Transmission et al. (2011). Node-
speciﬁc wind power capacities are multiplied with a time-dependent utilization
factor to retrieve the wind generation.
5.4.3. Load
Electrical load is assumed as a parameter and elasticity of consumption as well
as uncertainty is not considered. Total electrical load and the hourly load proﬁle
of the considered countries is based on values derived from ENTSO-E (2011a)
for 9th November till 15th November 2010. In order to distribute national load
to speciﬁc nodes in the transmission network, regional characteristics on gross
domestic product (GDP) and population are taken into account. The regional
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GDP serves as a distribution key for electrical load of industry and services,
and regional population for households, respectively. The regional GDP and
population are taken from Eurostat (2011) on a NUTS 3 level54 corresponding to
districts in Germany. The derivation of node-speciﬁc load is based on Leuthold
et al. (2012).
5.4.4. Transmission Network
The underlying transmission network of Germany is based on the European high
voltage transmission grid (ENTSO-E, 2011b) comprising transmission lines and
substations at the 220 kV and 380 kV voltage level. The network topology of the
high voltage transmission grid is depicted in Figure 5.5. Neighboring countries
of Germany (Denmark (West), Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland,
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands) are additionally considered. In order
to reduce computational eﬀort associated with a detailed representation of the
transmission network, a zonal transmission model of the German high voltage
transmission system is applied. Based on 50Hertz Transmission et al. (2010),
existing substations in Germany are assigned to 18 zones and interzonal trans-
mission lines are considered during the optimization. The zonal aggregation of
physical transmission system results in 26 nodes consisting of 18 zones within
Germany and 8 neighboring countries, and 159 transmission lines crossing zonal
boundaries.
The determination of technical characteristics for the zonal transmission net-
work is based on the detailed physical transmission network and afterwards
aggregated to zonal characteristics. Technical characteristics of transmission
lines are based on Kießling et al. (2001). For representative voltages of 380 kV
and 220 kV speciﬁc values for series reactance and resistance are derived and
multiplied with the line length to derive line-speciﬁc characteristics (reactance
xl, resistance rl). The derivation of the ptdf coeﬃcients entering the model is
described in the Appendix C.
5.5. Results
In the following application of the model, the impact of diﬀerent kinds of in-
corporating stochastic wind generation is analyzed. Three diﬀerent cases are
compared reﬂecting diﬀerent degrees of wind uncertainty considered in the daya-
head and intraday markets subject to transmission restrictions of the physical
54 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) is a hierarchical system for
geographic division of the European territory. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction
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Figure 5.5.: Topology of the high voltage transmission grid and zone deﬁnition.
Source: Own illustration
network55. Afterwards, the impact on system operating costs, the generation
dispatch of power plants, and ﬁnally prices of the dayahead and intraday market
are described and discussed.
5.5.1. Cases of Wind Uncertainty
The three considered cases of wind uncertainty are as follows. In the determin-
istic case, wind generation is set to the realized values in both the dayahead and
intraday market, and thus uncertainty about wind generation is not considered.
In the second case, the impact of a changing forecast of wind generation is
regarded. Changing forecast means, that in each market clearing, both dayahead
and intraday, a single wind generation forecast is considered representing the
current status of information on wind generation. As the information about
wind generation improves with decreasing forecast lengths, the forecast error
for a speciﬁc hour decreases during the rolling planning procedure. In the ﬁnal
intraday clearing for a speciﬁc hour, the wind generation equals the ﬁnal wind
realization.
55 The incorporation of network constraints within the dayahead and intraday market, in
particular network constraints within a country, abstracts from the current market design
of the German and most European countries where congestion in the national transmis-
sion grid are managed after the clearing of the markets (see e.g. Section 2.4.1). Hence,
an implicit auctioning of all considered transmission constraints is assumed as it ensures
an optimal utilization of transmission and generation.
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The third case takes into account the stochastic aspects of wind generation. In
the intraday market, a scenario tree is introduced and the power plant dispatch
is optimized with respect to diﬀerent possible wind scenarios of the scenario
tree. Again, a single wind generation forecast is considered in the dayahead
market based on published data and thus stochasticity of wind generation is
incorporated solely in the intraday market.
It is important to note that the three diﬀerent approaches are distinguished
by the treatment of the uncertainty of wind supply. For instance wind supply is
known with certainty in the deterministic case in both markets, the dayahead
and intraday market, respectively. Whereas, in the changing forecast case, the
system operator has given a unique value of renewable supply in the dayahead
market, the dayahead wind generation forecast. In the intraday market this
value changes over time as the quality of the forecast is improved with decreasing
forecast lengths. In the stochastic approach the same unique value is given in
the dayahead market. However, in the intraday market, the system operator
has given a distribution of possible wind realizations represented by a scenario
tree.
While the approaches diﬀer in the treatment of wind uncertainty, they have
an important feature in common: Due to the rolling planning approach each of
the employed approaches receives new information on the wind generation and
demand in each iteration as the time horizon is extended by one hour. As the
rolling planning approach moves hourly wise forward, in each iteration a new
value for the ﬁnal model hour for demand and wind is given. Consequently,
the intraday market serves two functions: First, it enables the system operator
to reoptimize the generation portfolio based the additional information about
demand and wind supply which was not available in the dayahead market.
Second, in the cases that incorporate forecast errors on wind generation, the
intraday market balances the deviation from the dayahead forecast.
5.5.2. Cost Results
The model is optimized for a total time frame of nine days where the ﬁrst and
the last day are introduced to account for initial and terminal model conditions.
In turn, the reported time horizon covers one week of seven days from Tuesday
to Monday. The costs analyzed in this section reﬂect the operating cost of the
generation dispatch determined in the ﬁnal clearing of the intraday model for
each hour of the time horizon.
Taking into account the system operating cost for the entire time frame of
all nine days, the deterministic case produces with system operating cost of
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735.89 million EUR, the changing forecast case causes 736.2 million EUR, and
the stochastic case results in 735.95 million EUR. Thus, these system operating
cost indicate that the deterministic case results in the lowest overall operating
cost, whereas the changing forecast case causes the highest system operating
cost. However, in particular the ﬁrst day is characterized by high system oper-
ating costs as the entire system has to be initialized and therefore the ﬁrst and
the last day are neglected in the following analysis due to their speciﬁcs.
The aggregated cost as well as the diﬀerent cost components for the time frame
of seven days are given in Table 5.4. For the determinstic case the total system
cost amount to 590.82 million EUR. The main part of the system cost are the
fuel cost, 433.65 million EUR, followed by the carbon cost, 150.55 million EUR.
With 6.62 million EUR, the startup cost account only for around 1% of the total
system cost. For the changing forecast case the total cost become 590.45 mil-
lion EUR consisting of 433.93 million EUR fuel, 150.43 million EUR carbon,
and 6.09 million EUR startup cost. Finally, the stochastic approach shows
433.55 million EUR fuel, 150.86 million EUR carbon, and 5.55 million EUR
startup cost, which sums up to the total system cost of 589.96 million EUR.
Comparing the cases which incorporate uncertainty about the supply of wind
with the determinstic case shows lower total system cost. In particular, the sum
of marginal cost, deﬁned as the sum of fuel and carbon cost, in the uncertainty
cases always exceeds the total marginal cost of the deterministic case. However,
this cost increase is counterbalanced by a decrease of startup cost. Overall, the
determinstic case shows the highest cost followed by the changing forecast, and
ﬁnally the stochastic approach. However, the diﬀerences of the system operating
cost between the cases are marginal up to 0.86 million EUR (0.2%) mainly due
to the analyzed time frame of seven days.
Except for the startup cost, which follow the cost ranking of the system cost,
the ranking on the cost component level is not uniform. Concerning the fuel cost,
the stochastic approach shows the lowest cost followed by the determinstic case.
The changing forecast approach shows the highest fuel but the lowest carbon
cost. The carbon cost of determinstic case are lower than for the stochastic
programming approach.
in million EUR Deterministic Changing forecast Stochastic
Fuel costs 433.65 433.93 433.55
Carbon costs 150.55 150.43 150.86
Start-up costs 6.62 6.09 5.55
System operating costs 590.82 590.45 589.96
Table 5.4.: System operating costs of the considered cases. Source: Own illustration
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Comparing the system operating cost with and without the ﬁrst and last day
shows that the ranking of the three approaches varies. One reason for this eﬀect
is that for instance pumped-hydro storage is charged less during the ﬁrst day in
the deterministic case than in the changing forecast or stochastic one. Hence,
the system operating costs of the deterministic case are higher in the following
days than in other cases if these days are analyzed independently of the ﬁrst
day. To that end, particularly the inﬂuence of the ﬁrst day on system operating
costs prevents a ﬁnal conclusion on the ranking of the considered approaches
regarding their system operating cost. Future analysis will extend the analyzed
time horizon to diminish the inﬂuence of initial and terminal conditions on
model results.
5.5.3. Dispatch Results
The characteristics of the cost results concerning their cost components can be
explained by analyzing the aggregated generation and average number of operat-
ing plants which are depicted in Table 5.5 at the technology level.56 Comparing
the diﬀerent cases, it is observe that the generation and the number of plants
online are remarkably invariant. Beside a slight change in the use of storage,
the approaches diﬀer in the use of lignite, coal, and CCGT plants. Concerning
these technologies it is important to emphasize that the marginal cost of a coal
plant are higher than lignite plants, whereas they have the same operational
ﬂexibility in terms of minimum online and oine times (see Table 5.2 and 5.3).
Furthermore, lignite generation more carbon cost intensive than coal and the
same is true for the comparison of coal to CCGT generation.
Comparing the changing forecast approach with the determinstic case, it is
observed that the introduction of the wind forecast error leads to a decrease
of lignite production. However, the average number of operating lignite plants
remains constant implying a decrease of average utilization57 by 0.15%. Fur-
thermore, coal-ﬁred generation also decreases slightly but is accompanied by
a decrease of the average number of operating plants. Average utilization is
falling by 0.17%. In contrast, generation of CCGT plants as well as the aver-
age number of plants online is increasing and thus utilization is increasing by
0.93%. As coal and lignite generation are partly replaced by more costly but
less carbon intensive CCGT generation, the fuel cost rise and the carbon cost
56 The high share of nuclear generation is explained by the fact, that neighbouring countries
are included with their demand and generation capacities. Incorporating loop ﬂows in the
electricity grid it is required to close the model accounting for cross-border transmission
which is done by including these countries.
57 Average utilization is deﬁned as the ratio of production to available installed capacity.
Chapter 5. Stochastic Electricity Market Model 131
decline, respectively (see Table 5.4).
Comparing the stochastic case to the determinstic case, lignite generation is
falling but by a larger amount as in the changing forecast case. However, the
average number of operating plants is increasing. Thus, utilization of lignite
plants is decreasing by 0.55%. For coal it is observed an increase in electricity
generation and additionally in the number of committed plants. However, coal
plants are used more intensively on average, resulting in an increase of aver-
age utilization by 1.48%. This is also true compared to the changing forecast
approach. Concerning CCGT plants, generation and average plants operating
are decreasing. Average utilization declines by 2.84%. Hence, by applying the
stochastic approach the system operator reacts to the uncertainty of wind avail-
ability mainly by decreasing CCGT generation and substituting it by coal-ﬁred
generation. Although lignite power plants decrease their generation, the results
show that the eﬀect of switching away from gas-ﬁred generation dominates and
thus total fuel cost decrease but total carbon cost increase (see Table 5.4).
Summing up, in both cases with forecast error included, lignite generation is
decreased. This decrease is necessary to increase the ﬂexibility of the generation
portfolio, in particular increasing the ability to react on changes in the wind
forecast in a least cost manner. However, the ﬂexibility is realized in diﬀerent
ways. The changing forecast approach enhances the ﬂexibility by using more
ﬂexible generation technologies, i.e. CCGT plants. In contrast, the stochastic
approach introduces ﬂexibility by committing more coal plants. As coal plants
are not running at their capacities bounds, using more coal-ﬁred plants enables
reacting to changes in the forecast by varying the generation level instead of
starting more expensive gas-ﬁred plants. This more cost eﬃcient behavior of
the system operator is caused by the stochastic programming approach: As he
takes into account possible deviations of the forecast he dispatches coal plants
at a level which allows balancing the forecast error in cases of negative and
positive deviation.
In addition to the overall generation results, Figure 5.6 shows the genera-
tion of the diﬀerent plant technologies in the diﬀerent markets as well as total
generation for each hour. Looking at the dayahead and total generation ﬁg-
ures, the dispatch is as expected and follows marginal generation costs. Hydro
and nuclear power plants operate in nearly all hours at their capacity bound.
Lignite power plants provide base load generation during the days with high
demand, but decrease their generation during day with lower demand levels.
Hard coal and partly gas-ﬁred generation represents mid load generation which
is dispatched during peak hours and reduced to minimum generation levels dur-
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Deterministic Changing forecast Stochastic
Generation Online Generation Online Generation Online
in GWh in GWh in GWh
Nuclear 13553 21 13553 21 13553 21
Coal 5145 55 5136 52 5221 58
Lignite 4693 59 4686 59 4667 60
CCGT 1744 23 1760 24 1694 21
OCGT 85 6 85 6 85 6
Gas Steam 811 10 812 10 811 10
OCOT 7 1 7 1 7 1
Oil Steam 10 1 10 1 10 1
Reservoir 1465 4 1465 4 1465 4
RoR 2180 56 2180 56 2180 56
PSP -147  -148  -147 
Wind 1338  1338  1338 
Table 5.5.: Aggregated generation and average number of plants online. Source: Own
illustration
ing oﬀ-peak hours. The relative constant production of natural gas ﬁred plants
is caused by incorporating combined heat and power plants using must-run con-
ditions. Finally, pump storage facilities are charged at night and released during
the day. Notable diﬀerences are observed in the intraday market.
In the deterministic case the intraday is used to reoptimize the generation
portfolio given new information about demand and wind generation.58 As the
wind supply realization is already known in the dayahead market, intraday
trades in each hour sum up to zero. Reoptimizing mainly occurs to avoid star-
tups and shutdowns of thermal generation by using storage facilities as new in-
formation on load and wind generation are provided during the rolling planning
procedure. As the ﬁrst 100 hours show, storages are mainly charged by CCGT
plants. From around hour 120 onwards the ﬁgure changes and lignite plants are
kept running by charging storages. This is caused by the fact that wind genera-
tion in these hours is relatively low. Furthermore, the future demand increases,
which is accompanied by a decrease in wind supply, which becomes known in
these hours. During these hours with high demand and low wind supply CCGT
plants are used charging the storage. As lignite and coal plants are operating
at maximum capacity these plants are needed to satisfy demand. Therefore the
CCGT plants are needed anyway and generation is increased above the level
58 As described in Section 5.3.3 the intraday model is optimized for a time frame of 36 hours.
Within the rolling planning procedure the intraday model is solved for each hour and thus
new information on load and wind generation are given compared to the dayahead market
model due to the optimized time frame of 36 hours. To that end, the reoptimization of
decision variables occurs due to intertemporal constraints such as ontime/oﬀtime or pump
storage restrictions.
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Figure 5.6.: Dispatch results for considered cases and markets by fuel types. Source:
Own illustration
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needed and storages are ﬁlled.
In the changing forecast approach the reoptimization of the generation dis-
patch takes place in the intraday market, but more importantly errors of the
wind forecast need to be balanced. The reoptimization of the dispatch becomes
obvious by noting that positive and negative trades occur at the same time.
Regarding the balancing of wind forecast errors, it is observed that coal plants
are used for balancing purposes during the ﬁrst hours. Additionally they are
also used to charge storage facilities. In the following hours, a switch to CCGT
plants occurs. The CCGT trades are always higher than in the deterministic
case indicating that more plants are running and consequently startup cost are
saved. In the hours with large forecast errors and low load lignite plants are used
for balancing the forecast error. However in contrast to the deterministic stor-
ages are also used to balance the forecast error indicated by positive production
of pump storages.
Comparable to the changing forecast, the reoptimization and the balancing of
forecast errors is done in the intraday market in the stochastic case. However,
coal-ﬁred generation is used especially in the ﬁrst hours for intraday adjustments
instead of ﬂexible CCGT generation. Furthermore, an increased use of storage
facilities is observed as more plants are running with lower utilization which
charge storage facilities. This allows balancing wind forecast error with storage
facilities instead of starting up new plants. As in the other cases in hours with
low demand lignite plants are used to balance mispredictions of wind generation.
However, the stochastic case uses more lignite than these cases.
To sum up, the general generation dispatch follows the marginal cost structure
of the generation technologies and the considered wind uncertainty cases diﬀer
mainly in their adjustment of the generation dispatch in the intraday. The in-
traday market itself provides two opportunities: First, the generation dispatch
can be reoptimized given new information on demand and wind generation;
second, mispredictions in wind generation are balanced within the intraday as
the information on wind generation improves over time. Regarding the con-
sidered cases, the generation technologies used especially to balance the wind
error diﬀer. The stochastic case makes use of available generation capacities,
whereas the changing forecast case compensates forecast errors by utilizing ﬂex-
ible generation units. The diﬀerence in balancing forecast errors is based on
the application of stochastic programming in the stochastic case. Taking into
account possible deviations of the forecasted wind supply, this case adjusts the
generation portfolio in a more cost optimal manner than the changing forecast
approach which is based on the expected value only.
Chapter 5. Stochastic Electricity Market Model 135
5.5.4. Price Results
The described characteristics of the generation dispatch between the diﬀerent
uncertainty cases determine the prices in the considered markets. The achieved
prices of the diﬀerent markets and cases are shown in Figure 5.7. The depicted
prices represent the hourly dayahead and intraday nodal prices weighted by the
nodal consumption.
For the dayahead market (Figure 5.7(a)), the general price pattern is compa-
rable in all cases with high prices during peak and low prices during oﬀ-peak
hours. Diﬀerences in the price pattern between the cases occur ﬁrstly during
peak hours and secondly during hours with low demand and high wind gener-
ation (e.g. hour 96-144). In particular, the prices between the deterministic
and the uncertainty cases diﬀer in hours with high wind forecast errors as the
deterministic case does not consider uncertainty about wind generation. This
becomes obvious in hour 144 where the diﬀerence between the dayahead forecast
and the ﬁnal realization of wind generation is signiﬁcant. Thus, the deterministic
case shows lower prices as the other cases. Regarding the cases with uncertainty
about wind generation, diﬀerences in dayahead prices occur in particular during
peak hours and in periods with high wind generation mainly caused by the in-
corporation of wind uncertainty and hence the diﬀerent use of coal and CCGT
power plants as described previously. Thus, dayahead prices are nearly identical
during the ﬁrst day due to low wind supply. During the following days the wind
supply increases, henceforth the generation dispatch is aﬀected, and ﬁnally the
dayahead prices diﬀer between the stochastic and changing forecast case.
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Figure 5.7.: Prices results of the dayahead and intraday market. Source: Own illus-
tration
With respect to the intraday market (Figure 5.7(b)), the general price pat-
tern does not change signiﬁcantly and all considered cases show comparable
Chapter 5. Stochastic Electricity Market Model 136
price patterns. Again, diﬀerences in the price pattern are caused by the dif-
ferent generation patterns. In particular, the stochastic case utilizes more coal
units to balance the wind generation forecasts. Henceforth, intraday prices (esp.
in peak hours) represent the marginal cost of coal generation and are thus the
lowest among the cases. On the other hand, the changing forecast case com-
pensates the forecast error of wind generation by increasing generation from
ﬂexible CCGT rather than coal generation. Hence, intraday prices reﬂect the
marginal cost of the CCGT power plants and are the highest especially during
peak hours. Additionally, the changing forecast case shows a remarkable price
peak of roughly 100 EUR/MWh in the intraday market in hour 42. Due to
high demand in combination with the unexpected increase of wind generation
network congestion arises in the western part of the electricity network causing
an increase of the intraday market price for this speciﬁc hour in the import-
constrained part of the network. To avoid an overloading of transmission lines
base load generation in the export-constrained region has to be reduced and
replaced by more expensive generation in the import-constrained region. This
replacement eﬀect causes costs for increasing as well as decreasing generation,
and is thus responsible for the signiﬁcant height of the price peak. This eﬀect
occurs solely in the changing forecast case as a single wind generation forecast
is considered within the dayahead and the intraday market. In the other cases
wind generation is either known with certainty (deterministic case) or diﬀer-
ent possible wind realizations are considered (stochastic case) which limits the
occurrence of comparable price spikes.
To summarize, the general pattern of market prices is comparable among the
considered cases especially in time periods with low uncertainty about wind
generation. Most remarkably, the diﬀerent use of the intraday market either for
reoptimization of balancing of wind forecast errors determines the price pattern
in this market. As the changing forecast case utilizes ﬂexible plants with higher
marginal cost rather than inﬂexible generation at lower utilization rates as in
the stochastic case, intraday market prices of the changing forecast case tend to
higher than in other cases. In addition, the occurrence of network congestion
depends on the considered case of integrating wind generation.
5.6. Conclusions
In this Chapter a stochastic electricity market model (stELMOD) is described
which captures the economic and technical characteristics of liberalized elec-
tricity markets. First the unit commitment and generation dispatch for the
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following day is determined in a dayahead market model. Simultaneously ca-
pacities providing reserves for system stability are optimized. Afterwards an
hourly intraday market model enables to adjust dayahead generation quantities
as well as the unit commitment if required. Uncertainty of wind generation can
be incorporated and successively updated to reﬂect the improvement of wind
generation forecast over time. Finally network constraints are reﬂected using
a DC-loadﬂow approach which captures the physical characteristics of trans-
porting electrical energy. Possible applications of the model are to analyze the
impact of stochastic renewable generation or the impact of diﬀerent markets
regimes within the rolling planning procedure (e.g. incorporation of network
constraints) on electricity market results. Future analysis could also address
the issue of the optimal timing of electricity markets within a daily market
procedure.
Within this Chapter, stELMOD is applied to the electricity system of Ger-
many including their neighboring countries. Uncertainty about wind generation
is considered in two distinct ways. First, the improving information on wind
generation are incorporated by a single wind forecast changing over time, and
secondly by a set of possible future wind realizations in a stochastic approach.
Both cases are compared to a deterministic case which neglects the uncertain
characteristics of wind supply. The consideration of uncertainty induces an ad-
justment of the generation portfolio towards a more ﬂexible one in order to
deal with the forecast errors of wind generation. The changing forecast case
achieves the ﬂexibility of the generation portfolio by the increased use of ﬂexi-
ble generation units, whereas the stochastic case balances the forecast error by
ﬂexibilizing the generation pattern of rather inﬂexible generation units. These
characteristics of the generation dispatch impact the system operating cost as
well as the prices of the diﬀerent dayahead and intraday market. As the pre-
sented application covers only a time frame of an exemplary week, the achieved
results have to be conﬁrmed by analyzing longer time horizons.
6. Summary, Conclusions, and
Further Research
Get the prices right, and it is much easier to rely on the market.
Hogan (1999, p.3)
In this thesis selected aspects of network congestion arising in liberalized
electricity markets and their management methods with a special weight placed
on the integration of increased renewable generation in Europe and Germany.
In this Chapter the thesis is summarized, the main ﬁnding are presented and
topics for future research are identiﬁed based on the presented work.
6.1. Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the topic of network congestion and their
management methods aimed to ease network congestion in liberalized electricity
markets. Congestion management methods are classiﬁed into preventive capac-
ity allocation and curative congestion alleviation concepts. Preventive meth-
ods allocate scarce transmission capacity within the regular market clearing
process and thus market participants adjust their generation or load pattern
accordingly. On the other hand, congestion alleviation methods are applied
subsequently to spot market clearing. Thus market participants do not inter-
nalize limitations of transmission capacity and network operator is in charge to
solve the congestion problem using economic or technical methods. Based on
the various management concepts, it is shown that the way how congestion is
handled results in diverse economic implications for market participants. After
the review of theoretical concepts, the electricity markets of Germany, Norway,
Sweden, Great Britain, and Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) are re-
viewed with a focus on national congestion management strategies. The review
shows that various market-based options are available to handle congestion in
transmission networks. In particular the implicit allocation of scarce capacity
during spot market clearing is seen as superior congestion management concept
as it provides correct economic signals on physical network congestion to mar-
ket participants. This concept is currently applied in various electricity markets
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(e.g. Norway, Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland). However, most European
countries currently introduced this concept to allocate only international trans-
mission capacities, whereas national congestion is eased by curative methods.
In Chapter 3 the current European concept to handle scarce transmission
capacity is analyzed and it is questioned whether a change in the congestion
management regime is beneﬁcial especially in the light of the integration of re-
newable energy sources. In a ﬁrst step savings in generation costs are quantiﬁed
in Section 3.2 if the current regime of national price zones including an allocation
of commercial transmission capacity is replaced by a nodal pricing regime. An
European network model is utilized and modiﬁed to gain quantitative insights
given diﬀerent levels of renewable wind generation. However, this analysis is
restricted to the analysis of generation costs and neglects distributional eﬀects
of congestion management and implied spot market pricing regimes. Therefore
impacts on distribution of surpluses of generation, demand, and network opera-
tors are addressed in Section 3.3. The results indicate that savings in generation
costs can be achieved by the establishment of a nodal pricing regime through a
coordinated generation scheduling across European countries taking all network
constraints into account. However, cost savings refer only to generation costs
and ignore the distributional eﬀects of diﬀerent pricing regimes. In particular
consumers will loose due to locationally diﬀerentiated prices as they face higher
costs for electricity. On the other hand, transmission system operators will proﬁt
from international as well as national congestion. However, it is questionable
whether the lower generation costs and increased transparency justiﬁes the cost
of implementing a nodal pricing regime across European countries.
Chapter 4 draws on the previous congestion analysis and focuses on the fu-
ture development of congestion management costs till 2020 in Germany. Given
higher shares of renewable generation, both wind and solar generation, the ex-
tent of network congestion is quantiﬁed and selected congestion management
methods to ease these congestion are evaluated. The expected evolution of the
high voltage transmission network and conventional generation capacities are ex-
plicitly taken into account. Comparably to Chapter 3, the results indicate that
both investigated pricing regimes (uniform and nodal pricing) achieve compara-
ble overall results in the short-term perspective, but both regimes diﬀer in the
distribution of costs. More importantly, pricing regimes provide diﬀerent incen-
tives to market participants to adjust their long-term investment behavior. The
uniform pricing regime provides incentives to the transmission system operator
to appropriately extend network infrastructure, whereas generators and con-
sumers receive economic signals through locational diﬀerentiated prices in the
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nodal pricing regime. The analysis for the German electricity system further
shows that a homogeneous development of transmission as well as generation in-
frastructure is a prerequisite to reduce congestion management costs. If both de-
velopments diverge congestion management costs tend to increase signiﬁcantly.
However, German transmission system operators are currently in charge to ap-
propriately extend the network taking into account the expected generation and
consumption developments. Given the expected capacity expansion of renew-
able energy sources and the current delays of transmission expansion projects,
it is concluded that economic signals should be given to market participants
rather than regulated transmission system operators to achieve a homogeneous
development of the power system. Therefore, the need for improving the current
congestion management regime arises in order to manage expected congestion
and resulting congestion management costs in Germany given higher shares of
renewable generation and the development of the conventional power plant ﬂeet.
Chapter 5 focuses on the integration of intermittent generation from renew-
able sources in the existing market procedure consisting of a sequential clearing
of electricity markets. As forecasting intermittent renewable electricity genera-
tion is subject to errors which reduce with shorter forecast lengths, the required
balancing of these forecast errors has to be performed by adjustments of the
generation commitment and dispatch. To reﬂect the market clearing proce-
dure as well as the characteristics of wind generation a stochastic electricity
market model is described consisting of two models (dayahead and intraday
market model) coupled by a rolling planning procedure. Stochastic program-
ming techniques are applied to reﬂect uncertainty about wind generation. The
optimization is subject to economical as well as technical constraints arising
from thermal generation units and the transmission of electricity. It is shown
that the adjustment of generation and thus the development of a ﬂexible gener-
ation portfolio depends on the way uncertainty is introduced in the models. If
uncertain wind generation is explicitly considered during the market procedure,
less ﬂexible generation units are used by decreasing their utilization and increas-
ing their number of operating units to balance resulting forecast errors. As the
generation from intermittent renewable sources is expected to further increase
in Germany as well as in other countries, the quantiﬁcation of their impacts
on electricity systems is of particular importance and therefore the presented
stochastic electricity market model can contribute to this.
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6.2. Future Research
There are several directions for further research. The existing analysis in Chap-
ter 3 and 4 on congestion management regimes could be extended to quantify
long-term implications of diﬀerent pricing regimes. The investment in adequate
generation and transmission infrastructure is currently a relevant issue espe-
cially in the light of higher renewable generation. Nodal pricing is seen as an
eﬃcient way to use existing generation as well as transmission infrastructure
in the short-run operational perspective. However, in the long-run investment
incentives should be provided to market participants in order to achieve an
eﬃcient and homogeneous development of the power system. A quantitative
analysis of long-term economic implications of diﬀerent congestion management
approaches and thus pricing regimes could contribute to the understanding of
investments in liberalized electricity markets and provides insights on relevant
market design and regulatory aspects especially in the context of increased re-
newable generation.
Furthermore, the energy transformation towards a renewable oriented elec-
tricity generation in particular in Germany represents a structural change for
the existing power system. Especially the uncertainty associated with renewable
generation has to managed in the operation of the power system. In Chapter 5
a model is described which is able to quantify the impacts of intermittent gen-
eration. As the presented application covers only a time frame of an exemplary
week, the achieved results have to be conﬁrmed by analyzing longer time hori-
zons. Therefore, a possible application of this model is to extend the model
horizon to e.g. a year in order to analyze the impacts of stochastic renewable
generation on the power system. Furthermore, the model could be extended
to quantify the inﬂuence of diﬀerent market regimes on market results. For
instance, it could be worthwhile to analyze the diﬀerent ways of managing con-
gestion as addressed in Chapter 4. Future analysis could also address the issue of
optimal timing of subsequently cleared electricity markets within a daily market
procedure.
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B. Regional Cost and Surplus
Results (Chapter 3)
Consumer Generation Congestion
Cost Proﬁt Cost Rent Cost
million EUR million EUR million EUR million EUR million EUR
BE, NL, LU 9,880 6,663 3,955  -1
AT, CH 5,448 6,893 997  83
DE 24,116 22,830 10,951  69
FR 23,710 28,836 7,544  762
IT 20,253 16,074 9,323  316
South West* 16,420 16,416 5,252  196
Central East** 108,23 11,378 7,003  40
South East*** 9,087 9,192 5,004  299
UK 18,159 17,215 12,062  0
North**** 2,172 2,696 675  0
Total 140,068 138,193 62,766 3,595 1,764
* ES, PT
** PL, CZ, SK
*** SI, HR, HU, RO, BA, RS, ME, MK, AL, BG, GR
**** DK, NO, SE
Table B.1.: Regional cost and surplus results of transaction based zonal pricing regime
in million EUR per year
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Consumer Generation Congestion
Cost Proﬁt Cost Rent Cost
million EUR million EUR million EUR million EUR million EUR
BE, NL, LU 9,914 6,791 3,840  10
AT, CH 5,010 6,280 654  82
DE 24,329 22,440 10,064  103
FR 25,563 32,275 8,760  732
IT 20,099 15,189 8,807  374
South West* 16,512 16,356 5,089  291
Central East** 10,505 9,413 5,197  120
South East*** 11,549 15,295 7,673  1,715
UK 18,160 17,524 12,370  0
North**** 2,690 3,307 632  0
Total 144,331 144,870 63,086 2,686 3,427
* ES, PT
** PL, CZ, SK
*** SI, HR, HU, RO, BA, RS, ME, MK, AL, BG, GR
**** DK, NO, SE
Table B.2.: Regional cost and surplus results of ﬂow based zonal pricing regime in
million EUR per year
Consumer Generation Congestion
Cost Proﬁt Cost Rent Cost
million EUR million EUR million EUR million EUR million EUR
BE, NL, LU 9,752 6,575 3,811  0
AT, CH 4,859 5,843 596  0
DE 24,068 21,169 9,795  0
FR 25,987 26,992 8,352  0
IT 22,968 17,217 9,188  0
South West* 16,944 15,271 4,437  0
Central East** 11,228 10,275 5,941  0
South East*** 11,274 12,482 6,308  0
UK 18,364 17,847 12,490  0
North**** 2,689 3,264 608  0
Total 148,133 136,935 61,526 11,078 0
* ES, PT
** PL, CZ, SK
*** SI, HR, HU, RO, BA, RS, ME, MK, AL, BG, GR
**** DK, NO, SE
Table B.3.: Regional cost and surplus results of nodal pricing regime in million EUR
per year
C. Derivation of the PTDF
Coeﬃcients (Chapter 5)
Technical parameters are required to calculate power transfer distribution fac-
tors (PTDF, PTDFl,n) which describe the impact of an incremental power
injection at node n on transmission line l. Incremental power is withdrawn at
the reference or slack bus. In order to determine the power transfer distribution
factors, branch and nodal susceptance matrices are calculated using Equations
(C.1) and (C.2), respectively. Il,n is the incidence matrix of the transmission
network and contains zeros except at the start (end) node n of transmission line
l where it is 1 (-1).
Hl,n = blIl,n (C.1)
Bn,nn = I
′
l,nHl,nn (C.2)
The power transfer distribution matrix PTDFl,n is then calculated using
Equation (C.3)
PTDFl,n = Hl,n[B
∗
n,nn]
−1 (C.3)
where B∗n,nn is the nodal susceptance matrix without the slack bus. Given the
PTDF matrix of the detailed transmission network, zonal distribution charac-
teristics of power ﬂows on interzonal transmission lines are achieved through
aggregation of the nodal power transfer distribution matrix belonging to the
considered zone. Power ﬂows on transmission lines are then calculated as the
sum of all nodal injections Yn,t weighted with the power transfer distribution
matrix ptdfl,n (see Equations (5.17) and (5.18), (5.37) and (5.38)).
D. GAMS Codes
D.1. GAMS Codes for Chapter 3
D.1.1. Nodal and Zonal Pricing Regime (Section 3.2.1.1 and
3.2.1.2)
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Scalars
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
SCALARS
MVABase for p.u. calculation [MVA] / 100 /
VoltageBase1 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 750 /
VoltageBase2 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 380 /
VoltageBase3 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 220 /
VoltageBase4 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 150 /
VoltageBase5 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 110 /
ReferenzBus swing bus for calculation / 1 /
TRM transmission reliability margin [%] / 0.2 /
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Sets
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
SETS
c colums in excel−data−sheets / c1 * c30 /
t timeframe / t1*t1 /
l lines in the network /
Line1*Line7191
/
n nodes in the network
s plants in the market / s1 * s1381 /
reg Country / 1*27 /
region(reg,n)
neighbor(reg,reg)
nuc(s) nuclear plants
lig(s) lignite plants
coal(s) coal plants
steam(s) oil and gas steam plants
ccgt(s) ccgt plants
gt(s) gas turbines
hydro(s) hydro plants
pump(s) pump storage plants
kwk(s) combined heat and power plants
tfirst(t) first time periode
tlast(t) last time periode
ALIAS (L,LL), (N, NN), (reg,rreg,rrreg);
tfirst(t) = YES$(ORD(t) eq 1);
tlast(t) = YES$(ORD(t) eq CARD(t));
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*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Parameters
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
PARAMETERS
LineData(l,*) data table lines
NodeData(n,*) data table nodes
PowerPlantData(s,*) data table power plants
d_ref(n,t) reference demand
p_ref(n,t) reference price table
WindGen(n,t) wind energy table
available(c,t) plant availablilies
country(n,c)
FromBus(l) starting node of line L
ToBus(l) end node of line L
LineVoltage(l) voltage level of line L (150 220 380)
Resistance(l) Resistance of line L
Reactance(l) Reactance of line L
ThermalLimit(l) Max. current of line L[A]
PowerFlowLimit(l) power flow limit of line L[MW]
Incidence(l,n) incidence matrix of the system
IncidenceTest(l) checking the incidence matrix
H(l,n) flow sensivity matrix
B(n,nn) network susceptance matrix
BVector(l)
GVector(l)
TRM(l) transmission reliability margin [%]
gmax(n,s) max generation capacity
gmin(n,s) min output to run a plant
pumpmax(n) max pump capacity
marginalcosts(n,s) reference marginal costs at max output
season(n,s,t) plant availability
slack(n)
par_exchange
exchange_BCE
g_TTC
on_TTC
delta_exchange
TTC
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Variables
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
VARIABLES
costs generation costs of the system
startupcosts(n,s,t) cost due to starting of a plant
netinput(n,t) net input at n in t
lineflow(l,t) line flow on l in t
delta(n,t) voltage angle differenc at n in t
on(n,s,t) plant condition variable
delta_BCE
;
POSITIVE VARIABLES
g(n,s,t) generation at n of plant s in t
q(n,t) demand at n in t
exchange
loadshed_up
loadshed_down
linescaling
gen
transfer
;
BINARY VARIABLES
on(n,s,t) plant condition variable
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Equations
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
EQUATIONS
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gencosts
generationcapacity1
generationcapacity2
linearinput
flow
linecap_pos
linecap_neg
slackfunct
energybalance
energybalance_TTC
constraint_TTC
;
gencosts..
costs =e= (SUM ((n,s,t), marginalcosts(n,s)*g(n,s,t))
+ 100000 * SUM(l, linescaling(l))
+ 500 * SUM((n,t),
loadshed_up(n,t)
+ loadshed_down(n,t))
)/1000000;
generationcapacity1(n,s,t)$gmax(n,s)..
g(n,s,t) =l= on(n,s,t)*season(n,s,t)*gmax(n,s);
generationcapacity2(n,s,t)$gmax(n,s)..
g(n,s,t) =g= on(n,s,t)*gmin(n,s);
linearinput(n,t)..
NetInput(n,t)
− SUM((nn), B(n,nn)*Delta(nn,t)) * MVABase
=E= 0;
flow(l,t)..
LineFlow(l,t) − SUM(N$H(l,n), H(l,n) * Delta(n,t) ) =E= 0;
linecap_pos(l,t)..
LineFlow(l,t) * MVABase
=L=
+ (1+linescaling(l))*PowerFlowLimit(l);
linecap_neg(l,t)..
LineFlow(l,t) * MVABase
=G=
− (1+linescaling(l))*PowerFlowLimit(l);
slackfunct(n,t)$Slack(N)..
Slack(N) * Delta(N,T) =E= 0;
energybalance(n,t)..
SUM(s$gmax(n,s),g(n,s,t)) + gen(n,t) + windgen(n,t)
− q(n,t) − NetInput(n,t)
+ loadshed_up(n,t) − loadshed_down(n,t)
=e= 0;
energybalance_TTC(n,t)..
SUM(s$gmax(n,s),g(n,s,t)) + gen(n,t) + windgen(n,t)
− q(n,t)
+ loadshed_up(n,t) − loadshed_down(n,t)
+ SUM(nn$B(nn,n), transfer(nn,n,t))
− SUM(nn$B(n,nn), transfer(n,nn,t))
=e= 0;
constraint_TTC(reg,rreg,t)..
SUM(n$region(reg,n),
SUM(nn$region(rreg,nn), transfer(n,nn,t)$B(n,nn)))
=l= TTC(reg,rreg);
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Solution procedure
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Optimal power flow *
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
delta_exchange(reg) = 0;
pumpdown.fx(n,t)=0;
pumpup.fx(n,t)=0;
gen.fx(n,t) = −nodedata(n,’P bus (MW)’)$(nodedata(n,’P bus (MW)’) < 0);
q.fx(n,t)=1*d_ref(n,t);
*windgen(n,t) = NodeData(n,’Wind infeed max (MW)’);
*windgen(n,t) = NodeData(n,’Wind infeed mean (MW)’);
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windgen(n,t) = 0;
PowerFlowLimit(l) = 1 * PowerFlowLimit(l);
g.l(n,s,t)$gmax(n,s)=1*gmax(n,s);
g.fx(n,s,t)$(gmax(n,s) AND PowerPlantData(s,’Type’) eq 3) = 1*gmax(n,s);
loadshed_up.fx(n,t) = 0;
loadshed_down.fx(n,t) = 0;
** define some generation for Ukraine and Marocco in order to make the BCE feasible
loadshed_up.up(’4073’,t)$region(’26’,’4073’) = 0.01;
loadshed_down.up(’4073’,t)$region(’26’,’4073’) = 0.01;
linescaling.fx(l) = 0;
par_exchange(reg) = 0;
MODEL UCTE_OPF/
gencosts
generationcapacity1
generationcapacity2
linearinput
flow
linecap_pos
linecap_neg
slackfunct
energybalance
/;
UCTE_OPF.reslim = 1000000000;
UCTE_OPF.iterlim = 1000000000;
UCTE_OPF.holdfixed = 1;
UCTE_OPF.optcr = 0;
UCTE_OPF.optfile = 1;
SOLVE UCTE_OPF min costs use mip;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* UC with TTC constraint *
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
TTC(reg,rreg)$neighbor(reg,rreg) = 0;
PARAMETER exchange_BCE(reg,rreg), additional_tc(reg,rreg);
EXECUTE_LOAD ’[Datafile].gdx’ additional_tc;
exchange_BCE(reg,rreg)$neighbor(reg,rreg) =
− SUM((l,t), lineflow.l(l,t) * mvabase
* SUM(n$(incidence(l,n) eq 1), Incidence(l,n)$region(reg,n))
* SUM(nn$(incidence(l,nn) eq −1), Incidence(l,nn)$region(rreg,nn))
)
+ SUM((l,t), lineflow.l(l,t) * mvabase
* SUM(n$(incidence(l,n) eq −1), Incidence(l,n)$region(reg,n))
* SUM(nn$(incidence(l,nn) eq 1), Incidence(l,nn)$region(rreg,nn))
);
TTC(reg,rreg)$neighbor(reg,rreg) = max(exchange_BCE(reg,rreg) + additional_tc(reg,rreg),0);
TTC(reg,rreg)$(TTC(reg,rreg) AND TTC(rreg,reg)) = min(TTC(reg,rreg), TTC(rreg,reg));
TTC(reg,rreg) = max(TTC(reg,rreg), TTC(rreg,reg));
TTC(reg,reg) = INF;
*BA −−> XX
TTC(’3’,’27’) = 60;
TTC(’27’,’3’) = 60;
*IT −−> XX
TTC(’15’,’27’) = 20;
TTC(’27’,’15’) = 20;
*GR −−> XX
TTC(’12’,’27’) = 20;
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TTC(’27’,’12’) = 20;
*PL −−> XX
TTC(’20’,’27’) = 220;
TTC(’27’,’20’) = 220;
*windgen(n,t) = NodeData(n,’Wind infeed max (MW)’);
*windgen(n,t) = NodeData(n,’Wind infeed mean (MW)’);
windgen(n,t) = 0;
MODEL UCTE_UC_TTC /
gencosts
generationcapacity1
generationcapacity2
energybalance_TTC
constraint_TTC
/ ;
UCTE_UC_TTC.reslim = 1000000000;
UCTE_UC_TTC.iterlim = 1000000000;
UCTE_UC_TTC.holdfixed = 1;
UCTE_UC_TTC.optcr = 0;
UCTE_UC_TTC.optfile = 1;
SOLVE UCTE_UC_TTC using mip minimizing costs;
PARAMETER nodalprice(n,t);
nodalprice(n,t) = energybalance_TTC.m(n,t) * 1e6;
PARAMETER generation(s,t), costs_TTC;
generation(s,t) = SUM(n, g.l(n,s,t));
g_TTC(n,s,t) = g.l(n,s,t);
on_TTC(n,s,t) = on.l(n,s,t);
costs_TTC = costs.l;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Optimal re−dispatch *
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
loadshed_up.up(n,t) = INF;
*loadshed_down.up(n,t) = INF;
on.fx(n,s,t)$(gmin(n,s) AND marginalcosts(n,s) le 114) = on_TTC(n,s,t);
MODEL UCTE_Dispatch_TTC /
gencosts
generationcapacity1
generationcapacity2
linearinput
flow
linecap_pos
linecap_neg
slackfunct
energybalance
/ ;
UCTE_Dispatch_TTC.reslim = 1000000000;
UCTE_Dispatch_TTC.iterlim = 1000000000;
UCTE_Dispatch_TTC.holdfixed = 1;
UCTE_Dispatch_TTC.optcr = 0;
UCTE_Dispatch_TTC.optfile = 1;
SOLVE UCTE_Dispatch_TTC using mip minimizing costs;
D.1.2. Total Transfer Capacity Calculation (Section 3.2.1.3)
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Scalars
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
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SCALARS
MVABase for p.u. calculation [MVA] / 100 /
VoltageBase1 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 750 /
VoltageBase2 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 380 /
VoltageBase3 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 220 /
VoltageBase4 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 150 /
VoltageBase5 for p.u. calculation [kV] / 110 /
ReferenzBus swing bus for calculation / 1 /
TRM transmission reliability margin [%] / 0.2 /
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Sets
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
SETS
c colums in excel−data−sheets / c1 * c30 /
t timeframe / t1*t1 /
l lines in the network /
Line1*Line7191
/
n nodes in the network
s plants in the market / s1 * s1381 /
reg Country / 1*27 /
region(reg,n)
neighbor(reg,reg)
nuc(s) nuclear plants
lig(s) lignite plants
coal(s) coal plants
steam(s) oil and gas steam plants
ccgt(s) ccgt plants
gt(s) gas turbines
hydro(s) hydro plants
pump(s) pump storage plants
kwk(s) combined heat and power plants
tfirst(t) first time periode
tlast(t) last time periode
ALIAS (L,LL), (N, NN), (reg,rreg,rrreg);
tfirst(t) = YES$(ORD(t) eq 1);
tlast(t) = YES$(ORD(t) eq CARD(t));
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Parameters
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
PARAMETERS
LineData(l,*) data table lines
NodeData(n,*) data table nodes
PowerPlantData(s,*) data table power plants
d_ref(n,t) reference demand
p_ref(n,t) reference price table
WindGen(n,t) wind energy table
available(c,t) plant availablilies
country(n,c)
FromBus(l) starting node of line L
ToBus(l) end node of line L
LineVoltage(l) voltage level of line L (150 220 380)
Resistance(l) Resistance of line L
Reactance(l) Reactance of line L
ThermalLimit(l) Max. current of line L[A]
PowerFlowLimit(l) power flow limit of line L[MW]
Incidence(l,n) incidence matrix of the system
IncidenceTest(l) checking the incidence matrix for errors
H(l,n) flow sensivity matrix
B(n,nn) network susceptance matrix
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BVector(l)
GVector(l)
TRM(l) transmission reliability margin [%]
gmax(n,s) max generation capacity
gmin(n,s) min output to run a plant
pumpmax(n) max pump capacity
marginalcosts(n,s) reference marginal costs at max output
season(n,s,t) plant availability
slack(n)
par_exchange
exchange_BCE
g_BCE
on_BCE
delta_exchange
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Variables
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
VARIABLES
costs generation costs of the system
startupcosts(n,s,t) cost due to starting of a plant
netinput(n,t) net input at n in t
lineflow(l,t) line flow on l in t
delta(n,t) voltage angle differenc at n in t
on(n,s,t) plant condition variable
delta_BCE
;
POSITIVE VARIABLES
g(n,s,t) generation at n of plant s in t
q(n,t) demand at n in t
exchange
loadshed_up
loadshed_down
linescaling
gen
;
BINARY VARIABLES
on(n,s,t) plant condition variable
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Equations
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
EQUATIONS
gencosts
generationcapacity1
generationcapacity2
linearinput
flow
linecap_pos
linecap_neg
slackfunct
energybalance
constraint_BCE_exchange
constraint_exchange
;
gencosts..
costs =e= (SUM((n,s,t), marginalcosts(n,s)*g(n,s,t))
+ 100000 * SUM(l, linescaling(l))
+ 100000 * SUM((n,t), loadshed_up(n,t)
+ 10000*loadshed_down(n,t))
)/1000000;
generationcapacity1(n,s,t)$gmax(n,s)..
g(n,s,t) =l= on(n,s,t)*season(n,s,t)*gmax(n,s);
generationcapacity2(n,s,t)$gmax(n,s)..
g(n,s,t) =g= on(n,s,t)*gmin(n,s);
linearinput(n,t)..
NetInput(n,t)
− SUM((nn), B(n,nn)*Delta(nn,t)) * MVABase
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=E= 0;
flow(l,t)..
LineFlow(l,t) − SUM(N$H(l,n), H(l,n) * Delta(n,t) ) =E= 0;
linecap_pos(l,t)..
LineFlow(l,t) * MVABase
=L=
+ (1+linescaling(l))*PowerFlowLimit(l);
linecap_neg(l,t)..
LineFlow(l,t) * MVABase
=G=
− (1+linescaling(l))*PowerFlowLimit(l);
slackfunct(n,t)$Slack(N)..
Slack(N) * Delta(N,T) =E= 0;
energybalance(n,t)..
SUM(s$gmax(n,s),g(n,s,t)) + gen(n,t) + windgen(n,t)
− q(n,t) − NetInput(n,t)
+ loadshed_up(n,t) − loadshed_down(n,t)
=e= 0;
constraint_BCE_exchange(reg,t)$exchange_BCE(reg)..
SUM((n,s)$(region(reg,n) AND gmax(n,s)), g(n,s,t) + loadshed_up(n,t))
− SUM((n)$(region(reg,n)), q(n,t) − loadshed_down(n,t) − windgen(n,t) − gen(n,t))
=e= exchange_BCE(reg) + delta_exchange(reg);
constraint_exchange(reg,t)..
SUM((n,s)$(region(reg,n) AND gmax(n,s)), g(n,s,t) − g_BCE(n,s,t))
=e= −par_exchange(reg);
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Solution procedure
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
delta_exchange(reg) = 0;
pumpdown.fx(n,t)=0;
pumpup.fx(n,t)=0;
gen.fx(n,t) = −nodedata(n,’P bus (MW)’)$(nodedata(n,’P bus (MW)’) < 0);
q.fx(n,t)=1*d_ref(n,t);
*windgen(n,t) = NodeData(n,’Wind infeed max (MW)’);
*windgen(n,t) = NodeData(n,’Wind infeed mean (MW)’);
windgen(n,t) = 0;
PowerFlowLimit(l) = 1 * PowerFlowLimit(l);
g.l(n,s,t)=1*gmax(n,s);
g.fx(n,s,t)$(PowerPlantData(s,’Type’) eq 3) = 1*gmax(n,s);
loadshed_up.up(n,t) = 0;
loadshed_down.fx(n,t) = 0;
** define some generation for Ukraine and Marocco in order to make the BCE feasible
loadshed_up.up(’4073’,t)$region(’26’,’4073’) = 0.01;
loadshed_down.up(’4073’,t)$region(’26’,’4073’) = 0.01;
linescaling.fx(l) = 0;
par_exchange(reg) = 0;
MODEL UCTE_LMP /
gencosts
generationcapacity1
generationcapacity2
linearinput
flow
linecap_pos
linecap_neg
slackfunct
energybalance
/ ;
UCTE_LMP.reslim = 1000000000;
UCTE_LMP.iterlim = 1000000000;
UCTE_LMP.holdfixed = 1;
UCTE_LMP.optcr = 0;
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UCTE_LMP.optfile = 1;
SOLVE UCTE_LMP using mip minimizing costs;
PARAMETER nodalprice(n,t);
nodalprice(n,t) = energybalance.m(n,t) * 1e6;
PARAMETER generation(s,t);
generation(s,t) = SUM(n, g.l(n,s,t));
exchange_BCE(reg) = SUM((n,s)$region(reg,n), g.l(n,s,’t1’))
− SUM((n)$region(reg,n), q.l(n,’t1’) − gen.l(n,’t1’));
DISPLAY exchange_BCE;
exchange_BCE(’16’) = 0;
exchange_BCE(’21’) = 0;
exchange_BCE(’26’) = 0;
exchange_BCE(’27’) = 0;
g_BCE(n,s,t) = g.l(n,s,t);
on_BCE(n,s,t) = on.l(n,s,t);
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Determination of TTC−Capacity
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
MODEL UCTE_TTC /
gencosts
generationcapacity1
generationcapacity2
linearinput
flow
linecap_pos
linecap_neg
slackfunct
energybalance
constraint_BCE_exchange
/ ;
UCTE_TTC.reslim = 1000000000;
UCTE_TTC.iterlim = 1000000000;
UCTE_TTC.holdfixed = 1;
UCTE_TTC.optfile = 1;
UCTE_TTC.optcr = 0.01;
UCTE_TTC.solvelink = 2;
OPTION Limrow=0;
OPTION Limcol=0;
*loadshed_up.up(n,t) = INF;
loadshed_down.up(n,t) = INF;
PARAMETER results_costs(reg,reg,*);
PARAMETER additional_tc(reg,rreg), ntc(reg,rreg);
SET count /1*500/
SCALAR end_looping /0/;
LOOP(neighbor(rreg,rrreg),
* par_exchange(reg) = 0;
delta_exchange(reg) = 0;
end_looping = 0;
loadshed_up.l(n,t) = 0;
loadshed_down.l(n,t) = 0;
g.lo(n,s,t) = 0;
g.up(n,s,t) = INF;
g.l(n,s,t) = g_BCE(n,s,t);
on.lo(n,s,t) = 0;
on.up(n,s,t) = 1;
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on.l(n,s,t) = on_BCE(n,s,t);
execerror = 0;
LOOP(count$(end_looping eq 0),
on.fx(n,s,t)$(NOT (region(rreg,n) OR region(rrreg,n))) = on_BCE(n,s,t);
delta_exchange(rreg) = delta_exchange(rreg) + 50;
delta_exchange(rrreg) = − delta_exchange(rreg);
SOLVE UCTE_TTC using mip minimzing costs;
end_looping = 1$(SUM((n,t), loadshed_down.l(n,t)) gt 0.02 or UCTE_TTC.modelstat
= 10);
execerror = 0;
additional_tc(rreg,rrreg)$(end_looping eq 0) = delta_exchange(rreg);
results_costs(rreg,rrreg,count) = costs.l;
);
);
D.1.3. Nodal Pricing Regime (Section 3.3.1.1)
$include [Datafile]
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* VARIABLES
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
VARIABLE
COST objective value: total cost
LINEFLOW line flow
NETINPUT net injection
DELTA voltage angle
;
POSITIVE VARIABLE
G conventional generation
LOADSHED
WINDSHED
HVDCFLOW
LINESCALE
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* EQUATIONS
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
EQUATIONS
* Objective functions
OBJ_cost objective function: total generation cost
* Market clearing equations
MKT_lp market clearing equation wo network losses (linear)
* Thermal generation restrictions
RES_gmax maximum generation restriction
* Network defintions and restrictions
DEF_LINEFLOW lineflow definition
DEF_NETINPUT netinput definition
RES_pmax maximum transmission restriction
RES_pmin minimum transmission restriction
RES_HVDC maximum transmission restriction for HVDC
DEF_slack slack bus definition
* Other Restrictions
RES_WINDSHED maximum amount of windshedding
;
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* Objective functions
OBJ_cost..
COST =E= SUM(sc,
* weight(sc) * (
SUM(p, c(p) * G(p,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, LOADSHED(n,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, WINDSHED(n,sc))
* )
+ SUM(l, 500*LINESCALE(l,sc))
)
;
* Market clearing equations
MKT_lp(n,sc)..
0 =E= q(n,sc) + NETINPUT(n,sc)
− SUM(p$mappn(p,n), G(p,sc))
− g_wind(n,sc)
− g_solar(n,sc)
− LOADSHED(n,sc) + WINDSHED(n,sc)
+ SUM(nn$P_HVDC_max(n,nn), HVDCFLOW(n,nn,sc))
− SUM(nn$P_HVDC_max(nn,n), HVDCFLOW(nn,n,sc))
;
* Thermal generation restrictions
RES_gmax(p,sc)..
G(p,sc) =L= g_max(p)
;
* Network defintions and restrictions
DEF_LINEFLOW(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) =E= SUM(n$h(l,n), h(l,n) * DELTA(n,sc))
;
DEF_NETINPUT(n,sc)..
NETINPUT(n,sc) =E= SUM(nn, b(n,nn) * DELTA(nn,sc)) * MVABase
;
RES_pmax(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) * MVABase =L= P_max(l) + LINESCALE(l,sc)
;
RES_pmin(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) * MVABase =G= − P_max(l) − LINESCALE(l,sc)
;
RES_HVDC(n,nn,sc)$P_HVDC_max(n,nn)..
HVDCFLOW(n,nn,sc) =l= P_HVDC_max(n,nn)
;
DEF_slack(n,sc)..
DELTA(n,sc) * slack(n) =E= 0
;
* Other Restrictions
RES_WINDSHED(n,sc)..
WINDSHED(n,sc) =L= g_wind(n,sc)
;
MODEL Europe_OPF /all/;
Europe_OPF.optfile = 1;
LOADSHED.up(n,sc) = q(n,sc);
LINESCALE.up(l,sc) = 0.0*P_max(l);
SOLVE Europe_OPF min COST use lp;
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D.1.4. Zonal Pricing Regime (Section 3.3.1.2)
$include [Datafile]
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* PARAMETERS (additional)
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
PARAMETERS
p_ntc price of ntc optimization
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* VARIABLES
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
VARIABLE
COST objective value: total cost
RE_COST objective value: total redispatch cost
LINEFLOW line flow
NETINPUT net injection
DELTA voltage angle
;
POSITIVE VARIABLE
G conventional generation
G_UP additional re−dispatch generation
G_DOWN reduced re−dispatch generation
LOADSHED
WINDSHED
TRANSFER
HVDCFLOW
LINESCALE
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* EQUATIONS
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
EQUATIONS
* Objective functions
OBJ_cost objective function: total generation cost
OBJ_redispatch objective function: total redispatch cost
* Market clearing equations
MKT_lp market clearing equation wo network losses (linear)
MKT_lp_ntc NTC market clearing equation wo network losses (linear)
* Thermal generation restrictions
RES_gmax maximum generation restriction
RES_gmin minimum generation restriction
* Network defintions and restrictions
RES_ntc ntc restriction
DEF_LINEFLOW lineflow definition
DEF_NETINPUT netinput definition
RES_pmax maximum transmission restriction
RES_pmin minimum transmission restriction
DEF_slack slack bus definition
RES_HVDC
* Other Restrictions
RES_WINDSHED maximum amount of windshedding
RES_National_Redispatch
;
* Objective functions
OBJ_cost..
COST =E= SUM(sc,
(
SUM(p, c(p) * G(p,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, LOADSHED(n,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, WINDSHED(n,sc))
)
+ SUM(l, 500*LINESCALE(l,sc))
)
Appendix 179
;
OBJ_redispatch..
RE_COST =E= SUM(sc,
(
SUM(p, c(p) * G_UP(p,sc)
+ ( − c(p)) * G_DOWN(p,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, LOADSHED(n,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, WINDSHED(n,sc))
)
+ SUM(l, 500*LINESCALE(l,sc))
)
;
* Market clearing equations
MKT_lp(n,sc)..
0 =E= q(n,sc) + NETINPUT(n,sc)
− SUM(p$mappn(p,n), G(p,sc) + G_UP(p,sc) − G_DOWN(p,sc))
− g_wind(n,sc) − g_solar(n,sc)
− LOADSHED(n,sc) + WINDSHED(n,sc)
+ SUM(nn$P_HVDC_max(n,nn), HVDCFLOW(n,nn,sc))
− SUM(nn$P_HVDC_max(nn,n), HVDCFLOW(nn,n,sc))
;
MKT_lp_ntc(n,sc)..
0 =E= q(n,sc)
− SUM(p$mappn(p,n), G(p,sc))
− g_wind(n,sc) − g_solar(n,sc)
+ SUM(nn$(b(n,nn) or P_HVDC_max(n,nn)), TRANSFER(n,nn,sc))
− SUM(nn$(b(n,nn) or P_HVDC_max(n,nn)), TRANSFER(nn,n,sc))
− LOADSHED(n,sc) + WINDSHED(n,sc)
;
* Thermal generation restrictions
RES_gmax(p,sc)..
G(p,sc) + G_UP(p,sc) − G_DOWN(p,sc) =L= g_max(p)
;
RES_gmin(p,sc)..
G(p,sc) + G_UP(p,sc) − G_DOWN(p,sc) =g= 0
;
* Network defintions and restrictions
RES_ntc(co,cco,sc)$ntc(co,cco)..
SUM(n$mapnc(n,co), SUM(nn$(mapnc(nn,cco) AND (b(n,nn) OR P_HVDC_max(n,nn))),
TRANSFER(n,nn,sc)))
=L= ntc(co,cco)
;
DEF_LINEFLOW(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) =E= SUM(n$h(l,n), h(l,n) * DELTA(n,sc))
;
*$SUM(co$mapnc(n,co), region(co))
DEF_NETINPUT(n,sc)..
NETINPUT(n,sc) =E= SUM(nn, b(n,nn) * DELTA(nn,sc)) * MVABase
;
RES_pmax(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) * MVABase =L= P_max(l)+LINESCALE(l,sc)
;
RES_pmin(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) * MVABase =G= − P_max(l)−LINESCALE(l,sc)
;
RES_HVDC(n,nn,sc)$P_HVDC_max(n,nn)..
HVDCFLOW(n,nn,sc) =l= P_HVDC_max(n,nn)
;
DEF_slack(n,sc)..
DELTA(n,sc) * slack(n) =E= 0
;
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* Other Restrictions
RES_WINDSHED(n,sc)..
WINDSHED(n,sc) =L= g_wind(n,sc)
;
*$region(co)
RES_National_Redispatch(co,sc)..
SUM(n$mapnc(n,co), SUM(p$mappn(p,n),
G_UP(p,sc) − G_DOWN(p,sc)) + LOADSHED(n,sc) − WINDSHED(n,sc))
=E= 0
;
TRANSFER.fx(n,nn,sc)$(SUM(co$mapnc(n,co), SUM(cco$mapnc(nn,cco), NTC(co,cco))) eq 0) = 0;
G_UP.fx(p,sc) = 0;
G_DOWN.fx(p,sc) = 0;
LOADSHED.up(n,sc) = q(n,sc);
* If transaction based allocation of international capacity
MODEL Europe_NTC
/
OBJ_cost
MKT_lp_ntc
RES_gmax
RES_ntc
RES_WINDSHED
/;
* If flow based allocation of international capacity
MODEL Europe_NTC
/
OBJ_cost
MKT_lp
RES_gmax
RES_WINDSHED
DEF_LINEFLOW
DEF_NETINPUT
RES_pmax
RES_pmin
RES_HVDC
DEF_slack
/;
*Europe_NTC.optfile = 1;
SET countrylines(l);
countrylines(l)=YES$lineup(l,’Countrylines’);
DISPLAY countrylines;
PARAMETER P_max2;
P_max2(l) = P_max(l);
P_max(l)$countrylines(l) = 1e6;
*Europe_NTC.optfile = 1;
SOLVE Europe_NTC min COST use lp;
p_ntc(n,sc) = MKT_lp_ntc.m(n,sc);
G.fx(p,sc) = G.l(p,sc);
PARAMETER price_ntc(co);
price_ntc(co) = SUM(sc, weight(sc) * SUM(n$mapnc(n,co), p_ntc(n,sc))/SUM(n, 1$mapnc(n,co)));
display price_ntc;
*−−−−−− Re−dispatch due to national restricitions
MODEL Europe_Nat_Redispatch
/
OBJ_redispatch
MKT_lp
RES_gmax
RES_gmin
DEF_LINEFLOW
DEF_NETINPUT
RES_pmax
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RES_pmin
RES_HVDC
DEF_slack
RES_WINDSHED
RES_National_Redispatch
/;
LOADSHED.up(n,sc) = INF;
WINDSHED.up(n,sc) = INF;
LINESCALE.up(l,sc) = 0.0*P_max(l);
SOLVE Europe_Nat_Redispatch min RE_COST use lp;
D.2. GAMS Code for Chapter 4
D.2.1. Uniform Pricing Regime (Section 4.2.1)
$ontext
Model for congestion management analysis in Germany
$offtext
$include dataload_scenario_22092011
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Optimal Dispatch Calculation
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* PARAMETERS (additional)
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Parameters
p_ntc price of ntc optimization
n1 n−1 matrix
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* VARIABLES
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Variable
COST objective value: total cost
RE_COST objective value: total redispatch cost
LINEFLOW line flow
NETINPUT net injection
DELTA voltage angle
;
Positive Variable
G conventional generation
G_UP additional re−dispatch generation
G_DOWN reduced re−dispatch generation
LOADSHED
WINDSHED
TRANSFER
;
Binary Variable
ONLINE line status variable
;
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* EQUATIONS
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Equations
* Objective functions
OBJ_cost objective function: total generation cost
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OBJ_redispatch objective function: total redispatch cost
* Market clearing equations
MKT_lp market clearing equation wo network losses (linear)
MKT_lp_ntc NTC market clearing equation wo network losses (linear)
* Thermal generation restrictions
RES_gmax maximum generation restriction
RES_gmin minimum generation restriction
* Network defintions and restrictions
RES_ntc ntc restriction
DEF_LINEFLOW_up lineflow upper definition
DEF_LINEFLOW_lo lineflow lower definition
DEF_NETINPUT netinput definition
RES_pmax maximum transmission restriction
RES_pmin minimum transmission restriction
DEF_slack slack bus definition
* Other Restrictions
RES_WINDSHED maximum amount of windshedding
;
* Objective functions
OBJ_cost..
COST =E=
SUM(sc,
* weight(sc) * (
SUM(p, c(p) * G(p,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, LOADSHED(n,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, WINDSHED(n,sc))
* )
)
;
OBJ_redispatch..
RE_COST =E=
SUM(sc,
* weight(sc) * (
SUM(p, c(p) * G_UP(p,sc)
+ (− c(p)) * G_DOWN(p,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, LOADSHED(n,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, WINDSHED(n,sc))
* )
)
;
* Market clearing equations
MKT_lp(n,sc)..
0 =E= q(n,sc) + NETINPUT(n,sc)
− SUM(p$mappn(p,n), G(p,sc) + G_UP(p,sc) − G_DOWN(p,sc))
− g_wind(n,sc)
− g_solar(n,sc)
− LOADSHED(n,sc) + WINDSHED(n,sc)
;
MKT_lp_ntc(n,sc)..
0 =E= q(n,sc)
− SUM(p$mappn(p,n), G(p,sc))
− g_wind(n,sc) − g_solar(n,sc)
+ SUM(nn$b(n,nn), TRANSFER(n,nn,sc))
− SUM(nn$b(n,nn), TRANSFER(nn,n,sc))
− LOADSHED(n,sc) + WINDSHED(n,sc)
;
* Thermal generation restrictions
RES_gmax(p,sc)..
G(p,sc) + G_UP(p,sc) − G_DOWN(p,sc) =L= g_max(p)
;
RES_gmin(p,sc)..
G(p,sc) + G_UP(p,sc) − G_DOWN(p,sc) =g= 0
;
Appendix 183
* Network defintions and restrictions
RES_ntc(co,cco,sc)..
SUM(n$mapnc(n,co), SUM(nn$mapnc(nn,cco), TRANSFER(n,nn,sc)))
=L= ntc(co,cco)
;
DEF_LINEFLOW_up(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) =l= SUM(n$h(l,n), h(l,n) * DELTA(n,sc))
+ (1 − ONLINE(l,sc)) * 10000
;
DEF_LINEFLOW_lo(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) =g= SUM(n$h(l,n), h(l,n) * DELTA(n,sc))
− (1 − ONLINE(l,sc)) * 10000
;
DEF_NETINPUT(n,sc)..
NETINPUT(n,sc) =E= SUM(l, Incidence(l,n) * LINEFLOW(l,sc)) * MVABase
;
RES_pmax(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) * MVABase =L= P_max(l) * ONLINE(l,sc)
;
RES_pmin(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) * MVABase =G= − P_max(l) * ONLINE(l,sc)
;
DEF_slack(n,sc)..
DELTA(n,sc) * slack(n) =E= 0
;
* Other Restrictions
RES_WINDSHED(n,sc)..
WINDSHED(n,sc) =L= g_wind(n,sc)
;
G_UP.fx(p,sc) = 0;
G_DOWN.fx(p,sc) = 0;
LOADSHED.up(n,sc) = q(n,sc);
model OPF_Germany_NTC
/
OBJ_cost
MKT_lp_ntc
RES_gmax
RES_ntc
RES_WINDSHED
/;
solve OPF_Germany_NTC min COST use lp;
p_ntc(n,sc) = MKT_lp_ntc.m(n,sc);
G.fx(p,sc) = G.l(p,sc);
model OPF_Germany_Redispatch
/
OBJ_redispatch
MKT_lp
RES_gmax
RES_gmin
DEF_LINEFLOW_up
DEF_LINEFLOW_lo
DEF_NETINPUT
RES_pmax
RES_pmin
DEF_slack
RES_WINDSHED
/;
*−−−−−− Re−dispatch due to international restrictions
set countrylines(l);
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loop((l,n,nn),
if(Incidence(l,n) eq 1 and Incidence(l,nn) eq −1,
countrylines(l) = YES$(mapnc(n,’DE’) and mapnc(nn,’DE’));
);
);
display countrylines;
parameter P_max2;
P_max2(l) = P_max(l);
P_max(l)$countrylines(l) = 1e6;
G_UP.up(p,sc) = g_max(p) − G.l(p,sc);
G_DOWN.up(p,sc) = G.l(p,sc);
G_UP.lo(p,sc) = 0;
G_DOWN.lo(p,sc) = 0;
ONLINE.fx(l,sc) = 1;
solve OPF_Germany_Redispatch min RE_COST use rmip;
*−−−−−− Re−dispatch due to national restricitions
P_max(l) = P_max2(l);
parameter g_up_int, g_down_int, g_int;
g_up_int(p,sc) = G_UP.l(p,sc);
g_down_int(p,sc) = G_DOWN.l(p,sc);
g_int(p,sc) = G.l(p,sc);
G.fx(p,sc) = G.l(p,sc) + G_UP.l(p,sc) − G_DOWN.l(p,sc);
G_UP.fx(p,sc) = 0;
G_DOWN.fx(p,sc) = 0;
G_UP.up(p,sc)$SUM(n$mappn(p,n), mapnc(n,"DE")) = g_max(p) − (G.l(p,sc))$((g_max(p) − G.l(p,sc)) ge
0);
G_DOWN.up(p,sc)$SUM(n$mappn(p,n), mapnc(n,"DE")) = G.l(p,sc);
G_UP.lo(p,sc)$SUM(n$mappn(p,n), mapnc(n,"DE")) = 0;
G_DOWN.lo(p,sc)$SUM(n$mappn(p,n), mapnc(n,"DE")) = 0;
ONLINE.fx(l,sc) = 1;
ONLINE.lo(l,sc)$(SUM(n$mapnc(n,"DE"), abs(incidence(l,n))) eq 2) = 0;
solve OPF_Germany_Redispatch min RE_COST use rmip;
D.2.2. Nodal Pricing Regime (Section 4.2.2)
$ontext
Model for congestion management analysis in Germany
$offtext
$include dataload_scenario_22092011
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
* Optimal Dispatch Calculation
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−*
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* VARIABLES
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Variable
COST objective value: total cost
LINEFLOW line flow
NETINPUT net injection
DELTA voltage angle
;
Positive Variable
G conventional generation
LOADSHED
WINDSHED
;
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*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
* EQUATIONS
*−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Equations
* Objective functions
OBJ_cost objective function: total generation cost
* Market clearing equations
MKT_lp market clearing equation wo network losses (linear)
* Thermal generation restrictions
RES_gmax maximum generation restriction
* Network defintions and restrictions
DEF_LINEFLOW lineflow definition
DEF_NETINPUT netinput definition
RES_pmax maximum transmission restriction
RES_pmin minimum transmission restriction
DEF_slack slack bus definition
* Other Restrictions
RES_WINDSHED maximum amount of windshedding
;
* Objective functions
OBJ_cost..
COST =E= SUM(sc,
* weight(sc) * (
SUM(p, c(p) * G(p,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, LOADSHED(n,sc))
+ 500 * SUM(n, WINDSHED(n,sc))
* )
)
;
* Market clearing equations
MKT_lp(n,sc)..
0 =E= q(n,sc) + NETINPUT(n,sc)
− SUM(p$mappn(p,n), G(p,sc))
− g_wind(n,sc)
− g_solar(n,sc)
− LOADSHED(n,sc) + WINDSHED(n,sc)
;
* Thermal generation restrictions
RES_gmax(p,sc)..
G(p,sc) =L= g_max(p)
;
* Network defintions and restrictions
DEF_LINEFLOW(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) =E= SUM(n$h(l,n), h(l,n) * DELTA(n,sc))
;
DEF_NETINPUT(n,sc)..
NETINPUT(n,sc) =E= SUM(nn, b(n,nn) * DELTA(nn,sc)) * MVABase
;
RES_pmax(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) * MVABase =L= P_max(l)
;
RES_pmin(l,sc)..
LINEFLOW(l,sc) * MVABase =G= − P_max(l)
;
DEF_slack(n,sc)..
DELTA(n,sc) * slack(n) =E= 0
;
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* Other Restrictions
RES_WINDSHED(n,sc)..
WINDSHED(n,sc) =L= g_wind(n,sc)
;
model OPF_Germany /all/;
solve OPF_Germany min COST use lp;
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on selected aspects of network congestion arising in liberalized 
electricity markets and their management methods with a special weight placed on the 
integration of increased renewable generation in Europe and Germany. In a first step, the 
theoretical concepts of congestion management are introduced complemented by a 
review of current management regimes in selected countries. In the second step, the 
European approach of managing congestion on international as well as national 
transmission links is analyzed and the benefits of an integrated congestion management 
regime are quantified. It is concluded that benefits can be achieved by a closer 
cooperation of national transmission system operators (TSOs). Thirdly, the German 
congestion management regime is investigated and the impact of higher renewable 
generation up to 2020 on congestion management cost is determined. It is shown that a 
homogeneous and jointly development of generation and transmission infrastructure is a 
prerequisite for the application of congestion alleviation methods and once they diverge 
congestion management cost tend to increase substantially. Lastly, the impact of 
intermittent and uncertain wind generation on electricity markets is analyzed. A stochastic 
electricity market model is described, which replicates the daily subsequent clearing of 
reserve, dayahead, and intraday market typical for European countries, and numerical 
results are presented. 
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